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Abstract
The modern relationship between the Vatican and the state of Israel is rooted in a
much deeper history of relations between Judaism and Christianity. In the main, this
relationship was fraught with tensions and animosity, as early Christian writers chastised
and demonized Judaism, ensconcing a hostility that endured for centuries. The advent of
political Zionism in the nineteenth century renewed Roman Catholic fears of a Jewishdominated Palestine, where religious sites sacred to Catholics would fall under the
political jurisdiction of a Zionist state. In 1904, Pope Pius X granted an audience to the
prominent Zionist Theodor Herzl, in which he reminded his guest that the Roman
Catholic Church could never endorse or support the creation of a Jewish home in
Palestine. This was to remain the essence of papal policy on Palestine for decades to
come.
This study examines the relationship between the Vatican and Zionism from the
Balfour Declaration (1917) to the creation of Israel in 1948, as well as Vatican attempts
to constrain the nascent state in the years after its birth. More specifically, it considers the
transnational nature of Roman Catholic responses to Zionism and the creation of Israel.
The Vatican was supported in its anti-Zionist stance by an international network of
national Catholic hierarchies, lay Catholic organizations and an active Catholic press.
Leading this international Roman Catholic lobby against Zionism were the Catholic
bishops of the United States. From the 1920s through the 1950s, American Catholic
leaders had become crucial intermediaries in the relationship between Washington and
the Vatican. Speaking as both loyal American citizens and as devout Roman Catholics,
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the bishops were uniquely positioned to transmit the Vatican‟s policy objectives to the
American government. The American bishops were also instrumental in advocating
Vatican positions on Zionism at the United Nations, evidence of the importance of the
American Catholic Church, and its various organs, in disseminating the positions of the
Vatican to the international community.
Through an examination of a comprehensive range of primary materials, this
study demonstrates that an understanding of the Vatican‟s relationship with Zionism and
the nascent Israeli state must take into account the transnational Roman Catholic
consensus on the future of Palestine, an advocacy led by American Catholics, who
represented the leading edge of Vatican attempts to shape the future of Palestine.

Keywords
Christianity, Cold War, Israel, international relations, Judaism, Palestine, Roman Catholic
Church, transnational history, United Nations, Zionism
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Introduction
On the morning of 30 December 1993, in the Vatican‟s Sala Regia, a
„Fundamental Agreement‟ was signed by Mgr. Claudio Celli, Vatican Assistant Secretary
of State, and Yossi Beilin, Israel‟s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, which paved the
way toward full diplomatic relations between the two parties.1 Though this agreement
between the Vatican and Israel was, on one level, a political document undertaken by two
sovereign subjects of international law for the purpose of exchanging ambassadors, it was
also emblematic of a more significant rapprochement. The tensions that characterized the
relationship between the Vatican and the state of Israel, particularly in the decade after
1948, had their roots much deeper in the historical relationship between Roman
Catholicism and Judaism. The Roman Catholic Church, in the main, had historically
viewed Judaism as a fallacious and pariah faith, and the Jews a group destined to wander
the earth for their complicity in the death of the Christian saviour, Jesus Christ. The
„historical‟ proof of this theology, according to numerous early Christian theologians,
was evidenced by the first century destruction of Judaea at the hand of the Romans: the
overthrow of the Jewish king, the fall of Jerusalem, the destruction of the Temple, and the
dispersal of the Jewish people.

1

While the original agreement settled the property rights of the Roman Catholic Church in Israel, the
issue of Jerusalem was not raised in the document, despite the fact that the Vatican, down to 1993,
continued to hold the official position that the city should be internationalized. As a result of these
negotiations, the Vatican named Andrea Cordero Lanza di Montezomolo its first apostolic nuncio to Israel
in 1994. For a fuller analysis of the accords, see Marshall J. Breger, ed. The Vatican-Israel Accords:
Political, Legal and Theological Contexts (Notre Dame, 2004).
1

Down to the twentieth century, papal aversions to the return of the Jews to
Palestine continued to be shaped by this fundamental conviction. This theological view,
of course, also shaped the Vatican‟s opposition to political Zionism, particularly as this
movement gained momentum from the late nineteenth century onward. The idea that the
Jews might return to Palestine to establish sovereign control there and that the most
sacred Holy Sites of Christianity, directly related to the life and death of Christ, might fall
under their jurisdiction, was unthinkable to the popes of the nineteenth and early
twentieth century. Theodor Herzl, the founder of modern Zionism, discovered this in
1904 when he was received by Pope Pius X in Rome. “The soil of Jerusalem,” the pope
informed his guest, “is sacred to the life of Jesus Christ. As head of the Church, I cannot
say otherwise. The Jews did not recognize Our Lord and thus we cannot recognize the
Jewish people.”2 In essence, the statement made clear that the Church, for reasons both
historical and theological, could not endorse the creation of a Hebrew home in Palestine.
As the Zionist movement gained momentum in the early decades of the twentieth
century, and particularly after the Balfour Declaration of 1917, Vatican opposition Jewish
territorial sovereignty in the Holy Land (Terra Santa) grew more entrenched. In the
decisive years after 1945, a period which witnessed the birth of the Israeli state, Vatican
anti-Zionist policies were put to the test, first in attempts to block the partition of
Palestine at the UN, and next to secure Jerusalem and its environs as an international,
sovereign corpus separatum, independent of either Israeli or Jordanian control.3

2

See Uri Bialer, The Cross on the Star of David: The Christian World in Israel’s Foreign Policy, 1948-1967
(Bloomington, 2005): 2.
3

A corpus separatum (Latin for ‘separated body’) was the phrase used to describe Jerusalem’s theoretical
extraterritoriality during the debates on the partition of Palestine at the UN. The 1947 UN Partition Plan,
2

In recent decades, a small but very good body of scholarship has emerged that
examines the Vatican‟s response to the rise of political Zionism and to the creation of the
state of Israel, as well as papal relations with the nascent state in its formative years.
Sergio Minerbi‟s The Vatican and Zionism: Conflict in the Holy Land, 1895-1925 (1990)
provides a comprehensive analysis of the historical roots of the Vatican‟s position on
political Zionism in the early years of that movement.4 Minerbi traces the Vatican‟s
anxiety towards the potential of Jewish sovereignty over the Holy Sites of Palestine, as
well as the active, and often frenetic, diplomacy of papal nuncios in opposing the Balfour
Declaration of 1917 (in which Britain pledged to support the creation of a Jewish state in
Palestine). The failure of the Vatican to secure even the most modest of its demands, as
Minerbi skilfully delineates, was but a prelude to setbacks later in the century. Livia
Rokach‟s The Catholic Church and the Question of Palestine (1987) provides a
competent overview of Vatican reactions to developments in the territory from the
Balfour Declaration to the Six Day War (1967).5 More comprehensive is Andrej Kreutz‟s
Vatican Policy on the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict (1990), which explores the evolution of
papal policy on the Palestine question, but which also examines the Vatican‟s relationship
with the Palestinian national movement through the twentieth century.6 George Irani‟s
The Papacy and the Middle East: The Role of the Holy See in the Arab-Israeli Conflict,

in fact, proposed a corpus separatum for Jerusalem and its surrounding territory, which encompassed the
towns of Bethlehem, Ein Karem and Abu Dis.
4

See Sergio Minerbi, The Vatican and Zionism: Conflict in the Holy Land, 1895-1925 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1990)
5

See Livia Rokach, The Catholic Church and the Question of Palestine (London: Saqi Books, 1987)

6

See Andrej Kreutz, Vatican Policy on the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990)
3

1962-1984 (1986) complements Kreutz‟s analysis, with a particular focus on papal policy
in the region after the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965).7 A number of articles by
Silvio Ferrari have more specifically examined the Vatican‟s quest to secure access to the
Holy Sites of Palestine in the postwar years, as well as delineating failed papal attempts
to secure an internationalized Jerusalem in the same period.8 More recently, Uri Bialer‟s
Cross on the Star of David: The Christian World in Israel’s Foreign Policy, 1948-1967
(2005) examines Israeli perspectives on the relationship with the Vatican in the post-1948
period, revealing the extent to which Tel Aviv considered the Vatican a genuine threat to
the interests of the nascent state.
While this study builds upon these works, it ranges beyond the existing
historiography by examining two important aspects of the Vatican‟s relationship with
Zionism and the state of Israel. The first half of the study examines the fundamentally
transnational nature of Roman Catholic attitudes towards political Zionism, with a
particular focus on Catholics in the United States. The second half of the study examines
the Vatican‟s political efforts to constrain Zionist ambitions in the post-1945 decade, with
a focus on the political advocacy of American Catholics on behalf of the papal secretariat.
I contend that the transnational consensus that existed among Roman Catholics on the
question of Zionism, combined with the growing power and influence of the Catholic
Church in the United States, gave American Catholic leaders a unique ability to transmit

7

See George Irani, The Papacy and the Middle East: The Role of the Holy See in the Arab-Israeli Conflict,
1962-1984 (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986)
8

See Silvio Ferrari’s “The Holy See and the postwar Palestine issue: the Internationalization of Jerusalem
and the protection of the Holy Places.” International Affairs (Summer 1984):261-283; “The Vatican, Israel
and the Jerusalem Question, 1943-1984.” The Middle East Journal 39, 2 (Spring 1985): 316-331.

4

the Vatican‟s Palestine policy both to the UN and to the most powerful capital in the
world. As such, American Catholics became the leading advocates of papal policy on a
number of postwar questions, including Palestine.
In this sense, my focus here is the fundamentally transnational character of
Vatican diplomacy on the question of Zionism and in its relations with Israel. In recent
decades, a growing body of scholarship has examined diplomatic and international
relations through a transnational lens.9 As defined and practised by scholars such as Akira
Iriye, Ian Tyrell, David Thelan and Patricia Clavin, transnational history concerns the
movement of people, ideas, technologies and institutions across national boundaries. In
the field of international relations, transnational history seeks to range beyond the
examination of relations between sovereign governments and their diplomats to consider
the influence of a range of non-governmental actors who influence global affairs,
including international cultural, religious and ideological organizations and bodies,
diaspora communities, multinational corporations and the international media.

9

Transnational perspectives have been employed by historians in various forms throughout the twentieth
century. Annales historian Fernand Braudel’s The Mediterranean in the Age of Phillip II (1949), could be
considered a forerunner of the transnational genre, as he explores geographic, economic and
demographic influences while political influences, and specifically the role of European rulers, were
considered the ephemera of history. Political scientists Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane edited a
collection of essays on transnational politics, Transnational Relations and World Politics (1970), which
further defined the field and which included an essay by sociologist Ivan Vallier on the Roman Catholic
Church as a transnational actor. More recently, a collection edited by Akira Iriye and Thomas Bender,
Rethinking American History in a Global Age (2002), presented the perspectives of a number of leading
scholars in the field of transnational history, specifically addressing the challenge of writing national
histories in an increasingly globalized and interconnected age. On further attempts to define the field, see
David Thelan, ‘The Nation and Beyond: Transnational Perspectives on United States History’, Journal of
American History, 86, 3 (1999); Patricia Clavin, ‘Defining Transnationalism’, Contemporary European
History, 14, 4, (Nov., 2005): 421-439.
5

The definition offered in 1972 by political scientists Robert Keohane and Joseph
Nye, that transnationalism describes “contacts, coalitions and interactions across state
boundaries that were not directly controlled by the central policy organs of government”
appeared to outline the essence of the concept.10 For historians employing a transnational
perspective, however, arriving at a unitary definition has proven somewhat more elusive,
particularly as the body of scholarship in the area of transnational history has expanded in
the last decade. Thelan has characterized transnational encounters as “border crossings”,
examining how particular values, ideologies and cultures passed through and over
national boundaries, often with ethnic and political diaspora communities, in the process
transforming nation-states and rendering political boundaries increasingly less
important.11 More recently, Clavin has challenged more traditional definitions by
contending that rather than view transnational communities as fixed or bound networks, it
is more accurate to view them as more malleable structures where individuals, groups and
ideologies wither away to be replaced by new groups and ideas.12 The very survival of
these networks, posits Clavin, was dependant on their flexibility and malleability. While
Clavin‟s definition can be accurately applied to the historical development of a number of
twentieth century transnational communities, it is less applicable to Roman Catholic
transnationalism in the decades before the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965), when
orthodoxy and ideological consensus, as opposed to malleability, characterized the
international Church. In this sense, the form of transnationalism I examine in this study is

10

Keohane, Robert and Joseph Nye, eds. Transnational Relations and World Politics, xi.

11

See Thelan, ‘The Nation and Beyond’, 968.

12

See Clavin, ‘Defining Transnationalism’, 438-439.
6

more akin to the traditional definitions offered by Keohane, Nye and Thelan, among
others.
The Roman Catholic Church, as an international religious organization which
maintains an extensive network of national hierarchies and which oversees nearly three
thousand territorial dioceses around the world, represents the quintessence of a
transnational actor in global affairs. Much of the existing historiography on Vatican
diplomacy, however, including work on the relationship between the Vatican and Israel,
has centred on traditional channels of diplomatic exchange; namely popes, nuncios and
apostolic delegates (papal diplomats), ministers and heads of state.13 This focus has
proven fruitful in examining the Vatican‟s formal relations with nation-states, particularly
in the area of concordat (treaty) negotiations, whereby the Church has sought specific
guarantees and rights for Roman Catholics in a given state or territory. Papal nuncios also
played a crucial role in transmitting papal policies and demands to national governments,
as the history of Vatican relations with Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Communist
Poland so vividly illustrates.
A strict focus on high diplomacy, however, does not adequately explain the
Vatican‟s postwar relationship to Zionism and the Israeli state. In the United States,
which was home to the most powerful national branch of the international Roman
Catholic Church, the apostolic delegate in Washington did not often communicate papal

13

Robert A. Graham, S.J.’s Vatican Diplomacy: A Study of Church and State on the International Plane
(1959) remains a forceful examination of the structure and method of the Vatican’s diplomatic activities.
More recently, essays in Peter C. Kent and John Pollard’s Papal Diplomacy in the Modern Age (Westport,
1994) have explored papal diplomacy in a range of twentieth century contexts. For a perspective on
modern papal diplomacy, see Thomas J. Reese’s Inside the Vatican: The Politics and Organization of the
Catholic Church (Cambridge, 2003).
7

demands on Palestine directly to the American government. These policies, instead, were
commuted to the American bishops through their national council, the National Catholic
Welfare Council (NCWC) in Washington D.C. The bishops, in turn, coordinated a
pervasive campaign designed to steer American and United Nations (UN) policy on Israel
toward lines amenable to the Vatican and the international Roman Catholic Church. This
campaign extended beyond the bishops themselves, and encompassed lay Catholic
organizations, sub-committees of the NCWC, and papal associations under the
jurisdiction of American Catholic leaders. The American Catholic press was also
deployed in the battle for public opinion, as both the Vatican and the American bishops
were cognizant of the potential clout of the „Catholic vote‟ in Washington‟s policy
considerations. American Catholic activism, moreover, came at the head of an
international Roman Catholic lobby on Palestine, hence the importance of considering the
transnational dimension of the Vatican‟s relationship to Zionism and the nascent Israeli
state.
In recent decades, a small body of scholarship has explored the transnational
character of Vatican diplomacy. Sociologist Ivan Vallier‟s 1972 essay „The Roman
Catholic Church: A Transnational Actor‟ delineated the multi-faceted organization of the
international Church, which pursued its objectives not only through the Vatican
secretariat and its network of papal diplomats, but also through a global network of
religious and lay Catholic organizations.14 Vallier‟s focus, however, remained
contemporary, and did not explore the historical dimensions of Vatican transnationalism.

14

See Ivan Vallier, ‘The Roman Catholic Church: A Transnational Actor’ in Robert Keohane and Joseph
Nye’s Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge, 1972): 129- 152.
8

More recent scholarship by Lisa L. Ferrari and Jeffrey Haynes has similarly considered
the contemporary aspects of Vatican transnationalism, examining papal attempts to shape
questions on social justice, bioethics and migration through its international network of
national hierarchies, religious and lay organizations.15 My own research seeks to examine
this transnational aspect of papal diplomacy as it applied to the historical relationship
between the Vatican and Zionism, positing that Roman Catholic transnationalism was a
more potent a force in the first half of the twentieth century than it was in the decades
after the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965).
This study is indebted to the work of Peter D‟Agostino, whose Rome in America:
Transnational Catholic Ideology from the Risorgimento to Fascism (2005) explored the
transnational nature of Catholic ideology from the middle of the nineteenth century to the
interwar decades.16 D‟Agostino posits that Catholics in the United States “forged an
imagined community with myths, shared symbols and a calendar of prescribed rituals,”
with the Holy See in Rome comprising the spiritual and physical centre of this
community.17 He reveals how American Catholics demonstrated solidarity with the popes
through public rituals and political agitation that distinguished Catholics from their nonCatholic neighbours. D‟Agostino traces this American Catholic exceptionalism through
reaction to the Roman Question and the rise of Mussolini‟s Fascist regime. Throughout

15

See Lisa L. Ferrari’s ‘The Vatican as a Transnational Actor’ in Paul Christopher Manuel, Lawrence
Reardon and Clyde Wilcox, eds. The Catholic Church and the Nation State: Comparative Perspectives
(Washington, 2006): 33-50; Jeffrey Haynes, Religion, Politics and International Relations (New York, 2011):
173-211.
16

Peter D’Agostino, Rome in America: Transnational Catholic Ideology from the Risorgimento to Fascism
(Chapel Hill, 2005).
17

Ibid, 7.
9

the nineteenth century, American Catholics rose to the defence of papal demands for
territorial sovereignty (the Roman Question), a position which placed them at odds with
Protestant, Jewish and liberal Americans, the latter whom regarded the emergence of a
unified, democratic and anti-clerical Italy as the liberal and progressive realization of
millennial hopes.
Similar patterns emerged with American Catholic sympathy and support for
Mussolini and Fascist Italy. As D‟Agostino outlines, American Catholics (particularly
Italian Americans) followed the lead of papal Rome in participating in rituals legitimizing
Mussolini‟s regime, as the Italian embassy in Washington forged strong relations with the
bishops and Catholic laity. American Catholic sympathy for Fascist Italy was
demonstrated, on a political plane, by demands that Washington repeal its embargo on
Rome during the Italo-Ethiopian War of 1935-1936, as outlined in chapter one of this
study. The absence of an anti-Fascist movement among American Catholics, moreover,
underscored a solidarity with papal Rome (which had come to endorse Mussolini‟s
regime after 1929), and again generated frictions between Catholics and their nonCatholic fellow citizens.
American Catholic attitudes towards Zionism through the first half of the
twentieth century dovetail neatly with the patterns revealed by D‟Agostino. I contend, in
fact, that the Vatican‟s diplomatic efforts to shape the Palestine question in the first
decade of the Cold War must be understood in the context of this shared transnational
opposition to Zionism. As chapter one outlines, such a consensus did exist between Rome
and the American bishops from the time of the Balfour Declaration onward. This was
despite frictions between Rome and the American bishops earlier in the century, when
10

papal fears of doctrinal and theological autonomy in the American Church led to a
crackdown.18 The Catholic consensus on Zionism, in fact, grew stronger in the interwar
decades, as the Zionist lobby itself grew more powerful and strident. This transnational
Catholic reticence to Zionism also proved remarkably resilient. Even the Holocaust,
which would create significant pockets of sympathy for Zionism in the United States, did
not fundamentally alter the Vatican nor American Catholic opposition to the creation of a
Jewish state in Palestine. While American Catholics expressed sympathy with the plight
of European Jews, often in language more explicit than that of Pope Pius XII, they
stopped firmly short of endorsing the Zionist program. When a Catholic leader did
express sympathy with Zionism, as the case of New Orleans‟ Archbishop Joseph
Rummel illustrates in chapter two, the Vatican moved quickly to suppress it, evidence of
the unanimity Rome would demand on the question.
In the postwar period, this transnational consensus melded into political action,
with American Catholics at the forefront of efforts to shape developments on postwar
Palestine. A number of factors had made the American bishops leading voices in the
international Church. Through the interwar decades and during the war, leading
archbishops such as Detroit‟s Edward Mooney, New York‟s Francis Spellman and
Chicago‟s George Mundelein had cultivated close ties with President Franklin Roosevelt
and the Democratic Party. Institutionally, the Catholic Church in the United States had

18

The Americanist controversy, at its core, was a characterized by a belief in papal circles that a number
of American bishops endorsed a separation of church and state (where the Vatican favoured a closer
cooperation akin to European models of church-state relations). The Vatican feared that the American
episcopate, functioning in a pluralistic and rapidly industrializing society, would adopt a relativistic
approach to Church doctrine and theology. Pope Leo XIII’s 1899 encyclical, Testem benevolentiae, was
specifically issued to suppress the Americanist heresy.
11

expanded steadily after the First World War, bolstered by waves of Catholic immigration
from Europe and high birth rates. This growth boosted the financial might of the
American Church. As John F. Pollard‟s recent study of Vatican finances reveals, New
York, Boston and Chicago, in that order, were the three wealthiest archdioceses in the
world by 1939.19 The Vatican, increasingly isolated in Europe and anxious to tap into the
resources of the American Church, grew progressively closer to the American episcopate
in the interwar years. This was firstly through the creation of associations such as the
Catholic Near East Welfare Association (CNEWA), which was placed entirely in the
hands of the American bishops, and which would play an important role in postwar
Roman Catholic efforts in on Palestine. The Vatican also placed American prelates in
ever higher positions of authority in the papal secretariat, another sign of the interwar
„turn‟ towards the American Catholic Church. President Roosevelt‟s creation of a
„personal representative‟ to the Holy See in 1939, moreover, appeared to signal ever
closer relations between the papacy and the United States.
As the postwar era dawned, it appeared that Washington, the Vatican and the
American Catholic bishops did comprise an informal, yet ideologically cohesive strategic
alliance that was primarily committed to the containment and rollback of Soviet
communism. On the question of Palestine, however, a distinctive American Catholic
lobby emerged which clearly diverged from Washington‟s policy on the territory. On this
issue, the American bishops clearly took their ideological and political lead from Rome.
The transnational consensus that D‟Agostino revealed on the Roman Question and
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Mussolini‟s Italy had survived the war intact, manifesting itself forcefully on the question
of Palestine. And as in previous cases, American Catholic positions on Zionism placed
them at odds with Protestants, Jews and liberals, a majority of whom had come to support
the creation of a Jewish home in the territory. The Vatican had high hopes that the
American bishops, given their ties in Washington, increasing financial might, and
growing public profile, and given their role as lynch-pins in the Vatican-American
relationship, might be uniquely endowed to transmit the Vatican‟s postwar designs both
in Washington and at the UN. Roman Catholic political pressure, both from Rome and
the various organs of the American Church, however, were ultimately unable to alter the
policy direction of Washington on the Palestine question. Throughout the postwar years,
President Harry Truman and American policymakers remained committed to a cautious
and seemingly malleable line designed to appease both opponents and proponents of the
internationalization of Jerusalem, while remaining a steadfast ally of the nascent Israeli
state. Chapters three, four and five of this study trace the rise, and ultimate demise, of this
American Catholic lobby on Palestine.
As this study is centred on the institutional responses of the American Catholic
Church to the rise of political Zionism and the creation of the state of Israel, it has drawn
heavily on a number of important archival collections in the United States. The papers of
the NCWC, housed at the Catholic University of America in Washington, D.C., were
indispensable to this work. The NCWC was the American bishops conference, and as
such, it was the administrative nerve-centre of the political activities of the American
episcopate. The communications of the Holy See to the American bishops, moreover, was
most usually channelled through the secretary general of the NCWC, making these papers
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essential to delineating the relationship between the Vatican secretariat and American
Catholic leaders. This collection also contains the papers of the Office of UN Affairs, an
NCWC mandated NGO which advocated the positions of the Vatican at the UN from
1946 onward. The papers of Catherine Schaefer, who directed the UN Office from 1946
to 1972, and who worked tirelessly to promote the Roman Catholic position on Palestine
at the world body, are also found in this collection. The papers of Schaefer‟s assistant,
Alba Zizzamia, who spearheaded a number of important initiatives on the Palestine
question in her own right, have also been examined.
Also in Washington are the National Archives and Record Administration
(NARA) collections and the archives of Georgetown University (Georgetown Special
Collections), both of which have been consulted for this study. NARA holds the papers of
Myron C. Taylor, who served as „special representative‟ to Pope Pius XII for both
President Franklin Roosevelt and President Harry Truman from 1939 to 1951. Taylor‟s
papers are vital to illuminating the relationship between the Vatican and Washington
from the beginning of the Second World War through the early Cold War, as well as
being an important window on the mind of the Vatican secretariat, particularly as it
related to Palestine. The Taylor papers also contained the extensive correspondence of
Truman with New York‟s Cardinal Spellman on the Palestine question, which is
examined in chapter four of this study. The „Palestine Notebook‟ of Dean Rusk and
Robert McClintock, also at NARA, provide valuable insight into the views of the
American delegation to the UN during the crucial period of 1946 to 1949. Georgetown‟s
Special Collections hold the papers of a number of figures germane to this study,
including Senator Robert F. Wagner, Edmund Walsh and Wilfred Parsons, as well as the
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papers of America, an American Jesuit magazine that exemplified the transnational
Roman Catholic consensus on Zionism.
Other archival collections have also been utilized. The papers of Archbishop
Edward Mooney, housed at the archives of the Archdiocese of Detroit, have revealed the
views of a leading American bishop of the era, who was raised to Cardinal by Pope Pius
XII in 1946, and who served as chairman of the NCWC from 1935 to 1945. Also in
Detroit are the archives of the Walter P. Reuther Library, at Wayne State University,
which hold the papers of Philip Slomowitz, influential editor of the Detroit Jewish News,
and an outspoken critic of Roman Catholic attacks on Zionism. In the late stages of
preparing this manuscript, I was also granted preliminary access to the papers of Mgr.
Thomas McMahon, which are housed at the archives of the Catholic Near East Welfare
Association (CNEWA) in New York. These papers, which were heretofore unavailable to
scholars, provide important details on the diplomatic efforts of McMahon who, as the
acting head of the CNEWA between 1944 and 1955, functioned as the de facto Vatican
envoy to Israel. McMahon‟s meetings and correspondences with a number of key figures,
including President Harry Truman, James McDonald (the first American ambassador to
Israel), David Ben-Gurion, Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett, various high-ranking
ministers in the Israeli government, prominent American Zionist leaders, and King
Abdullah of Jordan, among others, reveals his unique role as an unofficial yet crucial
intermediary in early Cold War Vatican-Israeli dialogue. McMahon‟s close working
relationship with New York‟s Cardinal Francis Spellman, the most powerful figure in
postwar American Catholicism (and whose papers remain closed to scholars), further
underscores the significance of these records. I have been afforded full access to
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McMahon‟s papers when they have been catalogued in their entirety by the summer of
2012.
Anyone studying the Cold War Vatican must contend with the fact that its papers
for the postwar period remain closed. In spite of this, a number of available sources
provide a window on the Vatican‟s Palestine policy during the period of this study. For
the war years, the eleven volume Actes et Documents du Saint Siège relatifs à la Seconde
Guerre Mondiale (ADSS), published between 1965 and 1981, provides a fairly
comprehensive picture of the Vatican‟s reaction to the Holocaust, as well as its inflexible
stance on the creation of a Jewish home in Palestine.20 The Myron C. Taylor papers also
reveal the Holy See‟s position on developments in Palestine. Supplementing these is
Ennio Di Nolfo‟s Vaticano e Stati Uniti, 1939-1952 (dalle carte di Myron C. Taylor)
(1978), a published collection, based on Taylor‟s papers, which includes numerous
references to the Palestine question.21 The NCWC papers, which contain ample
correspondence between the apostolic delegate (the Vatican‟s representative to the
American Catholic Church), and the American bishops, have also proven valuable.
In this study, I have also examined a wide cross-section of the American Catholic
press. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, the weekly newspapers of the various
archdioceses and dioceses (the diocesan press) were published under the editorial control
of the NCWC‟s Press Department and local bishops. As such, the editorial lines of these
papers could accurately be described as the official mind of the Church on a variety of
20
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social and political questions. The overwhelming consensus in the diocesan press on the
Palestine question only underscores this fact. I have also examined a number of largecirculation American Catholic journals which lay outside of the editorial control of the
NCWC, such as the Jesuit weekly America, the Paulist Catholic World and the lay
Commonweal, to illustrate that this consensus on Palestine extended beyond the diocesan
papers. Contrarian views were not selectively weeded out- virtually none were found.
I have also utilized the Catholic press because, from the beginning of the Second
World War, and particularly after 1945, the Vatican encouraged and often instructed
Catholic editors in the United States to disseminate the Roman Catholic position on
Palestine widely. This was particularly so after the American Catholic lobby was
countered by an active campaign in the American Jewish press which sought to diffuse
the criticisms of Zionist tactics in American diocesan newspapers. Concern about
negative reportage in the American Catholic press reached all the way to Tel Aviv, where
government officials, including David Ben-Gurion, urged moderation on Catholic editors,
and encouraged a vigorous response from Jewish papers. The Catholic press, as such,
became a key tool in the American Catholic lobby on Palestine, particularly as sympathy
for Zionism among non-Catholics burgeoned after 1945.
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Chapter 1
Origins: The Vatican, American Catholics and Zionism, 1897-1939

The Vatican‟s hostility to political Zionism in the 19th and 20th centuries, and its
disapproval of the creation of a Jewish national home in Palestine, is a policy which has
its roots deep in the history of relations between Christianity and Judaism.1 Its origins, in
fact, extend back to the life, and particularly the death, of Jesus. The charge that Jews had
been responsible for the murder of the Christian saviour spawned an entrenched
antagonism for Jews and for Judaism among early Christian theologians and Church
leaders. In short order, the deicidal Jews became the archetypal evildoers and outcasts in
Christian societies. References to deicide could be found in the gospels, but it was the
Church Fathers who ensconced notions of Judaism‟s inferiority and depravity in the early
Church. Christian writers such as Origen, Tertullian, Augustine and John Chrysostom,
among others, interpreted the New Testament in a manner which made antagonism to
Judaism appear as a part of the very mission of Christ. Portrayals of Jews as rapacious
hypocrites, children of hell and of the devil, haters of and rejected by God, and deicidal
were found throughout the early Christian scriptures. By the 6th century, such attitudes
had been absorbed by civil authorities and ensconced into legal codes. The Justinian
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Code (534), which for centuries would serve as a juridical guidepost in the West,
removed Jewish rights and classified them, with other non-Christians, as heretics. Later
laws, published “in the name of our Lord and God Jesus Christ,” punished Jewish
marriages as “abominable,” forbade circumcision of converts, and limited ways in which
Jews could worship.2
Roman Catholic resistance to the idea of a Jewish home in Palestine could also be
traced to the early Church, and was strongly linked to the notion of Judaism as a pariah
faith. That the Jews had lost their place as the „chosen‟, in the eyes of God, and had been
supplanted by Christianity was prophesied, according to these writers, by the fall of Israel
to the Romans. The destruction of the temple at Jerusalem in 70 CE, and the dispersal of
the Jewish peoples appeared to confirm this Christian triumph over Judaism. Tertullian
considered the Roman victory over the Jews, and the loss of their capital, as evidence of
God‟s abandonment of the Jews and their punishment in this life and the next. Ambrose,
the 4th century bishop of Milan, and his famous disciple, Augustine of Hippo, both
identified Jews with the fratricide Cain, who was condemned to wander the earth as
suffering examples to Christians who might be tempted to revolt against their faith. The
Christian identification of the Jews with Cain repudiated, in essence, the very notion of a
permanent Jewish home in Palestine, or anywhere. According to Christian teachings, the
Jews were no longer the divinely chosen witnesses to God‟s moral message, but a
rightfully suffering pariah group, condemned to eternal wandering for their mortal sin
against Christ.
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The emergence of this increasingly virulent Christian anti-Judaism, which denied
the right of Jewish settlement in the Holy Land, coincided with the growing presence of
Christian groups in Palestine itself. This began in earnest during the reign of Constantine
the Great (306-337), who had famously promulgated the Edict of Toleration which had
ended Christian persecution in the Roman Empire. Constantine‟s mother, Helena,
reputedly made a pilgrimage to Jerusalem, where she uncovered the remnants of the True
Cross and the tomb of Christ, discoveries which were intended to suggest Christianity‟s
ancestral and legitimate stake in the territory. Over the next several centuries, an
ambitious program of building, which included the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem
and the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem (the reputed site of Christ‟s
resurrection), appeared to cement the official presence, and primacy, of the Christian
Church in Palestine. The fall of Christian Palestine to Muslim invaders, beginning in the
7th century, only served to inspire the Crusades, which sought to expunge the „infidels‟
from the most sacred territory of the Christian faith. Though the Crusades were officially
launched to dislodge the Muslim caliphates from the Holy Land, European Jews were
frequently brutalized by departing Christian armies, still considered guilty of a much
more grievous injury to Christ, his crucifixion. It was against this theological and
historical backdrop that a Roman Catholic opposition to the very idea of a return of the
Jews to Palestine was forged, a view which persisted into the 20th century.
For centuries after the Crusades, the Holy Places continued to be the focus of
inter-faith disputes, given that Palestine was also home to sites sacred to Judaism and
Islam. Because the territory held such symbolic and historic importance to Christianity
and Islam, the rival monotheistic faiths of Europe and the Near East, Palestine was also a
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contested pawn in wider imperial struggles, as the history of the Crusades so vividly
illustrates. Disputes between Christian groups themselves over the administration and
control of holy sites were also prevalent. At sites such as the Church of the Holy
Sepulchre in Jerusalem and the Basilica of the Nativity in Bethlehem, Roman Catholic
and Greek Orthodox churchmen struggled bitterly for control, echoing larger imperial
struggles between the various Catholic empires of Western Europe, loyal to the popes,
and Byzantium, which historically had opposed papal supremacy.
Ottoman suzerainty over the region from the sixteenth century forward created
further challenges for Christian groups in Palestine. The Ottoman Sultans tended to
favour Orthodox Christians in Palestine, who were their own subjects, at the expense of
Latin (Roman Catholic) Christians, who were the subjects of European powers with
whom the Sultans were frequently at war. As a result of frequent tensions between Latin
and Orthodox Christians, and on occasion between Christians, Jews and Muslims, the
Ottoman Government decreed in 1757 a modus vivendi between the faiths, an agreement
that sought to prevent future disputes over jurisdiction by preserving the status quo, as it
existed in 1757, in perpetuity. The edict, which became known as the „Status Quo‟
agreement, applied to most of the sacred sites in Palestine, including Jerusalem‟s Wailing
Wall, Tomb of the Virgin and the Sanctuary of the Ascension, and Bethlehem‟s Basilica
of the Nativity and the Field of the Shepherds. The agreement, which was reaffirmed by
Istanbul in 1853, was also incorporated into the Treaty of Paris (1856), which ended the
Crimean War. Britain adopted the Status Quo into its Palestine Mandate in 1917, and as
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late as 1947, Orthodox Christian representatives at the United Nations (UN) appealed to
the juridical validity of the 200 year old edict.3
In the wake of the Status Quo agreement, the Holy See came to rely increasingly
on the French crown, which maintained sound relations with the Ottomans, to defend its
interests vis-a-vis the sultan, a position which France exploited to advance its own
political and diplomatic ambitions in the Near East. By the nineteenth century Russia,
which sporadically allied with the Ottomans, also accorded protection to the Greek
Orthodox churches in Palestine, ostensibly to protect the rights of Orthodox Christians
and their Holy Places.4 As Ottoman power declined throughout the century, the interest of
the European Great Powers in the region intensified, with the alleged objective of
protecting pilgrimage sites providing a flimsy cover for larger political, strategic and
economic ends.
The history of relations between the Holy See and what would become the State
of Israel originated in this 19th century competition of the European Great Powers for

3

United Nations representatives on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC) referred to the Status
Quo agreement between 1947 and 1949 in determining the validity of claims made by Orthodox
churchmen in Palestine. See ‘United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Committee on
Jerusalem- The Holy Places: Note on the History of the Status Quo, Working Paper Prepared by the
Secretariat’, 8 April 1949, National Catholic Welfare Conference (hereafter NCWC), Office of the General
Secretary (hereafter OGS), Archives of the Catholic University of America (hereafter ACUA), Box 44, File
22.
4

The best scholarly examination of the Holy See’s confrontation with pre-state political Zionism remains
Sergio Minerbi’s The Vatican and Zionism: Conflict in the Holy Land, 1895-1925 (New York, 1990). My brief
examination here is indebted to this work. Competition between France and Russia in the Near East,
under the auspicious guise of protecting the Christian ‘Holy Places’ of the Ottoman Empire, lay at the
heart of the dispute that would culminate in the Crimean War (1854-1856). Both Napoleon III and
Nicholas I, citing previous treaties, claimed jurisdiction as trustee and protector of Christian pilgrimage
sites. For a succinct treatment of the diplomatic intrigues leading to the war, see Norman Rich, Great
Power Diplomacy, 1814-1914 (Boston, 1992), 101-122.
22

influence and strategic advantage in the Near East.5 This strategic contest for advantage
in the Near East and central Asia, which historians would come to label the „Great
Game‟, also drew the Holy See into the political and diplomatic intrigues of the region. In
short order, the contest for Palestine drew all of the powers into the territory, each
seeking a stake in the Holy Land. In 1841, in an effort to check the expansionist leanings
of imperial Russia, Great Britain and Prussia established a Protestant bishopric in
Jerusalem. France and Austria-Hungary, as nominal allies of the Holy See, represented
papal claims against Orthodox and Protestant challenges. The Holy See itself jumped into
the fray, preferring not to leave its bidding entirely to its Catholic allies. In 1837, Pope
Gregory XVI had extended the authority of the Melkite (Arabic Eastern Catholic)
patriarch of Antioch to Alexandria and Jerusalem, re-establishing a Catholic ecclesiastical
structure in Palestine absent for centuries.6 In 1847, the Latin (Roman Catholic) Patriarch
was finally re-established in the Holy Land, and the Uniate Churches (Syrian Catholic,
Maronite, Armenian, Chaldean Catholic), though small by comparison, were re-organized
and strengthened in order to undertake new missions.7
From the 1850s to the end of the century, the Roman Catholic Church opened
dozens of new hostels for pilgrims, and even more schools, hospitals, clinics and
orphanages for the local Catholic population. These institutions were staffed by more
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than thirty male and female religious orders, sent by the Holy See to establish a firmer
presence in the Near East. As the Ottoman grip on the region weakened in the latter
stages of the century, over 100 new churches and chapels were constructed or reconstituted in Palestine, evidence of a Christian revival in a land so long under the
sultanate‟s yoke.
This does not suggest that the Holy See maintained strained relations with
Istanbul. On the contrary, Ottoman administrators allowed Roman Catholic religious a
generous degree of autonomy in establishing communities and administering to their
faithful, cognizant of Istanbul‟s weakening position in Europe, and mindful of the
papacy‟s influence with heavily Catholic powers such as France, Austria-Hungary, Spain
and Italy. Amicable relations with the Ottomans allowed the papacy to protect and to
cultivate the growing population of Christian Arabs in the region which, though small in
number, were beginning to exert a widening influence in Palestine. Christians Arabs,
unlike Muslims, were disproportionately urban and middle class. Because their
occupational distribution was most similar to that of the Jewish population, Christians
were generally more concerned about commercial competition from the small Jewish
population than from their Muslim compatriots.8 These indigenous Christian groups, who
spoke Arabic and were considered, along with Muslims, as Arabs, would form the
nucleus of both Arab nationalist and anti-Zionist movements in Palestine, and would play
a role in the Holy See‟s policy towards the region well into the twentieth century.9
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The Holy See and Zionism, 1897-1922
From the start, the founders of modern political Zionism understood the
importance of harmonizing the goals of Jewish nationalism with the Holy See‟s position
in Palestine.10 To this end, Zionist leaders actively sought the support and sanction of the
Roman Church. The importance of protecting the sanctity and security of Christian sites
was well understood by leading Zionist figures. Theodor Herzl, spiritual father of
political Zionism and author of the seminal Der Judenstatt (The State of the Jews), the
foundational manifesto of modern Zionism, expressed this in an 1896 meeting with
Cardinal Antonio Agliardi, the papal nuncio in Vienna. “The sanctuaries of
Christendom”, Herzl assured the nuncio, “would be safeguarded by assigning to them an
extra-territorial status such as is well known to the law of nations. We should form a
guard of honour about these sanctuaries, answering for the fulfillment of this duty with
our existence. This guard of honour would be the greatest symbol of the solution to the
Jewish Question after eighteen centuries of Jewish suffering.”11 Herzl stressed that
Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Nazareth would be excluded from a future Jewish state,
internationalized, and possible placed under the authority of the Holy See, pledges that
would be repeated by a succession of Zionist leaders down to 1948.12 Herzl would be the
first Zionist leader, however, to encounter the Holy See‟s ambiguous yet ultimately

loss of the pope’s temporal authority, had created a deep and lasting Vatican mistrust of liberal and/or
romantic nationalist movements.
10

The best single volume treatment of the modern Zionist movement remains Walter Laqueur’s A History
of Zionism (New York, 1972).
11

Theodor Herzl, The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl (New York, 1960), 1: 352-354. Quoted in Kreutz,
Vatican Policy on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 32.
12

Ibid.
25

disproving attitudes towards Zionism. In his diary, he confided that he left the meeting
with doubts about Agliardi‟s sincerity, fearing that the nuncio regarded the goals of
political Zionism untenable and at odds with papal designs for the territory.
Herzl‟s scepticism of Vatican support was piqued again the following year. In
May of 1897, on the eve of the first World Zionist Congress in Basle, Switzerland, the
Roman Catholic Church issued its first official statement on Zionism. The Jesuit
newspaper, Civiltà Cattolica, which closely mirrored the Vatican‟s line on international
affairs and inter-faith relations, proclaimed its position on a Jewish homeland as Zionist
delegates arrived in Basle:
One thousand, eight hundred and twenty-seven years have passed since the
prediction of Jesus of Nazareth was fulfilled, namely that Jerusalem would be
destroyed...As for a rebuilt Jerusalem, which might become the centre of a
reconstituted state of Israel, we must add that this is contrary to the predictions
of Christ himself who foretold that „Jerusalem shall be trodden down of the
Gentiles, until the time of the Gentiles be fulfilled‟ (Luke 21:24), that is...until
the end of the world.13
In no uncertain terms, the statement clarified Rome‟s opposition to political
Zionism on both theological and political grounds, and announced that the Church could
not support the ultimate aims of the Zionist movement.
Perhaps more definitive was Herzl‟s rebuff during a visit to Rome in January
1904. He was afforded the opportunity of audiences with both Pope Pius X and the
Secretary of State, Cardinal Merry del Val, evidence of his growing prestige as leader of
the Zionist movement. The granting of the audience itself was also a sign of the Pope‟s
benign relationship with Judaism, in contrast to the coarser attitudes of his nineteenth
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century predecessors. Both Pius X and Merry del Val, in fact, were known for their
strong relationship with the Italian Jewish community. As the pope pointed out to Herzl,
“I have always been on good terms with Jews...after all, there are bonds other than those
of religion: courtesy and philanthropy. These we do not deny the Jews. Indeed, we also
pray for them.”14 Merry del Val emphasized that “the history of Israel is our heritage, it is
our foundation”, and spent nearly an hour in intimate conversation with Herzl.15 Both
Pius X and his Secretary of State, however, categorically refused any support for the
Jewish nationalism espoused by Herzl and his followers. As Merry del Val explained to
Herzl, since the Jews had denied the divinity of Christ, “How can we, without
abandoning our highest principles, agree to their being given possession of the Holy Land
again?”16 The pope echoed his resolute Secretary in delivering his verdict to Herzl. “We
cannot give approval to the movement. We cannot prevent the Jews from going to
Jerusalem, but we could never sanction it. The soil of Jerusalem, if it was not always
sacred, has been sanctioned by the life of Jesus Christ. As the head of the Church, I
cannot tell you anything different.” It was at the end of this audience that Pius X issued
his infamous challenge to Zionism. “If you come to Palestine to settle your people there,”
he informed his guest, “we shall have churches and priests ready to baptize all of you.”17
With this ended Herzl‟s brief meeting with Pius X. While the pope offered Herzl
general platitudes to the Jewish people, he could not sanction the ambitions of political
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Zionism, despite Herzl‟s persistent assurances that Christian sites would never fall under
Zionist jurisdiction. The theological position of the Church, which had historically
shaped the Holy See‟s international policy, placed it at irreconcilable odds with Zionist
aspirations. It was a position, from Rome‟s standpoint, that could not be „negotiated
around‟. Several months after Herzl‟s visit, Merry del Val elaborated on the Vatican‟s
position in an interview with the Viennese Zionist journal Die Welt:
How can we deliver up the country of our redeemer to a people of a different
faith? Whenever a bad book appears or an ugly picture which mocks us, or a
newspaper which defames us- then... we find the Israelite behind it...Yet the
Church would do nothing to impede the Zionists effort to obtain, “a home in
Palestine secured by public law...” For that is quite another matter...If the Jews
believe that they can ease their lot in the land of their fathers, that is a
humanitarian question in our view. The foundation of the Holy See is apostolic;
it will never oppose an undertaking that alleviates human misery.18
The Vatican, then, would not oppose migration of the Jews to Palestine on
humanitarian grounds, but on theological grounds it could not support Zionism as a
political movement, nor could it endorse the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.
This was repeated to Heinrich York Steiner, as associate of Herzl, just weeks after the
latter‟s Roman visit. Merry del Val assured Steiner that if the Jews wanted to establish
agricultural colonies in Palestine, he would regard it as a humanitarian endeavour and not
impede it.19 The Secretary of State, however, did not anticipate mass immigration leading
to Jewish domination of the country, as would become the case by the later 1920‟s.
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The Vatican‟s position was to alter little through to the Balfour Declaration of
1917. From Herzl‟s visit forward, the Vatican came to realize that political Zionism
posed a greater danger to its interests in Palestine than did any other Christian group or
the Ottomans. As the Roman Catholic Church regarded itself as the one true faith, the
Vatican realized the need to espouse a firm anti-Zionist position, while preventing the
Church from being branded anti-Semitic. Though anti-Zionism could be explained as a
rational policy, consistent with the Church‟s historical mission to safeguard its Holy Sites
related to the life of Christ, charges of anti-Judaism or anti-Semitism could only impede
the Holy See‟s larger objectives. This was particularly important as the global Zionist
movement gained momentum in the years leading to war. It was a fine balance, however,
that the papacy, with its diverse international flock, its network of national hierarchies,
and its quasi-independent press (which included hundreds of diocesan newspapers), could
not always manage.20
Following Steiner‟s visit, nearly thirteen years would pass before the Vatican
would receive another Zionist delegate. By the time Pope Benedict XV received Nahum
Sokolow in 1917, however, the state of international relations had been significantly
altered. While the World Zionist Organization (WZO) had been plagued by infighting for
several years after Herzl‟s death in 1904, it had grown to become a formidable and multinational movement by the eve of the First World War.21 The growth of international
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Zionism was fuelled by a rapid out-migration of Russian Jews escaping persecution and
pogrom. From 1881 to 1914, nearly 170,000 Jews fled Russia, the majority heading for
Germany, Britain and the United States. As a consequence, Berlin, London and
Washington acted as international hubs of the movement through the war years. These
states, in turn, remained keen to cultivate Zionist loyalties to further the war effort, an
objective complicated by the fact that Germany would oppose both Britain, and
eventually the United States, on the battlefields of Europe. All Zionists agreed, however,
on the principle of a Jewish homeland in Palestine.
Sokolow‟s April 1917 visit to the Vatican came amidst this flush of optimism for
the Zionist movement, in the afterglow of the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, which
assigned the fate of Palestine to Britain and France after the inevitable fall of the Ottoman
Empire, and as it appeared likely that the Allies would prevail over the Entente.
Sokolow‟s confidence was further buoyed by Sir Mark Sykes, who had visited the
Vatican a week earlier. In private conversations with Mgr. Eugenio Pacelli (the future
Pope Pius XII), Cardinal Pietro Gasparri and Pope Benedict XV, Sykes came away with a
strong impression that the Vatican was at last prepared to accept the aspirations of
political Zionism.22 Sykes discussed the “immense difficulties which surrounded the
question of Jerusalem...and the conflicting interests of the Latin and Greeks besides the
aspirations of the various Powers.”23 Pacelli informed Sykes that the Vatican was not
opposed to British protection of the Holy Places, and additionally that he did not oppose
the Jewish settlement of Palestine, so long as the Holy Places remained under foreign,
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and preferably Christian, jurisdiction. Sykes, on his part, assured Pacelli that the Zionists
had no intention of annexing these sites. After brief meetings with Gasparri and Benedict
XV, Sykes remained convinced of the Vatican‟s goodwill. On 14 April 1917, Sykes
apprised Sokolow of his meetings in Rome:
I visited Msgr. Pacelli, and was received in audience by His Holiness. On both
occasions I [stressed] the intensity of Zionist feeling and the objects of Zionism.
I was careful to impress that the main object of Zionism was to evolve a selfsupporting Jewish community...which should...be a proof to the non-Jewish
people of the world for the capacity of Jews to produce a virtuous and simple
population...I further pointed out that Zionist aims in no way clashed with
Christian desiderata in general, and Catholic desiderata in particular, in regard to
the Holy Places.24
Sokolow saw Pacelli on 29 April, followed by meetings with Gasparri on 1 May
and Benedict XV on 4 May. Despite his optimism, buoyed by Sykes‟ letter, he was
careful to present the Zionist program in a most moderate vein, wary of altering the
Vatican‟s apparent change of view. With Pacelli and Gasparri, he was careful to
downplay notions of a Jewish state or of Jewish political domination of Palestine.25 To
Benedict XV, Sokolow characterized Zionist goals as the preservation of historical
Judaism with its spiritual and moral traditions, rooted in as it was in scripture. To this
end, he stressed, it was not necessary to encourage large-scale Jewish immigration to the
Holy Land, or to alter the existing demographic balance in Palestine. The central issue,
according to Sokolow, was to “inspire world Judaism by a new model of idealism”.26
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Sokolow‟s Vatican visit would ultimately produce a mixed bag of messages.27
Despite presenting his aims in moderate terms, Pacelli was sceptical, pressing his visitor
for a more rigidly defined outline of Zionist territorial demands. On hearing Sokolow‟s
general explanations of Zionist aims, Pacelli commented:

That is not enough. Borders must be determined, what the Holy Places are must
be defined, for on this there are differences of view: some hold that they mean
all the country, others- that they are only a few isolated sites. We must know in
advance what you demand, in order to avoid conflicts and competition between
us.28
While Sokolow had intended to speak in generalities, and to present Zionism as a
moderate and logical program, Pacelli continued to press for clarification on territorial
specifics, indicative of his later demands for the territorial sovereignty of Jerusalem,
Nazareth and Bethlehem after the establishment of Israel. Sokolow had clearly
underestimated the Vatican‟s territorial claims, which amounted to a virtual partition of
Palestine. Pacelli indicated that the reserved area, which would be off-limits to Zionist
claims, was to extend well beyond the Holy Places themselves and would cover
Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Nazareth and its surroundings, as well as Tiberias and Jericho.
Pacelli explained, cordially though firmly, that the legal and political status of the region
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would have to be established directly through negotiations between the Holy See and the
Powers, and that the Zionists would be expected to abide by their decisions.29
Though Gasparri also emphasized the Vatican‟s territorial claims, he expressed
sympathy with the plight of Jews in Russia, and with the basic aims of Zionism as
presented by Sokolow. A number of topics were discussed including the general situation
of the Jews and the desire for Palestine, the Holy Places and the Church‟s stand regarding
them, and the Vatican‟s attitude towards Zionism. Gasparri assured Sokolow that the
Vatican was not opposed to Jewish migration to Palestine, particularly if it was prompted
by religious persecution elsewhere. He reminded Sokolow that the Church had
condemned the persecution of both Catholics and Jews in Tsarist Russia, and that the
Vatican would continue to condemn the religious persecution of Jews wherever it
occurred. Though Gasparri‟s territorial demands differed little from those presented by
Pacelli, as both were espousing the papal line, he did end the meeting with Sokolow on
an affirmative note. “Naturally”, he exclaimed, “we are sympathetic to [Zionism]. You
must do this and we will be extremely glad if you succeed in establishing the Kingdom of
Israel.”30
On 4 May, Sokolow was received by Benedict XV in an audience lasting nearly
an hour, longer than the allotted twenty minutes. It was a sign of the pope‟s eagerness to
receive his visitor, and an implicit nod to the growing significance of the Zionist
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movement. Like Gasparri, the pope expressed sympathy with the plight of persecuted
Jews, and assured his guest that the Roman Catholic Church had no objection to the
immigration of Jews to Palestine. On the return of persecuted Jews to the Holy Land, in
fact, the pope expressed his approval, affirming to his guest that “...it is providential. God
has willed it.”31 The pope concluded his meeting by repeating to Sokolow, several times,
“Si, si, io credo che saremo buoni vicini” (Yes, yes, I believe we will make good
neighbours), suggesting that the Pope, like Gasparri, approved of a Jewish „kingdom‟ in
Palestine, so long as Roman Catholic sovereignty over religious sites and centres
remained intact.32 Sokolow was sufficiently encouraged that he submitted a report to
Chaim Weizmann suggesting that the Holy See‟s demands were finally dovetailing with
Zionist ambitions for Palestine. Weizmann, relying on the report, felt confident enough to
tell a London Zionist conference on 20 May that “we have assurances from the highest
Catholic circles that they will view with favour the establishment of a Jewish National
Home in Palestine, and from their religious point of view see no objections to it and no
reason why we should not be good neighbours.”33
Sokolow‟s visit, however, would mark the end of Vatican ambivalence towards,
and apparent sanction of, political Zionism for decades to come. The events of the next
several years served to harden Vatican opinion on the subject, and hearkened the return of
the firmly anti-Zionist line of previous decades. On 2 November 1917, British Foreign
Secretary Lord Arthur James Balfour issued the Balfour Declaration, drafted with the
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assistance of Weizmann, Sokolow and the British Zionist Lord Walter Rothschild.34 The
Declaration, which promised British support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine,
contained assurances of protection to non-Jewish communities in Palestine, though it
ominously neglected to discuss the rights of Palestinian Arabs, who constituted nearly
90% of the population.35 The Declaration, followed by General Edmund Allenby‟s
triumphant entrance into Jerusalem on 11 December, after British troops had captured the
Holy City from the control of the Ottomans, aroused latent anxieties in the highest levels
of the Vatican Secretariat.
The Vatican appeared initially relieved that Jerusalem had been wrested from the
Ottomans by a Christian state, and Benedict XV had long considered Great Britain the
ideal power to administer Palestine after the fall of the Porte. The Vatican‟s semi-official
organ, L’Osservatore Romano, went so far as to call the capture of Jerusalem a “victory
for the Christian civilization”; a sentiment echoed by the Catholic press the world over.36
What concerned the Holy See‟s bureaucrats, however, was that the Balfour Declaration
appeared to disregard papal claims to sovereignty over the Holy Places, making no
mention of sites considered sacrosanct by the Holy See. In fact, the Declaration appeared
to sanction the eventual Zionist domination of the whole country, including the Holy
Places and the indigenous Arab and Christian populations. The day after Allenby‟s
entrance into Jerusalem, Gasparri, speaking to the French attaché in Rome, confided that
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since the Turks had left, the status of the Holy Places would re-emerge as a source of
conflict between the Christian powers, and that “Zionism, of which Mr. Balfour had just
made a gift to Palestine, would not fail to engender other conflicts.”37 In concluding, he
added that it was “difficult to take a piece of our hearts away from the Turks in order to
give it to the Zionists.”38
The next five years would mark a period of intense Vatican opposition to Zionist
plans for Palestine, as it appeared that a Jewish state in the territory was rapidly moving
from ideology to reality. Added to this in the fall of 1917 were fears of a „Bolshevistic‟
Zionism using the territory as a beach-head to further expansion, a concern that caused
genuine disquiet in both Vatican and wider circles in the immediate aftermath of the
Russian Revolution. Closer to home, the spectre of Italian Bolshevism also appeared to
be looming larger, highlighted by waves of strike activity in 1919 and 1920. It was a
predicament that further stoked papal fears of losing administrative sovereignty in
Palestine. In the midst of such flux, the Vatican remained firmly committed to
maintaining control of the Holy Places and the Catholic institutions in the territory, and
maintained a vigorous antipathy to the notion of a „Jewish‟ Palestine.
Pope Benedict XV‟s pronouncements and allocutions increasingly reflected this
growing apprehension. His March 1919 allocution to the College of Cardinals amounted
to a forceful re-statement of Vatican policy, and was clearly intended to trumpet the
Vatican‟s demands to the delegates of the Paris Peace Conference, who had been
deliberating since January. The Pope explained that there was:
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“...one matter on which We are most specifically anxious and that is the fate of
the Holy Places, on account of the special dignity and importance for which
they are so venerated by every Christian. Who can ever tell the full story of all
the efforts of Our Predecessors to free them from the dominion of the infidels,
the heroic deeds and the bloodshed by the Christians of the West through the
centuries? And now that, amid the rejoicing of all good men, they have finally
returned into the hands of the Christians, Our anxiety is most keen as to the
decisions which the Peace Congress at Paris is soon to take concerning them. For
surely it would be a terrible grief for Us and for all the Christian faithful if
infidels were placed in a privileged and prominent position; much more if those
most holy sanctuaries of the Christian religion were given to the charge of nonChristians...”39
The Pope‟s subsequent statements on the issue reflected similar reservations on
the rapidity of developments in Palestine, and the potential for Rome to lose control and
influence in a territory inexorably bound to the tradition and history of the Church.
The Vatican‟s stiffest challenge to Zionism in this early period came in the form
of official protests issued by Gasparri to the League of Nations in and to the British
government in 1920 and 1922 which severely censured the British Mandate for Palestine.
The Cardinal censured the Mandate as providing the Zionists a “privileged and
preponderant position relative to other nations and faiths” in the territory, creating a
situation which favoured continued Jewish immigration into the territory.40 Gasparri
further critiqued the Balfour Declaration as incompatible with the spirit of the Treaty of
Versailles, and with the Covenant of the League of Nations, which stated that mandates
were supposed to be a “tutelage” which one power assumed over “peoples not able to

39

Constantine Rackauskas, ‘The Internationalization of Jerusalem’, NCWC/OGS/ACUA, Box 44, File 30.

40

Pietro Cardinal Gasparri to John Francis Charles de Salis (British Minister to the Holy See), 6 March 1922,
NCWC/OGS/ACUA, Box 18, File 44. Gasparri issued a similar missive to the British legation to the Holy See
on 7 December 1920.
37

support themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world.”41 The Vatican,
accurately, did not consider the Zionists in Palestine to constitute such a fragile
population. Gasparri reminded both the British government and the League that the
Mandate, which purported to support “the well being and development of the peoples of
Palestine”, in fact was becoming “an instrument for the subordination of the indigenous
population for the advantage of other nationalities.”42
The Vatican also tried to stir up opposition to the Mandate from „Catholic‟ states
at the League, including France, Italy, Spain, Poland and Brazil. Though each of these
powers had their own objectives for backing Rome, they all saw some utility in backing
the Vatican‟s stand, if only to thwart British influence in a Jewish dominated Palestine.
Italy and Spain, however, were wary of French influence in Palestine should the Mandate
be defeated, given France‟s history as defender of the papacy. Poland, having regained
independence only four years earlier, wielded little singular clout at Geneva, despite its
willingness to toe the Vatican line. In the end, then, no such unified front materialized,
despite Brazil‟s strenuous support of the Vatican position. As a first attempt by Rome to
rouse a „Catholic international‟ in opposition to Zionist aspirations, it was a failure.43 In
July 1922 the League of Nations approved the Palestine Mandate, and in December it
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officially came into force. The rebuff spoke volumes on the limits of post-Versailles
Vatican diplomacy, despite the reputed support of traditional Catholic allies at Geneva.
Papal failure to achieve results based on conventional diplomacy, especially
considering the nominal support of powerful allies, was particularly stinging to the
Vatican, given that the fate of the Holy Land was the one issue on which it felt it had a
sound and persuasive case. One certainly could argue that the Roman Catholic Church
had an ancestral and legitimate stake in the question, yet this amounted to little in the end.
The defeat of the Vatican in 1922 undoubtedly opened the door to closer co-operation
with less traditional partners. The American Catholic Church, which to this point had
played a minimal role in advocating papal policy would, given its growing financial
might and reputed influence in Washington, steadily assume a more central position in
the „Catholic international‟ throughout the interwar period. A brief examination of the
rise of the American Church, which expanded rapidly in the period before the First World
War, contextualizes the growing post-1918 alliance between the Holy See and the
American Catholic hierarchy.
The Rise of Roman Catholicism in the United States
The Roman Catholic Church in the United States has a presence that extends back
to the Spanish missions of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, with the earliest
communities found in what are now the states of Florida, Georgia and Texas. French
colonization in the eighteenth century expanded the Catholic presence to the Louisiana
Territory districts, as well as the Great Lakes region. Freedom of worship was guaranteed
by the United States Constitution of 1791, though Roman Catholics were traditionally
eyed with suspicion by the Protestant majority of the early Republic. As the Catholic
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population grew, so too did Protestant fears that Catholics undermined the ideals of
liberty, democracy and republicanism upon which the young nation had been founded.
Anti-Catholic nativism manifested itself politically in the „Know Nothing‟ movement,
whose leaders advocated the curbing of immigration from Catholic nations, and restricted
its membership to Protestant males of Anglo-Saxon (and preferably British) lineage.
Active in the mid-nineteenth century, the movement stoked fears that American Catholics
pledged primary fealty to papal Rome, and that Pope Pius IX purported to subjugate the
United States through mass Catholic immigration, co-ordinated by Irish-American
bishops (who were of course selected by the popes). The movement was not above the
use of violence to intimidate Catholics, though it did not achieve the notoriety of the Ku
Klux Klan in its anti-Catholic brutality.
Despite these tensions, the Catholic population continued to swell throughout the
nineteenth century. The Louisiana Purchase of 1803, and the Adams-Onis Treaty of 1819
(where Spain ceded Florida to the United States) greatly augmented the American
Catholic population, numbers that were bolstered further still by waves of Irish and
German immigrants throughout the century. By 1850, Roman Catholics comprised the
largest single Christian denomination in the United States, numbering nearly seven
million. Buttressed by heavy Catholic immigration in the last half of the century, the
American Catholic population tripled, to nearly 21 million, by 1890. This pattern
continued into the twentieth century, when scores of Italian and Polish immigrants were
added to the continuing influx of Irish and German Catholics. The majority of these
groups settled in the cities of the eastern seaboard and Great Lakes regions, such as New
York, Chicago, Boston, Detroit and Philadelphia, creating a demographic concentration
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in the north-east that would shape the power-structure of the Church well into the
century.
The growth of the Church in the first half of the twentieth century largely
mirrored the American ascent over the same period, and it experienced a post-1945 boom
which mirrored that of the nation itself. The United States emerged after the Second
World War as the world‟s most powerful nation-state, rivalled only by the Soviet Union
in measures of military, economic and strategic power. While the postwar boom did not
arrive in Europe for nearly fifteen years after the war, it began in the United States before
the defeat of Hitler‟s armies, and continued unabated for nearly twenty-five years. The
rise in American prestige and power after 1945 was reflected by the American Catholic
Church.44 Its leaders were hailed both for their efforts in support of the American war
effort and for denouncing the evils of Soviet communism. Its parish populations were
swelled by large numbers of Catholic immigrants from war-ravaged Europe, and the
postwar economic upsurge greatly facilitated the church‟s ability to fill its coffers and
raise its national profile. By the early 1950s, of the ninety million Catholics in the world,
nearly a third lived in the United States. In the course of 150 years, the American
Catholic population had increased from 150,000 to over 25 million, becoming the largest
single denominational group in the nation, Christian or otherwise.45
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Despite this growth, the relationship between Rome and the American Catholic
Church did not develop without strains. To Rome, the American Church was long
regarded an outpost of the faith, a missionary and immigrant Church that was kept under
the auspices of the Propaganda Fide (the branch of the Roman Curia tasked with
missionary work and related activities) until 1908, though apprehensions continued even
after this date. While nativists feared the influence of popes on American Catholics,
American bishops struggled to create an identity for the Church that was both Catholic
and American. This led to acute tensions between Rome and American Catholic leaders
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Pope Leo XIII decried the
constitutional separation of church and state in the United States, which denied the
Catholic Church certain privileges, particularly in education and the delivery of social
services, which it enjoyed in many European states. In an 1895 encyclical, he encouraged
American Catholic leaders to advocate for a closer relationship between the Church and
the American government, particularly in education. This brought him into conflict with
powerful figures such as Cardinal James Gibbons of Baltimore and Archbishop John
Ireland of St. Paul, who believed that religious freedom and pluralism, as well as the
separation of church and state, were beneficial to the Catholic Church in the United
States. These men, leading figures in the so-called „Americanist‟ movement, further
believed it unwise to attempt to influence government to favour Catholicism over other
faiths, another position which created frictions with Rome. The Pope‟s 1899 encyclical,
Testem Benevolentiae, censured the „Americanist heresy‟ and powerfully re-emphasized
the authority of Rome in the Church, condemning what he perceived as a growing
independence among the American episcopate. Gerald Fogarty contends that the tactfully
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worded encyclical, while forceful, reflected the diplomatic skill of the Pope, and allowed
him to defuse the Americanist dilemma without creating deeper rifts.46
Papal concerns over the independence of the American Church, however,
persisted. Leo XIII‟s successor, Pope Pius X, issued a 1907 encyclical, Pascendi
Dominici Gregis, which condemned „modernism‟ and „relativism‟ in the faith, a criticism
of theological trends that attempted to synthesize modern philosophical and ideological
thought into Catholic doctrine. It was aimed squarely at American and European
churchmen engaged in such synthesis. His „Oath Against Modernism‟, released in 1910,
was required to be taken by all clergy, religious superiors and seminary professors, and it
mandated a strict adherence to Roman interpretations of scripture and theology. Though
some chafed at such a prescribed fidelity, the Oath did manage to scuttle the creative
interpretation of theology, even if the Roman curia continued to harbour suspicions of the
American Church.
As late as the early 1920s, an air of mistrust towards the American Church
continued to permeate the Roman curia, extending to the Pope himself. Suspicions were
aroused again when, upon the United States‟ entry into the First World War, the
American hierarchy met collectively to establish a temporary council to coordinate
Catholic support for the war effort. The group‟s first spokesman, John J. Burke (who
edited the influential Catholic World) received the approval of Cardinal James Gibbons
(of „Americanist‟ notoriety) to convene a meeting of the hierarchy in December 1917 at
Washington‟s Catholic University of America. It was the first collective meeting of
American Catholic churchmen in over three decades, and it resulted in the creation of
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National Catholic War Conference, an emergency body that was dissolved at the end of
the war.47 Gibbons had pledged Catholic support for the war in an open letter to President
Woodrow Wilson in April 1917, when he powerfully outlined the collective duty of the
American Church. In creating the National Catholic War Council, Gibbons reiterated the
imperative of Catholic support. “The Catholic Church cannot remain an isolated factor in
the nation”, he intoned to American Catholics.
The Catholic Church possesses the spiritual and moral resources which are at the
command of the nation in every great crisis. Parochial, diocesan and provincial
limits must be forgotten in the face of the greater tasks which burden our
collective resources today. Today, as never before, the Catholic Church in the
United States has an opportunity for doing a nation-wide work. No one,
honestly, doubts Catholic loyalty to the principles of the American nation. And
from the hierarchy to the clergy, and from the clergy to the people, the
government expects an impulse towards a perfect and efficient cooperation with
all its agencies in carrying the war to success.48
American Catholics did respond resoundingly to the war effort, enlisting in
numbers that exceeded their proportion of the population.49 In pledging steadfast support
for the war, and in backing that up with a collective and coordinated effort, the American
bishops also earned considerable legitimacy in larger American society, and a degree of
political capital in its dealings with Washington. Indeed, the function of the Council to
express the collective will of the American episcopacy undoubtedly ushered in a new
pattern in the relationship between the bishops and Washington- one in which the unified
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demands of the Roman Catholic Church would become more difficult for policymakers
and politicians to ignore.
After 1918, Burke and Gibbons led a campaign to establish a permanent bishops‟
council, a reflection of the rising profile of the Church in American public life,
particularly given the ardent support of Catholics for the war effort. Burke envisioned the
new body as having a specifically political mandate- a collective voice that could
advocate on behalf of American Catholics. It was a vision that grew directly out of the
experience of the wartime council. In September 1919, at a gathering of representatives
from 87 of the nation‟s 100 dioceses at the Catholic University of America, the National
Catholic Welfare Conference (NCWC) was created as a permanent replacement of the
wartime council. Archbishop Edward Hanna of San Francisco was elected as its first
chairman, and it was decided that the organization would be centred around five
departments- Education, Legislation, Social Action, Lay Organizations, and a Press
Bureau- each headed by a bishop, coordinating the activities and advocacy of the Church
on a national level. Hanna described the specifically political role of the nascent body “to
deal directly with the United States government and its numerous departments on matters
that affect Catholic interests.”50 Bishop Peter J. Muldoon of Rockford, Illinois, who
served as the first chairman of the NCWC‟s administrative committee, also saw the utility
of the new body to galvanize Catholic opinion in the United States, creating a more
unified and forceful lobby. “We do not hesitate to say that some representative body
could accomplish untold good by directing editors, teachers, and even the clergy, on
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general matters pertaining to the welfare of the Church”, he wrote in 1919, as the bishops
met to form the NCWC. “There is an incessant demand for instructions on „how to act‟
on many bills that are now before the legislatures of the country.”51
While many American bishops were enthusiastic about the possibilities of
speaking with a unified national voice, the idea caused apprehensions in Rome, where
memories of the Americanist crisis had not subsided completely. Gibbons‟ involvement
in the NCWC, given his role during that crisis, only added to the air of mistrust. In
January 1922, the Holy See moved to suppress the NCWC, fearing that a collective voice
for the American bishops could only lead to a revived and potentially more dangerous
Americanism.52 On 6 February, Pope Pius XI succeeded Benedict XV on the papal
throne, and was immediately presented with a petition from a wide swath of American
bishops to save the NCWC, and was visited personally by bishop Joseph Schrembs of
Cleveland, who eloquently advocated for the body‟s survival. Cardinal Gasparri, who had
arranged for Schrembs‟ meeting with Pius XI, clearly foresaw the utility of the American
hierarchy speaking with a unified voice, and imparted to the new pontiff its potential
advantages. In what could only be considered a nod to the growing power of the
American Church, the new pope overturned the dissolution of the new body, stipulating
only that episcopal councils take place less often than every year, that attendance at
NCWC meetings remain voluntary, and that its decisions not be binding to all bishops of
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the American Church. The decision was a watershed moment in the relationship between
the Holy See and the American hierarchy, and one that would usher in a new era of
American Catholic political advocacy.
Following its brush with disbandment, the NCWC quickly established itself as the
leading voice, and political lobby, of the American Catholic Church. Opportunity to test
the potency of this lobby soon presented itself. The repressive anticlericalism practised by
the Mexican regime of Plutarco Calles, who had won the presidency in 1924, provided
the NCWC its earliest opportunity to advocate for a specifically Catholic policy response
on an international issue.53 A freemason, Calles initiated anticlerical legislation in June
1926 which included the outlawing of religious orders, the exiling of numerous bishops
and clergy on trumped-up charges, a suspension of the civil-liberties of the clergy, and
denial of the vote to the entire hierarchy. Within weeks, the situation descended into a
protracted struggle between Calles‟ anticlerical allies and the supporters of the Church
and the conservative, traditional order (the „Cristeros‟).
The response of American Catholics to the Mexican crisis was indicative of the
growing confidence and unity of the Church, undoubtedly aided by the existence of a
national body that could express a collective will. Catholic pressure comprised of public
statements issued by the bishops, cloistered diplomacy conducted by high-ranking
members of the hierarchy, and a broad-based press campaign, aimed at bringing public
pressure to bear on issues dear to American Catholics. In September 1926, the American
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bishops issued an open letter of sympathy to their Mexican co-religionists, assuring them
that Catholics in the United States- both clergy and laymen- remained committed to their
struggle for religious freedom and an end to persecutions, promising to stand with their
Mexican brethren “to the end.”54 This was followed by the bishops‟ “Pastoral Letter on
Mexico”, which was issued following the hierarchy‟s annual meeting in December.55
This statement drew clear parallels between the bishops‟ concerns both as Catholics and
as American citizens, juxtaposing the freedoms enjoyed by American Catholics with the
denial of religious liberties in Calles‟ Mexico. The statement was carefully worded so as
not to appear to advocate for direct American intervention in the Mexican crisis,
particularly military intervention, but it was clearly intended to galvanize Catholic
pressure in expecting a firmer policy response from Washington.56
A wider campaign of public awareness was initiated by the NCWC between 1926
and 1929, spearheaded by Baltimore‟s archbishop, Michael Curley, who had succeeded
Gibbons upon the latter‟s death in 1921. Curley engaged in a direct political activism that
his predecessor would have advised against. On the issue of Mexico, Curley was active
on the lecture circuit, delivering public speeches that sought a wider civic awareness and
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engagement on Mexican religious persecutions, and demands that Washington adopt a
firmer hand on Calles. Through the NCWC, he also encouraged grassroots activism on
the issue, and sought to mobilize organizations such as the National Council for Catholic
Men (NCCM) and the National Council for Catholic Women (NCCW) to spread
awareness of the plight of their Mexican co-religionists. In August 1926, the NCWC
called upon the local chapters of the NCCM and the NCCW to petition state and national
leaders, including the President, the Secretary of State and congressmen, to pressure
Mexico to cease its persecution of the Roman Catholic Church.57 To expand the base of
Catholic activism even further, the NCWC‟s administrative committee sought to form a
national committee of laypersons dedicated to stimulating a moral public opinion which
would prompt Washington to more definitive action, an initiative resulting in the creation
of the National Committee for the Protection of Religious Rights in Mexico (NCPRRM),
chaired by the prominent Catholic Judge Morgan J. O‟Brien.58 Beyond this, the NCWC‟s
press department supplied diocesan newspapers with a steady stream of dispatches from
Mexico, where the organization had stationed a number of correspondents, resulting in
pervasive coverage of Mexican atrocities in the widely circulated Catholic press. 59 This
campaign of awareness mounted by American Catholics was in full swing months before

57

‘Statement of Appeal from the NCWC to NCCM and NCCW Councils’, August 1926, NCWC/OGS/ACUA,
Box 5, File 44.
58

Redinger, American Catholics and the Mexican Revolution, 24.

59

Circulation figures for Catholic papers and periodicals for 1937 indicate a circulation of 2, 396, 516 for
diocesan newspapers, and 4, 604, 141 for magazines. Though circulation rose in the 1930’s, these figures
still infer a wide readership in 1926. See ‘National Catholic Welfare Conference News Service: Circulation
Figures’, 7 June 1937, NCWC/OGS/ACUA, Box 21, File 2.
49

Pope Pius XI offered his own formal denunciation of the Mexican situation, which he
offered in the November 1926 encyclical Iniquis Afflictisque.
The NCWC‟s response also included direct political advocacy. This included a
letter from the organization (which of course carried the weight of the entire American
episcopate) directly to President Calvin Coolidge in April 1926. The letter, which
requested the President‟s attention to the growing atrocities committed by the Calles
government, was published widely in the diocesan press in May. The most profound
aspect of the NCWC‟s advocacy on the Mexican crisis, however, was the role it played as
an intermediary between the American government, the Vatican and the Calles regime.
The organization‟s central figure in this matter was John J. Burke, whose efforts had been
instrumental in its founding.60 Between 1927 and 1929, Burke functioned as an unofficial
envoy of the Vatican to Calles, a role approved of and encouraged by Secretary of State
Frank Kellogg, and Dwight Whitney Morrow, who had been named the American
ambassador to Mexico in 1927. Morrow considered Burke to be a churchman of
exceptional diplomatic skill and tact, and one who might be able to persuade Calles to
cease his persecutions of the Church and allow for the return of the apostolic delegate,
George Caruana. Significantly, this sentiment was shared by the apostolic delegate to the
United States, Pietro Fumasoni-Biondi, and the Vatican itself, which preferred an
American churchman to conduct the delicate negotiations over its official delegate to the
American Catholic Church. Before a series of meeting with Calles in 1928, Burke met
with Fumasoni-Biondi to be briefed on the Vatican‟s demands, which included the return
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of the exiled Caruana, as well as bishops and priests who had been spuriously ousted by
regional officials. In his meetings with Calles, Burke presented the Vatican‟s demands
first and foremost, underscoring his role as the pope‟s de facto envoy. His efforts were
instrumental in achieving a modus vivendi with the Calles regime in 1929, which resulted
in the lifting of a number of restrictions on the Mexican Church, and defusing a situation
which had bedevilled Mexican-American and Mexican-Vatican relations.61
The lobbying efforts of the NCWC during the Mexican crisis signalled the
emergence of the American Catholic Church as an organized and unified political force.
Washington‟s reliance on Burke to conduct negotiations with Calles was emblematic of a
growing relationship between the NCWC, the American bishops and leading Catholic
figures on one side, and the American government on the other. The fact that Burke was
able to forge a satisfactory agreement in difficult circumstances only deepened esteem for
the NCWC. It was a relationship that would grow much stronger in the 1930‟s, when
Franklin Roosevelt would develop a remarkably close relationship with American
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Catholics, and when American Catholics would again press their demands on a number
of international questions, including Palestine.
The NCWC‟s efforts on the Mexican crisis also drew the American Church closer
to the Vatican. The entrustment of Burke to the negotiations with Calles might have been
desired by Washington, but was consented to by Rome, a decision that spoke volumes on
the Vatican‟s growing trust in the NCWC and the American bishops on political and
diplomatic questions. In a 1927 letter to the four American cardinals, Pope Pius XI
praised the “splendid zeal” of American Catholic activism on Mexico, and lauded the
various elements of the American Church for “vigorously defending and furthering the
cause of the Holy Roman Church.”62 He reserved particular praise for the NCWC, and its
News Service, for bringing public attention to the Mexican situation. It was a far cry from
the Vatican‟s grave suspicions of the NCWC just five years previous, and it similarly
signalled a closer working relationship between Rome and the American bishops that
would strengthen further in the next decade. The broadening political and social clout of
the American Catholic Church, as evidenced by activism on Mexico, and the Vatican‟s
cognizance of the fundraising potential of the growing Church, were at the core of this
rapprochement.
There were other signs in the 1920s of growing ties between the Vatican and the
American Catholic Church, and as with Mexico, it involved the diplomacy of a prominent
American Catholic and academic, Edmund Walsh S.J., who in 1919 had founded
Georgetown University‟s School of Foreign Service (six years before the United States
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Foreign Service existed). Since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, the Vatican had hoped
that a modus vivendi could be established with Moscow. The popes had denounced
atheistic communism since the mid-nineteenth century, but the events of 1917 raised
fresh fears of religious persecution in Russia and an expansion of bolshevism beyond its
borders. The Vatican had hoped that religious freedoms could be secured in exchange for
official recognition from the pope, an important legitimising and symbolic link for the
fledgling Soviet Union.63 Part of the Vatican‟s outreach strategy was a pledge of
assistance to famine-stricken regions of Russia, with a call to Catholics worldwide to
raise funds for the endeavour.64 The relief mission, however, had a practical purpose as
well- it allowed the Vatican to dispatch a legion of religious to the Soviet Union,
providing Rome an important source of intelligence from inside the country. As in the
case of Mexico, the Vatican chose an American prelate, Walsh, to coordinate the Papal
Relief Mission from Moscow.65 Walsh, who would find later fame as a chief American
consultant at the Nuremberg Trials, was uniquely suited to the role. Between 1922 and
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1924, he was in constant telegraphic contact with Rome, apprising the Vatican on the
condition of the Catholic Church under Soviet rule. Though he was recalled from
Moscow in 1924, allegedly because of his brusque (the Russians said “American”)
diplomatic manner, he did manage to open up a dialogue between the Vatican and the
Soviets.66
Despite his recall, the mission initiated an increasingly intimate working
relationship between the Vatican and the American Church. Upon his return from Russia,
Walsh was sent by Pope Pius XI to Washington with a letter for President Warren
Harding on the urgent need for Russian relief. While in the capital, Walsh was also able
to secure significant amounts of Catholic aid for Russia, a development that impressed
upon the Pope the financial might, as well as the fervent spirituality, of American
Catholics. In 1926, after consulting with the apostolic delegate in Washington, FumasoniBiondi, Pius XI created the Catholic Near East Welfare Association (CNEWA) as a
permanent umbrella organization for Vatican aid in Russia and the Near East. The
fundraising capacity of American Catholics was undoubtedly the key factor in the placing
of the new association in the hands of the American bishops. The example of the
Vatican‟s Russian relief efforts between 1921 and 1923 had clearly demonstrated to the
Vatican the fiscal might of the American faithful. Of the nearly two million dollars raised
by Catholics worldwide, over three quarters came from the United States.67 The
CNEWA‟s charter stipulated that funds raised (though mass stipends, special collections
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and donations) would be forwarded directly to the Vatican‟s Sacred Congregation for the
Oriental Church, and were to be dispensed at the behest of the Pope himself. The
association‟s „Annual‟ for 1927 suggested that Catholics who joined the CNEWA pledge
“a yearly minimum of one dollar”, and expressed “the Holy Father‟s hope that every
American Catholic who can possibly do so will join this association.”68 Given a Catholic
population of nearly twenty million in the United States, the fundraising potential of the
new association was considerable. The creation of the CNEWA had, in effect, allowed
the Vatican to tap into the vast financial might of the American Church while retaining
firm control of the disbursement of funds.
The new association was intended to provide Catholic assistance to Russia,
Greece, Palestine and central Europe (the very regions where the Vatican feared a
declining influence) and it was placed entirely in the hands of the American Catholic
Church. In March 1926, the Vatican named Walsh the CNEWA‟s first president.69 In
September, Walsh described “the wish of the Holy Father to form a permanent society
somewhat like the International Red Cross or the American Near East Relief. It will be a
centralized Catholic distributing agency which can materially assist the Holy See to meet
the daily demands made on the Holy Father for assistance in humanitarian works,
education, and in social welfare work all over the world, as well as in distinctly religious
and missionary activities.”70 Its charitable efforts occasionally extended beyond the Near
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East, such as a $100,000 donation made by the Holy Father, through the CNEWA, to
victims of the Great Mississippi Flood of 1927, a donation which raised the domestic
profile, and fundraising capability, of the association.71 Its board comprised the leading
archbishops in the United States, and included cardinals William O‟Connell of Boston,
Denis Dougherty of Philadelphia, and Patrick Hayes of New York.72 In entrusting the
new association to the American bishops, the Vatican expressed “complete confidence in
the [American] bishops, and the Holy See leaves to them full liberty in the practical
working out of this project.” On the organization of the CNEWA‟s departments and
functions, Cardinal Luigi Sincero, head of the Pontifical Mission for Russia, expressed
that “the Holy See relies, as always, on the judgement of the American bishops.”73
The placing of the CNEWA in the hands of the American episcopate was another
sign of the Vatican‟s growing trust in, and reliance upon, the American Catholic Church,
an alliance girded by the fiscal power of the American faithful. The CNEWA, as the
singular Roman Catholic aid organization for Russia and the Near East, was tasked with
collecting funds from every American diocese, with proceeds placed “at the direct
disposal of the Holy Father himself.”74 Its objectives for 1927 included the
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commencement of a Russian seminary at Rome, as well as aid for Russia, Greece, Syria
and Palestine. A target amount of one million (American) dollars was set by the Vatican,
a figure that was surpassed by June.75 The success of the CNEWA attracted attention
beyond Catholic circles. Herbert Hoover, who at this time served as Secretary of
Commerce, lauded the work of American Catholics in this sphere, connecting the
alleviation of famine and disease to the combating of bolshevism and other antidemocratic forces. A number of mainstream, secular newspapers echoed Hoover‟s
sentiments.76
The generosity of American Catholics, as well as the stalwart leadership of the
American episcopate and clergy, did not go unrecognized by the Vatican. In June 1927,
Pius XI praised the American Church, which had “once more demonstrated its traditional
loyalty to this Holy See, manifested in their spirit of generosity.”77 In the same year, he
credited them further with underwriting the Vatican‟s program for the “safeguarding of
international peace through international understanding,” praising the “great, permanently
organized body of American Catholics forming a solid phalanx” behind him, “unfailing
in their loyalty and devotion.”78 In October 1928, he again extolled the leadership of the
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American bishops in their development of the CNEWA. “We are indebted to you,
Venerable Brothers,” he exclaimed, “in who the sacred hierarchy of the United States
finds its personification, and without whom nothing ever could or can now be
accomplished.”79 He further praised the American Church for “the substantial financial
help given Us in support of two works of religion which are the object of intense daily,
and, ...harrowing concern of Our Apostolic ministry.”80 The first of these were funds for
the Propaganda Fide, the Vatican office tasked with carrying the faith to non-Catholic
regions and states. The second “work” was funds for the Roman Catholic Church in
Palestine, where the Vatican clearly sought to bolster its institutional presence in the
midst rising Arab-Jewish tensions. The Pope urged the bishops to keep in mind “that East
which once was a most flourishing garden of the Catholic Church and which later,
separated, or rather torn, from the Church, fell into so wretched a plight, spiritual and
material as well; that East which now as never before fills Us with hopes so strong and so
sweet of seeing her return to the One Fold, but which for this very reason is more than
ever beset and tempted by propaganda (only too well equipped with worldly resources of
every kind) hostile to Christ and His Church.”81 As early as 1928, then, it was clear that
American Catholic money was supporting the Roman Catholic institutional presence in
Palestine, a territory now firmly on the radar of the Vatican secretariat. Though the
Vatican would ultimately fail in its efforts to normalize relations with Moscow, the

79

GUA-SC, Edmund Walsh Papers, ‘Pope Pius XI to the Archbishops and Bishops of the United States’, 23
October 1928, Box 6, File 391.
80

Ibid.

81

Ibid.
58

CNEWA would remain central to Rome‟s outreach in the Near East, and would play a
vital role in postwar Palestine.
Storm-Clouds Over Europe: The Vatican and American Catholics Move Closer
Increasing diplomatic isolation in Europe was another factor drawing the Vatican
closer to both the American Catholic Church and Washington in the later 1920‟s. The
decade, however, had started with a sense of optimism. Following its rebuff from
participating in the Versailles negotiations, the Vatican spent much of the 1920‟s
attempting to solidify its relations with Europe‟s secular governments. Vatican criticisms
of the Versailles Treaty, mainly that it was an arbitrary and punitive settlement bound to
create future discord, created strains between the papacy and the victorious powers,
particularly France. In Vatican circles, German weakness was considered a portent to
further unrest, and Gasparri sought a return to the „balance of power‟ that had preserved
European stability for much of the nineteenth century. He still sought, however, to
normalize relations with France, the „eldest daughter of the Church‟, which had been
severed two decades previous over tensions in church-state relations and anticlericalism.
Gasparri engaged in careful diplomacy with France, and instructed apostolic delegates in
London, Brussels, Madrid and Rome to counsel moderation on Paris. This strategy of
outreach, which included the canonization of Joan of Arc in 1920, led to the reestablishment of Franco-Vatican relations in 1921.82
The signing of the Locarno Treaties in 1925 was another source of optimism for
the Holy See. The treaties, considered a keystone to political and economic recovery at
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the time of their signing, did create a genuine atmosphere of optimism among European
statesmen for the remainder of the decade.83 Under its terms, Germany was re-integrated
into the European states system, and the powers entered into a mutual non-aggression
pact. In addition, Germany was admitted to the League of Nations, and a withdrawal of
Allied troops from the Rhineland was ordered. The Vatican regarded the Locarno as a
sensible revision of the lopsided Versailles Treaty, and Gasparri expressed a cautious
optimism to foreign diplomats that European relations were finally on a stable course.
In the afterglow of Locarno, the Vatican set about securing its legal position with
a number of European governments through the concordat, a church-state agreement
which preserved the traditional social and civic privileges of the Roman Catholic Church,
as well as securing tax-exempt status for its considerable land and property holdings. The
agreements furnished mutual benefits, providing lay governments an orderly relationship
with both the Church and their Catholic populations (which, in many cases, comprised
the majority). In a short span, the Holy See completed concordats with Latvia (1922),
Poland (1925), Lithuania (1927), Romania (1927) and the German states of Rhineland,
Westphalia and Saarland (1929). The German concordats paved the way for the
Reichskonkordat (1933), an agreement which appeared to normalize relations between
the Holy See and Nazi Germany. The most important negotiations completed by the Holy
See in these years, however, were the Lateran Agreements of February 1929, which
offered Italian recognition of the sovereignty of the pope in the Vatican City, in return for
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papal recognition of the Kingdom of Italy (and Mussolini‟s Fascist regime), and the
exchange of ambassadors. In addition, the agreement provided an indemnity paid to the
Holy See to settle accounts outstanding since Italian unification in 1860, and provided
guarantees on the position of the Church in Italian society.84 The agreements appeared to
settle, once and for all, the tensions between the popes and the Italian state (the „Roman
Question‟) which had bedevilled this relationship for six decades. By the end of 1929,
then, it appeared that the Holy See had buttressed its position with a number of important
European states, and had re-established its position as an independent, neutral and
apolitical „moral arbiter‟ in continental affairs.
The optimism of the mid-to-late 1920‟s, however, would prove to be short lived,
not only for the Holy See but for the wider continent. The economic crash of 1929
strained pre-existing political fault-lines, and renewed the Vatican‟s diplomatic anxieties.
Gasparri‟s cherished „balance of power‟, which he had advocated since 1919, and which
created for the Holy See the political space to exercise influence, eroded rapidly in the
1930‟s. Just as it appeared that the papacy had re-integrated itself into the postwar states
system, economic deterioration and political crises, combined with the rising hostility of
totalitarian regimes in Italy and Germany, once again placed the Vatican in a precarious
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position. As the organizational centre of a universal church which had to deal with the
particular needs of national groups, it had always been subject to pressure from all sides
and factions, representing varied individual and state interests.85 The deterioration of
European affairs after 1930 would create for the Vatican, however, an increasingly
challenging balancing act.
Despite completing a concordat with the Nazi government in 1933, relations
between Rome and the new regime quickly deteriorated. Though Gasparri and his undersecretary had severe doubts about Nazi sincerity at the signing of the agreement, fears of
bolshevism and a paucity of options led to its completion. True to form, Berlin
disregarded most elements of the accord, and the Roman Catholic Church in Germany
was offered little protection against Nazi arrogance and ruthlessness. From the early
1930‟s forward, Pius XI made no secret of his disdain for the Nazi state, despite papal
expectations of a functioning modus vivendi with the Nazi state. It was a position that did
little to enhance Vatican-German relations.86 Rome‟s relationship with Fascist Italy held
up somewhat better, as the Lateran Accords had appeared to create a genuine
rapprochement, according the Church the social and political latitude to pursue its
mission. Cooperation between the Vatican and the regime appeared to reach an apex in
1935, when Italian priests and bishops lent active support to the Italian invasion of
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Abyssinia during the Italo-Ethiopian War.87 From this point forward, however, VaticanItalian relations began to regress. The creation of the Rome-Berlin Axis in 1936, which
drew Italy firmly into the German orbit, created strains between Pius XI and Mussolini
which would intensify as the Italian dictator moved closer to his German counterpart.88
Mussolini‟s adoption of anti-Semitic racial laws in July 1938 further strained relations
between Pius XI and the Fascist state.
It was in the midst of such political volatility, and diplomatic isolation, that the
Vatican began to cultivate ever closer connections both to the American government and
the American Catholic Church. Though the entire world had been shaken by the financial
crash of 1929, American political structures remained remarkably resilient and stable,
attributes admired and sought by the papacy. Alfred E. Smith‟s 1928 run for the
presidency, while ultimately ending in failure, illustrated the extent to which Roman
Catholics could penetrate American political life, even if nativist, anti-Catholic blocs
remained. And the effective diplomacy of the NCWC on the Mexican crisis, as well as
the administrative and fundraising acumen of the CNEWA, had revealed the potential,
both political and financial, of the American bishops. As European political instability
deepened, and as it became increasingly manifest that the United States had supplanted
Britain and as the world‟s most stable and powerful democracy, Vatican attentions
became increasingly focused on Washington and the American Church.
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In the 1930‟s, a number of American Catholic leaders rose to prominence. The
principal national figure among the American bishops was Archbishop Francis Spellman
of New York, a close associate of Eugenio Pacelli (who would become Pope Pius XII in
1939), and friend of Presidents from Roosevelt to Johnson.89 Spellman, who had studied
for the priesthood in Rome, had served in 1925 as the first American attaché to the
Vatican secretariat of state, where he became familiar with leading figures of the
secretariat, including Pope Pius XI, Gasparri and Domenico Tardini, who would later
advise Pius XII on political matters and serve as secretary of state to Pope John XXIII. In
1927, Spellman‟s long and close friendship to Pacelli began during a visit to Germany,
where the future pope was serving as apostolic nuncio. This relationship, which would
strengthen over the 1930‟s and endure throughout Pacelli‟s pontificate, would guarantee
Spellman, and by extension the American Church, an important voice in the formulation
of Vatican policy both during and after the war. In 1939, the Pope would move Spellman
from Boston (where he served as auxiliary bishop), to New York, where he was named
archbishop of the nation‟s preeminent archdiocese. In the consistory of 1946, Pius XII
would make Spellman a cardinal, cementing his position as the foremost leader in
American Catholicism.
Other important national figures included Chicago‟s Archbishop George
Mundelein, a close associate of Roosevelt and key political ally, credited with delivering
the Catholic vote to the Democrats in the 1933 and 1936 federal elections. Mundelein‟s
early and unequivocal support of the New Deal firmed up Catholic support for Roosevelt
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in the heavily Catholic mid-west, and his public praise of the Roosevelt administration`s
action on Mexico further cemented Catholic approval. Between 1932 and the cardinal‟s
death in 1939, Roosevelt could count on the political support of Mundelein who, by his
very association with the president, had become the most visible figure in American
Catholicism. The pair would meet fourteen times in this period, and they shared an active
and frequent correspondence. That no other religious figure would share such a
relationship with Roosevelt was emblematic of the rapidly growing prestige of American
Catholicism.
Archbishop Samuel Stritch, who succeeded Mundelein in 1939, and who was also
raised to the Sacred College by Pius XII in 1946, also maintained a close relationship
with Roosevelt throughout the 1930‟s, as did Boston‟s Cardinal William Henry
O‟Connell. O‟Connell was succeeded in 1944 by Richard J. Cushing, who would
advocate for the Vatican on the Palestine question after 1945, and who later achieved
national renown as the churchman to deliver the invocation at John F. Kennedy‟s 1960
inauguration.90 Other key figures included Detroit‟s Edward Francis Mooney, a former
chairman of the NCWC, and archbishops John F. O‟Hara of Philadelphia, Michael J.
Curley of Baltimore, Patrick O‟Boyle of Washington and Timothy McNicholas of
Cincinnati, all of whom cultivated important political ties in the postwar years. Howard
Carroll, who served as the General Secretary of the NCWC from 1944 to 1957, and Mgr.
Thomas McMahon, who served as the acting head of the CNEWA after 1943, would
emerge as similarly influential figures in the postwar American Catholic firmament,
particularly on the question of Palestine.

90

Ibid.
65

The growth of the American Catholic Church, and the expansion of its influence
in the postwar period, did not escape the attention of the Vatican. From the early 1930‟s,
officials in the Vatican secretariat had divined the growing importance of the American
Church within the international Roman Catholic communion. Later in the decade, the
British Minister at the Vatican, Francis D‟Arcy Osborne, reflected that “the steady
increase of the Catholic populations of the New World, compared with the relative
stability of that of the old, has during the last quarter of a century made the Vatican less
dependent than formerly on Europe, and more anxious to adopt a democratic attitude in
conformity with the spirit of America, to which the papacy may one day have to look for
its main support, financial as well as spiritual”.91
The foresighted Pope Pius XI, preparing Pacelli for the papal throne, had sent him
to the United States in 1936 to acquaint him personally with the leading figures of the
American Church.92 It was Spellman who co-ordinated Pacelli‟s 1936 visit, the first ever
of a future pope to the United States.93 The visit, along with strengthening the bond
between Rome and American Catholic leaders, also highlighted the pre-eminence of
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Spellman in the American Church. Several members of the American hierarchy,
including Mundelein, O‟Connell and Hayes, were vexed by Spellman‟s close control of
Pacelli‟s visit, a situation undoubtedly facilitated by his friendship with Pacelli and his
Roman contacts. Privately, John Burke expressed frustrations over Spellman‟s diffidence
towards the NCWC during Pacelli‟s tour, and criticized the bishop‟s treatment of Amleto
Cicognani, the apostolic delegate, who had been frustrated in his own efforts to manage
Pacelli‟s agenda.94 If the tour signalled Spellman‟s rising status in the American Church,
it also signalled the beginning of intense Vatican efforts to develop closer ties to the
American government. Though the visit was classified as unofficial by the Holy See, the
visit was intended to draw the nominal allies closer together. Pacelli‟s agenda was
threefold: to consult with Catholic leaders and the American government on official
Vatican-American diplomatic relations; to seek American co-operation in the Vatican‟s
various anti-communist endeavours; and to muzzle Father Charles Coughlin, the antiRoosevelt „radio priest‟ who had become a dangerous nuisance both to Washington and
Rome.95 The tour, which was covered extensively by the mainstream secular press,
included meetings both with Catholic leaders and government officials. Through Joseph
P. Kennedy, a prominent Catholic and a major contributor to Roosevelt‟s campaign chest,
Spellman arranged a meeting between Pacelli and Roosevelt at Hyde Park on 5
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November, where diplomatic relations, Coughlin, and closer Vatican-American cooperation were discussed.96
Spellman was the key figure in the strengthening link between Rome and the
American Church from the interwar period forward. He had worked with Pacelli in the
Vatican Secretariat of State in the early 1930‟s, where the two became close friends and
Spellman became Pacelli‟s protégé.97 After becoming auxiliary bishop of Boston in 1932,
Spellman continued to cultivate his Roman contacts, and it was he who made
arrangements for Pacelli‟s 1936 tour. Throughout the 1930‟s Spellman, in addition to his
close relationship with Rome, also developed strong ties with Roosevelt. Spellman, along
with Cardinal George Mundelein of Chicago, actively supported the New Deal, and both
held spiritual authority and political sway in strongholds of Democratic Party
membership.98 Spellman also cultivated a close political relationship with Joseph
Kennedy, a fellow Bostonian, which opened additional avenues for the ambitious prelate.
From 1933 to 1936, Spellman discussed the virtues of formal Vatican-American
diplomatic ties with both Kennedy and James Roosevelt, the President‟s son, a message
he would later take to the President himself during Pacelli‟s visit.
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“The Mangiest, Scabbiest Cat Ever”: The American Catholic Political Lobby
Matures
The political activism of the American Church, honed during the Mexican crisis,
continued to mature through the 1930‟s. Emboldened by an increasingly potent collective
voice, American Catholics adopted distinct positions on several international crises of the
decade, most notably on the Italo-Ethiopian War and the Spanish Civil War.
Significantly, these stances echoed the Vatican‟s quite closely, and stood in distinct
contrast to the position of the federal government and mainstream Jewish and Protestant
groups, highlighting the influence of papal Rome on the political mind, and advocacy, of
American Catholics. Though the League of Nations had firmly denounced Italy‟s
unprovoked attack on Abyssinia in October 1935, the Vatican issued only ambiguous
reactions, reluctant to criticize Mussolini‟s policies too directly, and anxious to maintain
an apolitical neutralism, particularly within the stormy context of European politics.99
Though not unanimous, the response American Catholics to Italian aggression was
similarly ambiguous.100 Many American Catholics continued to view Mussolini with a
mixture of curiosity and admiration, regarding him as the defender of the Church and its
values in Europe, and as a committed anti-communist, a theme that was treated
obsessively in the American diocesan press. The vague reactions of American Catholic
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leaders strained relations between Catholics on the one hand, and Protestants and Jews on
the other, who had roundly criticized Italian actions as a clear breach of international law.
Particularly conspicuous was the lack of Catholic endorsement for the various American
aid agencies established for Ethiopia, many formed by mainstream Protestant and Jewish
organizations, creating interdenominational frictions that would soon be heightened over
the question of Palestine.101
Though Roosevelt and Cordell Hull desired a stricter and more effective embargo
policy on Italy, one that actually curtailed the Italian war effort, American Catholics,
particularly Italian-Americans, opposed vehemently, citing the unjustness of an embargo
policy that treated the belligerents unequally.102 The NCWC argued that a revised
embargo policy compromised American neutrality, and would draw the United States
dangerously closer to intervention, a position that the American Catholic press touted
widely. The persistence of the Catholic lobby hindered Roosevelt‟s implementation of a
stronger embargo, and weakened the president‟s suggestion of a „moral embargo‟ against
the Fascist state. Much as in the case of Mexico, American Catholic positions on the
Italo-Ethiopian War complicated American policymaking efforts. That Roosevelt
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ultimately abandoned a more comprehensive embargo, despite support from Protestant
and Jewish groups, was further evidence of the growing influence of American Catholics
on Washington‟s policy considerations.
The Spanish Civil War similarly served to highlight the increasing stridency of
American Catholic activism on international questions, as well as the clear positional
parallels between the Vatican and the American Church. Upon the outbreak of hostilities
in Spain, the Roosevelt administration sought, above all else, to avoid entanglement in
what was regarded as a European civil war, a policy that fit neatly into the isolationism of
the New Deal. Over time, however, a steadfast isolationism became more difficult to
maintain, particularly given the clear evidence of Nazi and Fascist assistance to General
Francisco Franco‟s Nationalist forces, and in the face of growing atrocities on both sides.
Though few Americans advocated direct intervention in the Spanish conflict, a
wide range of liberal voices, which included many mainstream Protestant and Jewish
groups, advocated for the lifting, or at least the revision of, the American embargo on
arms shipments to Spain, a barrier which they claimed only aided Franco‟s Nationalists.
A number of prominent Protestant and Jewish figures spoke out on the urgent need for
embargo revision, including theologian Reinhold Neibuhr, Albert Einstein (then at
Princeton University), and a cross-section of literary, entertainment and academic
figures.103 The various proponents of embargo revision appeared to secure a victory in
January 1938, when over sixty congressmen issued a statement expressing solidarity with
the Spanish Cortez (Legislature) as a stirring example to the world in its fight to protect
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democracy, a development which appeared to portend the lifting of Washington‟s
embargo.104
Liberal opposition to the Spanish embargo was counterbalanced by a majority of
American Catholic leaders. Though few American Catholics advocated intervention,
most were horrified at the atrocities perpetrated against Spanish religious by Republican
Loyalists, and regarded Franco as a defender of religious freedom (even if many
Catholics were dubious of his political legitimacy). Michael J. Ready, General Secretary
of the NCWC, responded directly to the congressional statement of support for the
Republicans with an open letter, carried widely in the Catholic press, and sent directly to
the State Department, which expressed “shock and amazement” that democratically
elected American congressmen could so cavalierly support an un-democratic, repressive
and anti-clerical regime as the Spanish Republicans.105 Ready‟s letter followed the
statement of the American bishops, issued following their annual meeting in November
1937, expressing support and sympathy for their Spanish co-religionists, a statement
bolstered by a wave of reportage in the Catholic press highlighting the rape of nuns, the
shooting of bishops, and the burning of churches.106 In addition, a number of Catholic
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organizations, at the suggestion of the NCWC, passed resolutions condemning the
anticlericalism of the Barcelona government, forwarding them to key figures in
Washington, including Roosevelt and Hull.107 In December 1938, the National Council of
Catholic Men (NCCM) created the “Keep the Spanish Embargo Committee”, which
constituted another flank in American Catholic efforts to shapes Washington‟s policy on
Spain.
The intensity of American Catholic political pressure on maintaining the Spanish
embargo did not go unnoticed in Washington. In a May 1938 conversation with
Roosevelt, Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes noted that the President feared that the
lifting of the embargo “might have meant the loss of every single Catholic vote next fall,”
a predicament that made the Democrats justifiably wary.108 Though Ickes later quipped in
his diary that Catholic political pressure was “the mangiest, scabbiest cat ever”, the
administration was clearly cognizant of the need to strategically appease it.109 George Q.
Flynn contends that although Catholic pressure did not sway the administration‟s
decision on the Spanish embargo (and only reinforced it), the episode endowed the
American Catholic Church with a reputation for political power it did not fully merit.110
Nonetheless, the fight to maintain the embargo (and the apparent success of the Catholic
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lobby), emboldened the NCWC‟s political lobby, and created the impression in nonCatholic circles (and particularly among mainstream Protestant and Jewish groups), that
Catholics held a special sway in Washington. In fifteen short years, the American
Catholic Church, organized through the NCWC, had emerged as a cogent and unified
voice in American public and political affairs, a powerful advocate of Vatican interests
within the American body politic.
As the political voice of the American Church grew more strident in the later
1930s, so too did Spellman‟s profile also continued to rise. Upon the outbreak of war, he
led American-Catholic support for the war effort, both in his vociferous support for
American entry into the war, and in his capacity as the head of the American Catholic
military chaplaincy. As archbishop of New York, Spellman was also named military
bishop of the United States, a position that took him to Rome several times during the
war.111 Because of his close relationship with Pacelli, Spellman became a primary broker
in the relationship between Washington and the Vatican during the war years. One of
Spellman‟s key wartime duties had been to administer Vatican funds that had been
shipped out of Europe and deposited into American banks for the duration of the war,
evidence of the trust and esteem the Pope held for his point-man in the American Church.
As the Cold War dawned, Spellman had proven his value to the Vatican as an effective
financial manager, diplomat and administrator and was the only senior churchman,
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contends historian Gerald Fogarty, whom the pope regarded as a personal and trusted
friend.112
So highly esteemed was Spellman in Roman circles that there was speculation, as
the war drew to a close, that the archbishop of New York would be named the Vatican‟s
secretary of state, a position made vacant upon the death of Cardinal Luigi Maglione in
August of 1944. The pope, cognizant of Spellman‟s influence with the American
government and Catholic hierarchy, and aware of the potential power of both in the
postwar world, offered him the position at the end of September. Spellman asked for time
to defer his decision until the war‟s end, at which point he declined the offer, arguing that
he would be of more use to Pius XII as archbishop of New York than as secretary of
state.113 Though Spellman had been offered the second most prestigious position in the
Vatican, a job Pacelli himself had held before becoming pope, he feared the constraints of
working too closely with Pius XII. On several foreign questions, the pope had consulted
more extensively with Spellman than with Maglione, and there was no guarantee he
would not turn to someone else in the future.114 Upon reflection, Spellman concluded that
as archbishop of New York, he could operate free of Vatican strictures, forcing Pius XII
to rely on him as a political lynch-pin between Rome and Washington. His decision to
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remain in the United States, given his acute political instincts, and given Rome‟s
increasing desire to draw talented Americans into the Secretariat, spoke volumes on the
growing prestige and influence of the postwar American Church in the international
Roman Catholic firmament.
Vatican hopes for a direct envoy with the American government, which Spellman
had advocated for some time, were realized in January of 1940, when Roosevelt named
Myron Taylor, former chairman of the United States Steel Corporation, as his „personal
representative‟ to the Holy See. Negotiations for such a representative had been ongoing
since Pacelli‟s visit. Roosevelt had hoped that Mundelein would be his point-man for
negotiations with Rome, but the Cardinal‟s death in October 1939 forced the president to
turn to Spellman, with whom he shared a much less intimate association. Earlier in the
same year, Spellman had been installed as the archbishop of New York following the
death of Cardinal Hayes. The appointment itself was a sign of Spellman‟s favour in
Vatican circles, and of the newly elected Pius XII‟s desire, as Europe slid into war, to
draw closer to the American government. The mercurial rise of Spellman, who would
maintain a close relationship both to Roosevelt and Pius XII, combined with the
establishment of a direct presidential envoy to the pope, and the increasing political
stridency of the NCWC, served to draw together the Vatican, the American Church and
the American government through the war years and beyond. It was a strategic and
ideological alliance that would be tested by several international developments, including
the rapid postwar changes in Palestine.
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The Vatican, American Catholics and Political Zionism, 1922-1939
Throughout the interwar period, Vatican attitudes on political Zionism remained
unfavourable, becoming more hardened in the 1930‟s, as increased Jewish immigration to
Palestine lent a renewed urgency to the question of Jewish statehood. Despite the strains
that existed between the Vatican and American bishops in the early 1920‟s, American
Catholic attitudes towards Zionism mirrored Rome‟s quite closely, evidence of an
analogous transnational outlook that appeared to supersede other tensions. An
examination of the American Catholic press over this period illuminates these parallels.
Reflecting Vatican sentiment, American Catholic journals regarded the 1917 capture of
Jerusalem by General Allenby a positive development, delivering the holy city from the
clutches of Muslim rule into the hands of a Christian power. Scepticism of Zionism,
however, remained a prominent theme, and was evinced almost immediately. Chicago‟s
Catholic diocesan paper, the New World, expressed optimism in December 1917 that
“whatever fate awaits the Holy Land, of this we have surety- never again will it depart
from Christian control”, but in the same article it expressed fears that a Zionist-dominated
Palestine would unleash repression against its Catholic population. Similar sentiments
were echoed the following April by the American Catholic Quarterly Review, which
noted that the „politico-religious‟ program of Zionism could spell disaster for the
presence of Roman Catholicism in the territory.115 A host of other diocesan papers,
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including the Boston Pilot, the Michigan Catholic, and the Los Angeles Tidings
expressed comparable concerns.116
These initial anxieties, however, appeared to have subsided by the early 1920‟s.
Following the implementation of Churchill‟s „White Paper‟ of 1922, which amounted to a
watering down of promises made in the Balfour Declaration, reactions in the American
Catholic press toward political Zionism became discernibly muted.117 A joint resolution
of Congress in September 1922, which affirmed that the United States favoured the
establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, did not appear to raise American
Catholic ire.118 Vatican protests, both privately and to the League of Nations, appeared to
have been effective in diluting the Balfour Declaration, as expectations of imminent
Jewish statehood began to diminish. Even the Brooklyn Tablet, edited by the implicitly
anti-Semitic Patrick F. Scanlan, which had adopted a vitriolic editorial stance against
Zionism in previous years, made little mention of it after 1922.119 The remainder of the
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decade, in fact, marked a benign period in Catholic-Jewish relations in the United States.
The resurgence of nativism in this decade, particularly during Al Smith‟s run for the
presidency in 1928, caused Catholic and Jews to find common cause in the face of
Protestant bigotry. Since nativists often lumped Catholics and Jews together as
potentially subversive and „un-American‟, the Catholic press stuck back by emphasizing
that bigotry itself was „un-American‟. In doing so, Catholic journalists and essayists often
defended Jews alongside Catholics, placing critiques of Zionism temporarily aside.
Also mollifying American Catholic (and Vatican) opinion in the 1920‟s was the
steady expansion of the Church and its institutions in Palestine in these years, combined
with the decline of political tensions there after 1922. Under the protection of the British
mandate, and in an atmosphere of political stability, the Roman Catholic Church
underwent a rapid expansion in Palestine. The Jesuits opened a Jerusalem branch of the
Pontifical Biblical Institute, and a number of churches, monasteries, schools and hospitals
were erected in Haifa, Jaffa, Nazareth and Jerusalem.120 Institutions destroyed during the
First World War were rebuilt, and twelve new Roman Catholic parishes were constructed
to minister to Palestine‟s growing Roman Catholic population. America, the Jesuit
journal founded in 1909 and edited by the firebrand Richard Tierney S.J., reflected this
trend towards a muted response to Zionism. Under Tierney, who a later America editor
described as a “man of strong personal views, detesting sham and doubletalk, and
shirking from no controversy”, the influential journal took bold positions on a number of
national and international affairs, including Mexican anticlericalism (for which Tierney
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received a letter of thanks from Benedict XV), Irish nationalism and Palestine. In the
early 1920‟s, however, it reflected Rome‟s general satisfaction with the situation in
Palestine. America reported approvingly on the British Cardinal Bourne‟s visit to
Palestine in 1924, where he observed that the Arab population had “learned to be
patient”, and that he did not notice “the same unwise insistence on an untenable
domination on the part of the Zionists” as he had in 1919.121 The temporary cessation of
tensions in Palestine turned the attention of the majority of Catholic journals elsewhere in
these years. The apparent waning of Zionist ambitions after 1922, combined with
Catholic institutional expansion in Palestine, in fact, tempered American Catholic
editorial opinion on the subject for nearly the remainder of the decade.
There was also evidence that American Catholic money, which flowed to
institutions in Palestine from the CNEWA via the Vatican‟s Oriental Congregation, was
also contributing to the solidification of the Catholic presence in the territory. The
NCWC‟s John Burke, who traveled to Palestine in April 1929 with Pietro FumasoniBiondi, the apostolic delegate to Washington, praised the Franciscans in particular for
their prolific institution-building activities in the Holy Land, and intimated that a Catholic
presence in the territory was essential to the Vatican‟s continued stake there. He
specifically cited the importance of American Catholics to this effort, whose “financial
and political support help in securing and extending the right of Catholics to care for the
Holy Places.”122
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Events in Palestine in the later 1920‟s, however, served to retrench Catholic
hostilities to Zionism. Riots erupted in the territory in 1929 that were the result of longmounting tensions. Despite British-Vatican cooperation in the region, which had
facilitated the expansion of Roman Catholic institutions in Palestine, Arab-Jewish
relations had continued to degrade. By 1928, leading Zionist groups had overcome
hobbling political and ideological divisions, and the movement began to regain its former
momentum.123 Palestinian-Arab leaders, recognizing the resurgent threat of Jewish
Statehood, pressed British authorities on negotiations for a separate Arab state in
Palestine, pointing to other successful Arab-national movements in the region.124 In a
bitter atmosphere of growing mistrust, Muslim-Jewish tensions erupted over rights at the
Wailing Wall. Though Muslims maintained control of the Wall, Jews were allowed to
pray on the pavement beyond it, so long as they did not erect benches, chairs or other
accommodations in the area. Days before the 1928 Jewish Day of Atonement (September
28), Jews erected a screen at the Wall to divide male and female faithful. Muslim reaction
led to an order to dismantle the screen, which British officials deemed an “infringement
of the status quo ante.”125 British officers began to dismantle the screen during
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Atonement Day services, to which Jews reacted angrily, and to which Muslim leaders
mistook as British pro-Arab sympathy. The incident sparked both Jewish and Arab
demonstrations, and placed the incompatibility of Jewish and Muslim ambitions in sharp
context.
The demonstrations piqued latent Arab-nationalist fervour. Over the next several
months, in an effort to underscore Muslim jurisdiction over the Wall and its surrounding
area, an extension was built over its northern portion, and a large muezzin was stationed
on a nearby roof to call the faithful to prayer five times daily. In the summer of 1929, a
passage was created from the Haram to the pavement, effectively making the area a
Muslim thoroughfare.126 Jewish leaders claimed that these alterations constituted a more
severe infringement of the „status quo ante‟ than had the prayer screen, to which Arab
leaders responded with a host of accusations, including a purported Jewish assault on the
Mosque of Omar itself. Tensions crested in August, when Arabs attacked Jewish districts
in Hebron, Safad and several other places. In Hebron alone, 60 Jews were murdered,
prompting a Zionist writer to observe that, “if it had not been for some friendly Arab
families, not a single Jewish soul in Hebron would have remained alive.”127 British
officials, overwhelmed by the impulsiveness and ferocity of the attacks, called in troops
from Egypt for assistance. Though order was restored, the incident permanently poisoned
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the well of Arab-Jewish relations in Palestine, and served to gird the Zionist movement
for future challenges.
While the Vatican did not issue a direct statement condemning the violence, its
position could be gleaned from the reactions of the l’Osservatore Romano, the Holy
See‟s “semi-official” journal which, for all intents and purposes, accurately represented
papal views. It deplored the violence unleashed by Arab mobs, but noted that the Vatican
had warned the British of rising tensions, and had recommended “certain changes in
policy” in order to avert a bloody conflict.128 According to the Vatican, unrest in
Palestine was clearly linked to economic injustice stemming from unchecked Jewish
immigration. The Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem, Monsignor Luigi Barlassina, was quoted
as saying that both Christians and Muslims opposed continued Jewish immigration to the
Holy Land, citing it as a root cause of the recent unrest. (Barlassina, who advised Vatican
policy on Palestine and staunchly defended both Christian and Arab rights, presented the
Vatican‟s objections to the Balfour Declaration to the British government in 1921, and
gave anti-Zionist speeches on scores of occasions. He was, perhaps, the most vocal
Catholic anti-Zionist in Palestine, and he maintained an acrid relationship with both the
Zionists and British officials, undoubtedly colouring Vatican responses as a result).
The initial responses of the mainstream American Catholic press was not entirely
unsympathetic to Jewish losses, a reflection, in part, of generally amicable CatholicJewish relations in the 1920‟s. Journals such as America, Commonweal and the Pilot that
had, throughout the decade, defended Catholics alongside Jews in the face of Protestant
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bigotry, were generally prompt in condemning Arab violence. Commonweal carried a full
report on the massacre at Hebron, chiding Muslim leaders for inciting violence, and
included a message of condolence from New York‟s Cardinal Hayes to American Jewish
organizations.129 The journal further expressed an implicit sympathy with Zionist aims,
urging that Jewish access be granted to worship at the Wailing Wall, given that Jew‟s
rights were “anterior to the Moslem‟s in history; and speaking as Christians, we hold that
his right is spiritually superior as well.”130 The Jesuit journal America expressed similar
indignation at anti-Jewish violence.131 Boston‟s Pilot added to the chorus of Catholic
sympathy for Jewish targets of Muslim violence. Its editor expressed his solidarity with
Jewish victims: “To the unfortunate victims of the uprising in Jerusalem go the
condolences and sympathy of their friends throughout the world. The popular mind
associates the Jewish people with Jerusalem because of the tradition of the past, and the
Old Testament Christian people applauded the Zionist movement.”132
A majority of the American Catholic press, however, was condemnatory not only
of Arab violence, but of political Zionism itself, which a number of Catholic
correspondents regarded as a cause of the 1929 uprisings. The NCWC‟s correspondent in
Palestine and associate of Barlassina, Dr. Alexander Mombelli, filed a series of reports on
the Arab-Jewish riots of 1929 which were widely reprinted in the American diocesan
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press.133 He traced the root of recent unrest to the Balfour Declaration, in his opinion a
flawed agreement that gave oxygen to an ultimately untenable political goal: namely
Jewish statehood in Palestine. Arab violence was carefully explained as an inevitable
reaction to Jewish political and economic hegemony in the Holy Land, a situation
exacerbated by steady Jewish immigration. In stressing the political, and not religious,
origins of the riots, Mombelli attempted to diffuse the idea that the uprisings could be
ascribed to „Moslem fanatacism‟, a notion widely expressed in the mainstream secular
press. Zionism was described as a purely political program, divorced of any theological
legitimacy and “foisted upon pious Jews” only to strengthen its chances of success. 134 He
further suggested that the agitations at the Wailing Wall had been sparked by Zionist
groups, who had demonstrated there a day before the violence had erupted. His critiques
of Zionism were surpassed only by his reports on the embattled position of the Catholic
Church in Palestine, which he filed throughout the 1930‟s.135
As was frequently mentioned in the Catholic press, Mombelli highlighted the
„bolshevistic‟ nature of Jewish communes in Palestine, associating Zionism with an
ideology long since condemned by the Vatican. He raised the issue of extreme divisions
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within the movement itself, where moderates such as Weizmann and fundamentalists
such as Ze‟ev Jabotinsky vied for control.136 As in the mainstream Protestant press, his
reports emphasized a lack of support from most Jews for Zionism, painting the movement
as the ill-conceived brainchild of a small group of quixotic agitators.137 He portrayed the
violence of 1929 as a necessary check on Zionist ambitions, and concluded that its
demise would only benefit the Holy Land. As he observed: “Zionism has had a very
severe trial- its colonies devastated, its buildings robbed, its initiatives paralyzed. When it
is considered that it was already in difficulties, the case is all the worse. If the Arabs in
future should rise and be supported by their co-religionists of Transjordania, Syria, Iraq
and the Arabian peninsula, what might be the result?”138
The anti-Zionist and implicitly pro-Arab reportage of Mombelli, which was
carried by a number of high-circulation diocesan weeklies, did not escape the attention of
Jewish Americans. The tensions that had previously played out between Zionist leaders
and the Vatican now appeared to pit Catholics against Jews in the United States. Jewish
leaders expressed concern with Catholic coverage of events which, contrary to the
mainstream secular press, appeared to fault Zionism for political tensions in Palestine.
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Morris Lazaron, an influential Baltimore rabbi who would play a significant role in
interfaith initiatives in the 1930‟s through the National Conference of Christians and Jews
(NCCJ), expressed reservations at the implicit biases in Catholic coverage. Though a
leading voice in the American non-Zionist movement, he took exception to what he
regarded as an anti-Semitic propensity in the diocesan press, a position he expressed in
letters to Burke and the National Catholic News Service (NCNS).139 In a response to
Lazaron, Burke conceded that his correspondent did advocate an anti-Zionist position, but
that he did not “show an anti-Jewish spirit”, and that he did highlight Arab atrocities. “He
does show bias”, Burke admitted, “against the extreme form of Zionism, and he does play
up the Arab side and the Arab defence. Yet at the same time, he shows the Arabs in a bad
light in two respects- in the violence they commit and in their non-conciliatory spirit.”140
In closing, Burke expressed a view that was to define the position of mainstream
American Catholicism for the remainder of the 1930‟s: a denunciation of anti-Semitism
and Jewish persecution, combined with a forthright opposition to the tenets of political
Zionism. “The impression I have reading his weekly correspondence is that he is not at
all anti-Jewish, but that he is certainly in favour of a lessening of the Zionist status...Only
when the material is grossly wrong do we interfere, and in this case we hardly think that
the case merits intervention.”141
American Catholic disdain for Zionism, coupled with a claimed affinity for Jews
and an abhorrence of religious persecution in general, closely mirrored the Vatican‟s
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position in the 1930‟s, and it was reflected broadly in the American Catholic press. The
Balfour Declaration, which had received little analysis or comment in the diocesan press
in 1917, was now regarded as the source of political and social instability in Palestine.
The riots promulgated by Muslims were tied to legitimate grievances stemming from
Jewish political and economic dominance in Palestine, and not in eruptions of religious
violence. America, which adopted an editorial line increasingly sympathetic to Arab
concerns, emphasized the marginalization of Arabs by Jews in Palestine, the latter having
“every advantage- capital, science and organization.”142 Despite this position of
advantage, Zionists were portrayed as a ravenous group bent on further dominance. As
the New World (Chicago) reported, Zionists demanded “a Jewish police force, a Jewish
defence force, and a Jewish administration.”143 In discounting charges of „Moslem
fanaticism‟ in the riots of 1929, editor Patrick Scanlan of the Brooklyn Tablet reminded
readers that “there was once a religious warfare in the Holy Land. The papers said
nothing about it. It was when Christ was crucified,” a clear allusion to Jewish complicity
in the crucifixion and an example of the thinly-veiled anti-Semitism that characterized the
paper until at least the early 1950‟s.144
The British Commission charged with investigating the 1929 riots reached a
conclusion not disagreeable to the Catholic position. Appointed by Lord Passfield
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(Sidney Webb) and headed by Sir Walter Shaw, the Commission arrived in Palestine in
late October 1929 to observe and report on the political and social condition of the British
Mandate. The Passfield „White Paper‟ essentially amounted to a check on the national
ambitions of both Palestinian Arabs and Zionist Jews. As both movements appeared to be
gaining momentum and international support (with „American Zionism‟ gaining strength,
and regional support for Arab Palestinians coalescing), British surveyors feared losing
control of the territory to either group. Jewish immigration, which had caused the Jewish
population of Palestine to double in ten years (from 84,000 in 1920 to 175,000 in 1930),
was cited as a central cause of Arab discontent, and limits on Jewish immigration to
Palestine was suggested.145 Maintenance of the status-quo became central to the Shaw
Commission‟s report. The Labour government of Ramsey MacDonald adopted Shaw‟s
suggestion that the Balfour Declaration really imposed on Britain two separate but equal
obligations to both Jews and Arabs. In announcing Britain‟s official policy on the
Palestine Mandate, MacDonald explained that, “A double undertaking is involved, to
Jewish people on the one hand, and to the non-Jewish population of Palestine on the
other; and it is the firm resolve of His Majesty‟s Government to give effect, in equal
measure, to both parts of the Declaration and to do equal justice to all sections of the
population of Palestine.”146
The Vatican, which continued to oppose Jewish statehood in Palestine, was
generally approving of the British resolution, which appeared to hobble Zionist national
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ambitions. The Vatican similarly feared Muslim control of the territory, which was
regarded as an equally dangerous threat to Roman Catholic interests in the Holy Land.
Both Britain and the Vatican feared Soviet infiltration, which the Passfield „White Paper‟,
by maintaining some semblance of order, appeared to have staved off. For the time being,
the synchronous goals of the Vatican and Britain, namely to prevent the hegemony of
either Arab or Jew in Palestine, and to ward off Soviet infiltration, appeared to be secure.
The Vatican‟s public stance on Palestine became increasingly cautious in the late 1920‟s
and early 1930‟s. The Passfield „White Paper‟, as did Churchill‟s „White Paper‟ of 1922,
appeared to have created a temporary calm in the Holy Land. The Vatican secretariat
continued to air its concerns to Britain through diplomatic channels, but its public
positions became focused on bolshevism and the promotion of international religious
freedom (as in Mexico, Spain and Russia).
The American Catholic press similarly expressed satisfaction with the restrictions
of the „White Paper‟, which placed a check on a Zionist solution that many Catholic
editors considered untenable. The Commonweal, a liberal and lay Catholic journal,
founded in 1924 and reputed for its principled editorials and liberal slant, issued perhaps
the most balanced Catholic reaction to the Passfield „White Paper‟, but one which still
regarded a Jewish state in Palestine as ultimately untenable:
We have expressed before this our sense of the tragic impasse in Palestine. The
peculiar need of the Jews for a geographical home, the peculiar historic and
spiritual appropriateness of locating that home in Palestine, are beyond question.
Beyond question too, are the facts of the solemn invitation and guarantee
extended to the Jewish race in the Balfour document, and that race‟s
overwhelming response in dollars and men. On the other hand, the resentment of
the Palestinian Arabs at what they feel to be an alien invasion, is as little to be
conjured away; and when we consider the homogeneity of the whole Moslem
90

body, and the 75,000,000 Indian Mohammedans who at any moment may take
up actively the cause of their Arab co-religionists, we can understand Britain‟s
present minimizing of their undertaking.147

Other American Catholic journals, particularly the diocesan papers which
received dispatches from the NCWC News Service, were less judicious in their
evaluations. Mombelli, who remained in Palestine as the NCWC‟s correspondent, placed
the blame for the 1929 riots squarely on the Zionists, and considered the roots of discord
in the Holy Land to be political, and not racial or religious, a tack that allowed Roman
Catholic observers to critique Zionism while avoiding the smear of anti-Semitism. The
unrest of 1929, he maintained, was the inevitable end-result of Zionist belligerence. “This
roseate idea that a solid and admirable new homeland for the scattered Jewish people,
with the current faith of Moses as its centre, has been rearing itself here and has become
far too widespread,” he wrote in October 1929. “Regrettable as these recent events have
been, it was time that something came about to bring the truth of the matter to the
fore.”148 In early 1930, Mombelli quoted Robert Gordon-Canning, the noted British
fascist, anti-Semite and supporter of Arab nationalism who visited the territory in 1929
and concurred that “the fundamental unrest in Palestine and the hatred of the Jew by the
Arab is political, and neither racial nor religious.”149 In stressing that the movement was
essentially political, based on a cynical realpolitik, Mombelli emphasized its
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incompatibility with orthodox Judaism, and indeed its links to bolshevism and
communism, charges echoed by a number of American bishops and high-ranking figures
in the Vatican secretariat. In linking Zionism and bolshevism, he assured readers that
Zionists had every intention of “making Palestine a battlefield.”150
The portrayal of political Zionism as a dangerous, ill-founded and belligerent
movement, cynical in its methods, based in power politics, and divorced from orthodox
Judaism in spirit and action, formed the essence of American Catholic characterizations
of it for the remainder of the 1930s. Steady Jewish immigration to Palestine, and the
periodic flare-ups of Arab-Jewish tensions over the decade, only entrenched the antiZionist premonitions of the Catholic press.151 Nazi persecution of Jews in Germany,
however, gave a new urgency to the question of a Jewish homeland in Palestine as the
decade wound to a close. Nazi brutality also steeled the Zionist lobby in the United States
which, by the eve of war, was strenuously advocating its positions in Washington. As
American Catholic and Vatican positions on Zionism continued to coalesce, and as
American Catholics more confidently advocated their views on a number of international
questions, so too had the American proponents of Zionism (which included a number of
Protestant leaders) become more strident. The war, and its immediate aftermath, would
serve to place these opposite camps in sharp relief.
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Chapter 2
Toeing the Roman Line: American Catholics, the Holocaust and the
Palestine Question
As the clouds of war continued to gather over Europe, ties between the Vatican,
Washington and the American Church continued to coalesce. The appointment of Myron
C. Taylor as Roosevelt‟s „personal representative‟ to the Vatican in December 1939
highlighted the President‟s desire to establish a direct link to the Pope, despite stiff
Jewish and Protestant disproval of the mission. Roosevelt‟s ties with American Catholic
leaders were also strong on the eve of war, and he would count on the support of the
bishops to transform a staunch Catholic isolationism into support for the war effort by
1941. Cardinal Spellman‟s close relationship with Pacelli (who had been elected Pope
Pius XII in March 1939) heralded an ever closer working relationship between the
Vatican and the leading figure in the American Church. The informal, tripartite „strategic
alliance‟ appeared to have congealed.
On the question of Zionism, however, a deepening cleft emerged between the
Vatican and American Catholics on one side, and Washington and American Zionist
groups on the other. The Holocaust, despite providing the most compelling rationale yet
for the creation of a Jewish home in Palestine, did not alter either the Vatican‟s or the
American bishops‟ opposition to the Zionist program, a stance which remained firmly
rooted in historical and theological notions. American Catholic expressions of sympathy
for persecuted Jews were widespread and genuine, reaching beyond the retrained and
abstract statements issued by the wartime Vatican. On the substantive issue of a Jewish
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national home in Palestine, however, the American bishops remained firmly in line with
Rome. Simply put, the tragedy of the Holocaust did not break up the transnational Roman
Catholic consensus on Zionism, despite the increasingly compelling logic for the creation
of a Jewish national home.
The Wartime „Strategic Embrace‟: American Catholics, the Vatican and
Washington
The war years witnessed a progressive consolidation of the interrelationship
between the Vatican, Washington and the American bishops, an informal alliance which
the conflict itself had made increasingly vital. These relationships, of course, had been
warming since the early 1930‟s. The Vatican had long been cognizant of the increasing
importance of the United States in international affairs, acknowledged by Pacelli‟s
American „tour‟ of 1936, and was anxious to build on its collegial and constructive ties to
both American Catholics and their government. By the late 1930‟s, Roosevelt had spent
nearly a decade cultivating his ties to American Catholic leaders, as his close ties to
Mundelein, Stritch, Mooney and Spellman attested. Catholics had been instrumental in
delivering Roosevelt electoral victories in 1932 and 1936, and the President remained
committed to maintaining amiable relations with the Church, particularly as the European
situation darkened. His appointment of Myron C. Taylor, a prominent New York
industrialist, as his „personal representative‟ to the Holy See in December 1939,
highlighted the President‟s genuine desire for closer ties with papal Rome. Roosevelt‟s
appointment of Taylor was a tacit sign of the significance the President placed on a
diplomatic channel directly to the Pope. The idea of a representative had the additional
support of Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State, and Sumner Welles, his undersecretary,
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and was negotiated through Cicognani and Spellman.1 Spellman‟s central role in the
negotiations, in fact, signalled his increasingly important function as a conduit between
the Vatican and the President, enhanced by his accession to Archbishop of New York in
May 1939. Hull and Welles considered the Vatican an important wartime „listening post‟,
a repository of diplomatic intelligence that could only enhance American efforts. The
Vatican, on its part, recognized the growing role of the United States in global affairs,
and was eager to establish more regular channels with Washington, particularly in the
midst of a rapidly deteriorating European situation. The American Church, an institution
and a constituency both American and Catholic, was poised to become the crucial
intermediary in the wartime Washington-Vatican axis.
The American Catholic bishops, on their part, largely abandoned the staunch
isolationism of the 1930‟s to wholly endorse the American war effort. Though
isolationism had defined mainstream American Catholic positions on the war debate in
the later 1930s, and while pockets of Italian-American Catholics remained sympathetic to
Mussolini and the Fascists, the bishops adopted the position that the struggle against Nazi
Germany was indeed a fight for the survival of Christian civilization. In December 1941,
two weeks after the Pearl Harbor attack, Mooney, acting as the chairman of the
administrative board of the NCWC, assured Roosevelt that the United States could count
on the unconditional support of the American Catholic Church.2 In fully equating
Catholicism with unreserved patriotism, Mooney informed the President that “the historic
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position of the Catholic Church in the United States gives us a tradition of devoted
attachment to the ideals and institutions of government we are now called upon to
defend.” He assured Roosevelt that the bishops, “spiritual leaders of more than twenty
million Americans,” were “keenly conscious of [their] responsibilities in the hour of the
nation‟s testing.”3 In concluding, Mooney reiterated resolute Catholic support, and
intimated the importance of the struggle for the survival of Christian civilization. “We
give you, Mr. President, the pledge of our whole-hearted support in the difficult days that
lie ahead. We place at your disposal in that service our institutions and their consecrated
personnel. We will lead our priests and our people in constant prayer that God may bear
you up under the heavy burdens that weigh upon you...that He will strengthen us all to
win a victory that will be a blessing not for our nation alone but for the whole world.”
In short order, support for the war effort was widely trumpeted in the Catholic
press, which characterized the struggle as a stark confrontation between Christian
civilization and barbarism.4 In January 1942 the Vatican, through Cicognani, virtually
demanded that the American episcopate present a unified public stand of support for the
statement, despite the lingering of isolationist sentiments among some bishops.5 It was a
corporate action that the Vatican would soon again expect on the question of Palestine.
The statement, which was released to the press, was also reported on widely in
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mainstream papers, including the New York Times, which reprinted the letter in its
entirety on Christmas Day.6 In his response to the NCWC, Roosevelt thanked the bishops
for their pledge of support, and assured that an allied victory would be a victory for
Christian civilization. “We shall win this war and in victory we seek not vengeance,” he
intoned, “but the establishment of an international order in which the spirit of Christ shall
rule the hearts of men and of nations.”7 As the United States entered the war, Roosevelt
could certainly count on Catholic enlistment, which would surpass even the high levels of
the First World War.
Events of the war itself drew the parties ever closer. Soon after the American
entry into the conflict, the NCWC again assured Roosevelt of the unswerving loyalty of
American Catholics to the war effort. In a memorandum to the President, Mooney,
speaking on behalf of the NCWC, presaged a fruitful postwar cooperation between the
Vatican and the United States, “when anti-Christian philosophies which have taken the
sword will perish by the sword,” and he outlined the unanimity of papal pronouncements
and American objectives.8 The nation was united in the war effort, he continued, and
“among the architects of this unity are the foremost Catholic leaders in our country.”9 It
was a statement of fealty to which the Vatican would demand full adherence to from the
American episcopate. The American bishops‟ annual statement for 1942, „Victory and
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Peace‟, affirmed the sentiments of Mooney‟s letter.10 Roosevelt, on his part, sought to
assure the Vatican that he shared papal visions of a postwar order. In September 1942, he
prepared a lengthy and confidential memorandum for Pope Pius XII, to be delivered
personally by Taylor, in which he praised the moral leadership of the Roman Catholic
Church, particularly in denouncing Nazi racialism, and pledged to fight the Axis to the
bitter end.11 He further praised the support of the American Catholic bishops, who had
engaged “the lives, the treasure and the sacred honour of American Catholics in the
defence of their freedom against aggression.” He further emphasized the enduring unity
of purpose between Washington and papal Rome. “We want nothing better,” he
concluded, “than a continuation of those parallel efforts made by the Pope and the
President before the war became general.”12
The war also highlighted the growing role of the American episcopate as an
intermediary between Washington and the Vatican, despite the existence of an American
envoy to the pope. The allied bombings of Rome vividly underscored the diplomacy of
the American bishops, particularly Spellman, Mooney and Stritch, on behalf of the
Vatican. Allied strategic bombing of Rome throughout the spring, summer and autumn of
1943, designed to loosen the German grip on the Eternal City, strained relations between
the Vatican and Washington. Publically, the bishops said little about the bombings, eager
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to maintain a unified front in supporting the war effort, and reticent to incur the hostility
of non-Catholic groups. Privately, however, the bishops strenuously commuted to
Roosevelt the Pope‟s desire to spare Rome further bombings. In September, the NCWC
issued a letter to Roosevelt, in the name of the entire American episcopate, reminding the
President of his responsibility to protect Rome from further damage.13 Spellman, on his
part, met repeatedly with Roosevelt to negotiate a cessation. During a meeting with the
president in September 1943, Spellman presented a statement, also signed by Mooney
and Stritch, which recommended that Rome be declared an „Open City‟, and immediately
be spared allied bombs.14 The trio didn‟t hesitate to draw parallels between their demands
and American domestic politics, alluding to the political power “of more than twenty
million American Catholics, [who hoped] that their government will not have to share
further responsibility for even more disastrous developments that threaten the Holy See
under the conditions.” The statement further warned against ignoring the international
political influence of the Roman Catholic Church, continuing that “military measures
which offend the religious sense of so many citizens in so many nations may have
consequences fatally prejudicial to the interests we all have at heart in the making of the
peace and to the national and international collaboration necessary to that blessed end.”15
Roosevelt, on his part, pledged to his guests the creation of a free zone of twenty miles
around the city, and assured them that the allied (and American) cause was in full unison
with the Holy See‟s.
13

Michael Ready to Roosevelt, 15 September 1943, NCWC/OGS/ACUA, Box 21, File 7. In this letter, the
bishops re-affirmed their “deep patriotic devotion” to the President and to the American war effort.
14

Mooney, Spellman and Stritch to Roosevelt, 21 September 1943, Actes et Documents, Volume 7, 648650.
15

Ibid.
100

On 11 November, just weeks after the meeting with Roosevelt, the American
bishops convened in Washington for their annual meeting. While the annual statement
issued for 1943, „The Essentials of a Good Peace‟, expounded on the necessary
conditions of a Christian postwar order, the meeting was also significant for the adoption
of a resolution where the bishops pledged their “filial devotion to the Holy See.”16 In it,
they vowed to raise public awareness through the Catholic press, and keep Washington
apprised of any threats to the Vatican City or other church interests. Though the
bombings of Rome were not mentioned explicitly, they were clearly implied. The
resolution was a call to action for the American bishops, echoing the pope‟s July request,
on visiting a shelled Roman neighbourhood, that the American Church “demonstrate its
dissatisfaction in such great grief.” Though the bishops never publically criticized the
allied bombings of Rome, the American Catholic press expressed evident dissatisfaction,
clearly revealing the position of the American Church.
While the war, then, drew the Pope, the President and the American bishops
closer together, it also raised hopes that the bishops might more effectively press the
Vatican‟s demands on Washington. The bishops, on their part, had answered the nation‟s
call to duty, and their protests on the bombing of Rome represented their first attempt,
since the American entry into the war, to shape Washington‟s policy on an issue germane
to the Vatican. It was a lobby that would be mobilized again on a number of postwar
questions, including Palestine.
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Into the Abyss: The Pope and The Shoah
The Second World War and the Holocaust proved to be cataclysms that shaped
subsequent European and international affairs in profound and irrevocable ways. The
conflict, besides proving to be the crucible of a new and dangerous ideological divide,
produced atrocities that that made the logic of a Jewish homeland more compelling.
Britain, the mandatory power, had been reticent to support Zionist ambitions for much of
the 1930‟s, and the British „White Paper‟ of 1939 appeared to have placed renewed
obstacles in the path of such a goal.17 The horrors of the Holocaust, however, and the
growing sense of the depth of the Jewish refugee crisis created a sense of urgency on the
Zionist Question from 1943 onwards. The tragedy of European Jewry underscored the
moral, political and historical legitimacy of a Jewish state in Palestine. Much scholarly
ink has been spilled on the question of the Vatican‟s efforts, or lack thereof, to assist
European Jews during the darkest days of their history.18 Significant is that fact that a
growing awareness of the tragedy affecting European Jewry after 1942 did not alter the
Vatican‟s fundamental opposition to the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, a
position it had presented in its 1922 „aide memoire‟ to the League of Nations, and which
remained unchanged through the war.
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The Vatican did consider the Holocaust a tragedy for humankind, and numerous
papal attempts to assist Italian and European Jews were documented.19 Despite the
ambiguity of official pronouncements, for which the wartime Vatican has been justifiably
criticized, examples of papal assistance to European Jews during the war abound. A brief
examination of Vatican efforts does place its policy on political Zionism into wider
context. In Italy, the Vatican had protested Fascist anti-Semitic laws since their inception
in 1937, a reflection of Pius XI‟s deep enmity for racialist ideologies. In 1939, when
these decrees excluded Jews from a number of professions, including medicine, law,
teaching and journalism, Cardinal Maglione, the Vatican Secretary of State, openly
criticized the “so-called racial laws”, and stressed in a note to the Mussolini government
that the laws created a “good deal of suffering, desolation and ruin”.20 The Vatican
maintained official protests against Italian racial laws for the duration of the war. Pinchas
Lapide, a postwar Israeli diplomat and prominent scholar of the wartime papacy,
contended that racial laws were never fully implemented in Italy due in part to the
ceaseless interventions of the papal nuncio to Italy, Francesco Borgongini-Duca, on
behalf of Italian Jews.21 Vatican diplomats in Nazi-occupied territories such as France,
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Slovakia, Croatia and Greece similarly protested to local official against anti-Semitic
decrees, and with some success, particularly in Catholic states.22
Efforts to assist European Jews extended beyond official protests. Between 1939
and 1945, more than six thousand Italian Jews obtained passports, ship tickets and travel
money from the Rome-based St. Raphael‟s Association, an organization directly funded
by the Vatican. Countless others were sheltered in monasteries, churches, convents and
private homes, all with the explicit knowledge of the Pope, and consistent with his
opposition to Nazi and Fascist racialist policies.23 The Vatican Relief Commission, at a
cost of nearly one million dollars, supplied food, clothing, and medicine to untold
thousands of refugees, prisoners and partisans during the winter of 1943-44, including at
least 6000 Jews in Rome alone. As confidence in papal efforts to assist persecuted
minorities increased, funds flowed to the Vatican from various international sources. In
January 1940, the Chicago-based „United Jewish Appeal for Refugees‟ forwarded
125,000 dollars as a contribution to Vatican rescue efforts. Throughout the war, the
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Vatican distributed American federal funds through its various aid organizations in Rome
and throughout Italy, for the benefit of Jews and non Jews alike.24
The Vatican also sought to facilitate the emigration of Italian Jews to safer
wartime havens. One of the more famous of these initiatives was the provision of more
than a thousand Brazilian immigration visas to Italian Jews, many of them recent
converts to Catholicism, to provide safe passage from Rome to Rio de Janeiro, a plan
which saw more than a thousand visas issued.25 The Vatican also provided financial
support to DELASEM (Delegazione per L’Assistenza degli Emigranti Ebrei), a Jewish
resistance organization that operated in Italy throughout the war, and that facilitated the
emigration of nearly 9000 Jews from Italy, primarily to neutral states such as Spain,
Portugal and Ireland.26 The initiative, though undoubtedly beneficial to Jews fleeing Nazi
terror, fit neatly into the Vatican‟s longstanding position on Zionism. It recognized the
legitimate plight of persecuted Jewry, and it sought to offer material and logistical aid
where it could, but it implicitly suggested a destination other than Palestine, consistent
with the view that the Terra Santa itself was sacred to Roman Catholics, and could not be
jeopardized by the fulfillment of the Zionist program.
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Vatican efforts were acknowledged by a number of prominent Jewish and Zionist
leaders. In a 1943 letter to Amleto Cicognani, the apostolic delegate in Washington,
Chaim Weizmann expressed gratitude to the Church for its assistance to European Jews.
“I was happy to hear from Secretary [Henry] Morgenthau,” he said, “that the Holy See is
lending its powerful help wherever it can, to mitigate the fate of my persecuted coreligionists, and once more I would like to give expression to my deep feeling of
gratitude in which I am sure every humanitarian would share.”27 In the immediate
postwar years, praise for Pius XII from Jewish leaders was largely effusive. Dr. Raphael
Cantoni, head of the Italian Jewry‟s Wartime Assistance Committee, observed of Roman
Catholic efforts: “The Church and the papacy have saved Jews as much and in as far as
they could save Christians...Six million of my co-religionists have been murdered by the
Nazis, but there could have been many more victims, had it not been for the efficacious
intervention of Pius XII.”28 In a private audience granted in the fall of 1945, a group of
prominent Jewish leaders, including Italian Rabbi Elezier Jeruscialmi, thanked the Pope
for his efforts in sparing their co-religionists the worst of Nazi abuses.29 Moshe Sharett,
the future Israeli foreign minister and prime minister, echoed these sentiments following
an audience with Pius XII in April 1945: “I told him [the Pope] that my first duty was to
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thank him, and through him, the Catholic Church, on behalf of the Jewish public for all
they had done in the various countries to rescue Jews, to save children, and Jews in
general. We are deeply grateful to the Catholic Church for what she did in those countries
to help save our brothers.”30
Throughout the war, a distinct bifurcation endured in the Vatican‟s response to
persecution of Europe‟s Jews, characterized by assistance to Jews, where possible, one
the one hand, and an opposition the goals of political Zionism on the other. Simply put,
the tragedy of the Holocaust and the refugee crisis that it created did not translate into
Vatican support for the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. Assistance to European
Jews was regarded as a Christian duty, an obligation to lend assistance to a suffering
fellow man. Monsignor Domenico Tardini, the Vatican‟s undersecretary of state,
expressed as much in the spring of 1943, when he observed that “the Jewish question is a
question of humanity. The persecutions to which the Jews in Germany and the occupied
or conquered countries are subjected are an offence against justice, charity,
humanity...Therefore, the Catholic Church has full reason to intervene, whether in the
name of divine law or natural law.”31 Support for a Jewish homeland, however, despite
the catalyst that the Holocaust had created toward that very end, was unfailingly opposed
by Pius XII‟s Vatican, based on the ancestral Roman Catholic tenet that the Terra Santa
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was sacred to the faith, and must never fall under the political jurisdiction of a sovereign
power.
In the spring and summer of 1943, as the world became more fully apprised of the
tragedy of the Holocaust, Cardinal Luigi Maglione, Pope Pius XII‟s Secretary of State,
restated the Vatican‟s opposition to Zionism in stark terms. In a March letter to William
Godfrey, apostolic delegate to London, he expressed disappointment that Britain, which
had recently facilitated the immigration of Jews from all corners of Europe to Palestine,
had “altered its course”, and appeared to be contravening the limits on immigration
outlined in the 1939 „White Paper‟.32 It was clear that Maglione equated Jewish
immigration to Palestine with the creation of a Jewish state there. “The Holy See has
never approved the project of making Palestine a home for the Jews,” he continued.
“Palestine has always been more sacred to the Catholic than the Jews.”33 Maglione‟s
notes from April revealed similar sentiments. He reflected on the “particular historical
rights” held by Catholics on the Holy Places, which extended “with deep piety and
devotion to Palestine itself, made sacred by the presence and memory of the divine
redeemer”, alluding that the whole territory was sacred to the Church.34 As such, he
concluded that “Catholics would be injured in their religious sentiment and rightly fear
for their rights if Palestine would belong exclusively to the Hebrews,” echoing sentiments
that could be traced back to the writings of Origen, Tertullian and Augustine.
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In a May letter to Cicognani, the apostolic delegate to Washington, he re-iterated
the Vatican‟s 1922 „aide memoire‟ to the League of Nations, which continued to define
the Vatican‟s position on Palestine.35 The Holy See, he expressed, could not accept the
creation of a Jewish state in a territory that held such deep historical, theological and
spiritual significance for the world‟s Roman Catholics. It was a territory, he reminded
Cicognani, which constituted the very cradle of Christianity. Though he admitted that “at
a time, the Jews did have a home in Palestine”, he questioned “how this historical criteria
could be adopted to restore a people to a territory they occupied more than nineteen
centuries ago?”36 He suggested that another home could be found for the Jews outside of
Palestine. Pushing forward the Zionist program, he warned, would be dangerous. “It
would create serious new international problems, and would lead to a justifiable lament
from the Holy See, which has always provided charity and assistance to non-aryans.”
Maglione‟s statements perfectly reflected the duality of Roman Catholic attitudes towards
the Jewish plight, which encompassed a professed Christian duty to assist fellow men in
need, with a resolute rejection of the solution proposed by Zionism. It was a duality
almost perfectly mirrored by the institutional response of the American Catholic Church.
American Catholics, the Holocaust and Zionism
From the time of the Kristallnacht forward, expressions of solidarity with
European Jews, and denunciations of Nazi brutality, were largely forthcoming from the
various organs of the American Catholic Church. This was despite the fact that the

35

Luigi Maglione to Amleto Cicognani, 18 May 1943, Actes et Documents, Volume 9, 300.

36

Ibid.
109

Church was still working to effectively constrain the anti-Semitic „radio priest‟, Father
Charles Coughlin, whose popularity on the airwaves had contributed to tepid CatholicJewish relations in the 1930‟s. Maria Mazzenga has argued that a crassly anti-Semitic
broadcast of Coughlin‟s, delivered in the immediate wake of the Kristallnacht,
galvanized his opponents in the American Church to present a more definitive stance of
support for European Jews.37 The brutality of the Kristallnacht, which aroused
sympathies across the American political and religious spectrum, combined with
Coughlin‟s crass response to it, did appear to spur the American Church to speak out
more openly against Nazi crimes.
In the immediate wake of the Kristallnacht, the Knights of Columbus published
an open letter to Roosevelt, expressing the organization‟s “deepest sympathy for the
distressed Jews of Europe”, and urging the American government to use its diplomatic
channels and political clout to help secure the refuge of Jews to Palestine and other safe
havens.38 John A. Ryan, the foremost progressive American Catholic thinker of the
prewar era, wasted little time in denouncing Nazism following the Kristallnacht.39 In a
July 1938 address to the annual convention of Duluth‟s B‟nai B‟rith, Ryan denounced
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Nazi persecution of the Jews as “contrary to the moral law of nature,” and deemed Nazi
racial theories as “utterly without scientific basis.”40 He continued that “Hitler‟s theory
and practice with regard to the Jews contradicts, as he well knows, the very doctrines of
Christianity.” Ryan assured his audience that “authorized teachers and expounders of
Catholic doctrine do not indulge in anti-Semitism,” and he re-iterated the “outspoken
espousal of the Jewish cause” by Catholic editors and writers in the United States.41 Later
in 1938, he wrote that Nazism, which was “excessively nationalistic, adheres to a theory
of racial superiority and racial purity which are without foundation in fact, and which
have been used as a pretext for an enormous amount of injustice and uncharity towards
the Jewish race.”42 In 1939, Ryan told the audience of a Jewish civic forum in New York
that anti-Semitism was “contrary to Christianity and violates the basic principles of
American democracy. Followers of Christ cannot believe He would hate the race from
which He sprang or any other people.”
Ryan did not stand alone in expressing such sentiments in the immediate wake of
the Kristallnacht. American Catholic solidarity with, and sympathy for, German Jewry
was expressed emphatically and passionately in a thirty minute radio address, broadcast
from the Catholic University of America, and carried by NBC to a nationwide audience.
Organized by Maurice Sheehy, professor of religion at Catholic University, and airing in
November 1938, just 2 weeks after the Kristallnacht, the address featured a number of
prominent American Catholic leaders, including Sheehy, Bishops John Mitty of San
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Francisco, John Gannon of Erie, and Peter Ireton of Richmond, former Democratic
presidential candidate Al Smith, and Catholic University rector Monsignor Joseph
Corrigan.43 Sheehy‟s opening remarks were indicative of the tone of the broadcast. “The
world is witnessing a great tragedy in Europe today,” he intoned, “and after sober, calm
reflection, various groups and leaders of the Catholic Church have sought permission to
raise their voices, not in mad hysteria, but in firm indignation against the atrocities visited
upon the Jews in Germany. The Catholic loves his Jewish brother because, as Pope Pius
XI had pointed out, we are all spiritual Semites.”44 The address amounted to a resolute
condemnation of Nazi aggression, and implicitly served to counter the recent anti-Semitic
musings of Coughlin. In effect, the address proposed an alternative to Coughlin‟s
defensive Catholicism, beckoning American Catholics to champion religious freedom
and democratic ideals, and to pray for his persecuted Jewish „brothers‟. It was this
enlightened strain of American Catholicism which informed Catholic responses to Jewish
persecution through the war.
In large part, Catholic periodicals and diocesan newspapers in the United States
reflected the position of Rome; namely that the persecution of European Jews was a
tragedy for all humankind, but that it did not necessitate, or obviate, the creation of a
Jewish homeland in Palestine. Declarations of solidarity with persecuted Jews, therefore,
featured prominently in a wide range of Catholic journals from the Kristallnacht forward,
reflective of genuine American Catholic sympathies for the Jewish plight. The widely
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circulated Commonweal, edited by Edward S. Skillin, was at the forefront of Catholic
sympathy and solidarity with European Jewry. Under Skillin‟s direction (which lasted to
1967), the journal became a leading voice of liberal Catholicism in the United States,
publishing a range of seminal essays by figures, both Catholic and non-Catholic, such as
Hanna Arendt, Luigi Sturzo, G.K. Chesterton, Evelyn Waugh, Hilaire Belloc and others.
He was unafraid to challenge preponderant views in the American Church. In 1938,
Skillin penned an editorial deploring the widespread tendency of American Catholics to
conflate Franco‟s anti-communism with the cause of the faith, a position which placed
him at odds with a number of leading figures in the American Church.45
On the question of Jewish persecution, the Commonweal was unequivocal. The
journal heavily criticized Charles Lindbergh‟s anti-Semitic „Iowa Speech‟ of 1941, in
which the former aviator and ardent isolationist identified Jews as the “principal agitators
for war”.46 Jewish control of publishing and media, contended Lindbergh, drew the
United States closer to a conflict it should properly avoid. A Commonweal editorial
strongly disproved Lindbergh‟s speech, questioning his faulty logic in linking Jews to
either media control or to pro-war agitation. Lindbergh‟s crude positions and barely
concealed anti-Semitism, it continued, threatened to discredit the legitimate isolationist
positions held by so many American Catholic leaders. The fate that had befallen
European Jews, it argued, was a scourge that could only spread if not opposed by all faith
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groups, including Roman Catholics. “Anti-Semitism is an element and a symptom”, it
concluded, “of the calamity from which all groups and classes of America should want to
save as much of the world as possible.”47
Through 1942 an 1943, as the world became gradually apprised of the full extent
of Nazi plans for Jewish genocide, the American Catholic press continued to denounce
anti-Semitism and Nazi crimes in the strongest terms. In those years, Commonweal ran a
series of articles by the exiled French-Catholic philosopher Jacques Maritain that
attempted to discredit Nazi racialist theories, and their resultant policies, on
philosophical, moral and scientific grounds.48 Maritain eloquently imparted to his readers
the notion that anti-Semitism had historically been, and remained, repugnant to any
genuine interpretation of Christian history, and was the result of human weakness and
distorted biblical and theological interpretations. German racial laws, according to
Maritain, represented a complete and total abandonment of any genuine Christian
morality, and stood in opposition to God‟s natural law, which Pius XI had recently
emphasized in the anti-Nazi encyclical Mit Brennender Sorge. As to whether or not
Catholics should embrace the American entry into the war to fight the totalitarian
persecutions, Maritain was unequivocal. “The only conclusion possible,” he observed in
1943, “is an unutterable horror of the mind and heart in the face of the human degradation
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of which racist crimes are the expression, and a resolution to fight this degradation to the
death.”49
The Catholic weekly America, published by the Jesuits since 1909 and considered
as moderate and judicious in its editorial line, presented similar denunciations of Nazi
crimes and offered messages of Catholic solidarity with the persecuted Jews of Europe.
Like the Commonweal, it was edited in this period by another leading Catholic liberal,
John LaFarge S.J., who would gain later acclaim as a champion of racial equality,
establishing the National Catholic Conference for Interracial Justice in 1960. America‟s
relatively wide circulation and weekly magazine format, combined with its reputation for
attracting noted non-Catholic contributors, made it an influential journal in both Catholic
and wider circles.50 As with Commonweal, America drew consistent attention to Jewish
persecutions, particularly from the summer of 1942 forward, as news of Nazi atrocities
became more widely understood in the West. A 1942 article, by the Jewish-American
field reporter Maurice Feldman, detailed the entrenchment of Nazi torment of German
and central European Jews, outlining the dire situations in Hungary, Slovakia, Romania
and Croatia. In concluding, Feldman presaged the „Final Solution‟ in observing that
“there is no doubt that the Nazis have plans not only for the destruction of the Jews in
Europe, but throughout the whole world.”51
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By the spring of 1943, America drew attention to, and denounced, Nazi pogroms
in the most explicit manner. In June, it reprinted from Commonweal parts of Maritain‟s
passionate and erudite refutation of Nazi racist laws, assuring that his ideas received wide
exposure in the Catholic press.52 In solidarity with Maritain‟s positions, America warned
its readers that any equivocation in Catholic attitudes to the Jewish plight amounted to a
grave error. “It is not a question of this or that human being,” the editorial intoned, “it is a
question of all human beings and methods of destruction which exceed the nightmares of
the most diabolical imagination.”53 It opined that Jewish sufferings could not be
dismissed as mere “atrocity stories”, but a plan for racial genocide carried out to “an
inexorable and well defined plan.” Through 1943 and 1944, America‟s editorials
reminded readers that the tragedy unfolding for Jews, which stemmed from wrongheaded anti-Semitic vitriol, could befall Catholics as well. The atrocities, it stated, were
“but a step” from Catholics if they condoned the spread of this “moral poison in the
world, rooted in hatred of God and Christ Himself, which spreads like a forest fire and
soon cares little what victim its violence destroys.”54 Similar sentiments were voiced by
Louisiana‟s Father Elliot Ross, who told the New Orleans Catholic Action of the South
that there were “Catholics who do not realize that if anti-Semitism comes [to the United
States], anti-Catholicism will not be far behind. If anti-Semitism ever becomes

52

America, ‘The Mass Murder of Jews’, 12 June 1943, 266.

53

Ibid.

54

Ibid. In this vein, see also America, ‘Persecution Stalks the Jews Across the Face of Europe, 19
September 1942, 654-655; America, ‘Fulton Sheen on Anti-Semitism’, 28 November 1942, 200; America,
‘The Massacred Jews’, 13 March 1943, 630; America, ‘The Church on the Jews, 15 May 1943; America,
‘The Murder of a Race’, 6 October 1945(?).
116

formidable among us, every probability points to the prejudice breaking bounds and
including Catholics as well as Jews.”55
Though America and Commonweal represented the leading edge in the
denunciation of Nazi racialism and solidarity with European Jewry, similar expressions
could be found across the American Catholic press. The large-circulation Catholic World,
published by the Paulist fathers, offered a severe and lengthy critique of anti-Semitism in
an October 1939 essay, calling it “unjust, brutal, and opposed to the teachings of
Christ.”56 Large circulation papers such as the Michigan Catholic, the Catholic Mind, the
Boston Pilot and the Catholic Worker offered similar sentiments.57 Virtually no paper
stood „silent‟ on the issue. Even the Brooklyn Tablet, which had offered support to the
anti-Semitic Father Charles Coughlin throughout the 1930‟s, presented denunciations of
Nazi racialism.58
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Expressions of wartime solidarity were not limited to the American Catholic
press. Catholic leaders such as Ryan, Mitty, Gannon and Sheehy, building on their efforts
following the Kristallnacht, continued to decry Nazi brutality throughout the war.
Official pronouncements and statements from the various Christian denominations,
including Roman Catholics, against the policy of anti-Semitism were compiled in 1943
by the National Conference of Christians and Jews (NCCJ), and were published and
widely distributed in a pamphlet entitled Christians Protest Persecutions.59 In an address
to Detroit civic forum in June 1944, Archbishop Edward Mooney hailed the heroism of
the victims of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising, and denounced Nazi brutality in clear terms.
Mooney further expressed revulsion at the plight of Jews through the centuries, and
outlined the need for Catholics to “give full play to our instinctive revulsion and horror
against this latest instance of mass cruelty in the story of the Warsaw Ghetto, to prepare
ourselves for the impending task of putting together the shattered pieces of a war-torn
world.”60 In pointing up the anti-Christian as well as anti-Semitic elements of Nazism, he
concluded “May we not hope that in the fires of a common tribulation new bonds of
human solidarity and mutual goodwill are being forged between Catholics and Jews?” In
the same speech, Mooney stressed the incompatibility of anti-Semitism and Christian
faith. “Catholic teaching formally and explicitly condemns ant-Semitism,” he intoned.
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“Catholic teaching directly emphasizes the dignity of the human person of which antiSemitism outrages. Catholic teaching exalts the historic religious role of the Jewish
people, and glories in the heritage from Judaism which is an essential element in
Christianity.” He then paraphrased Pope Pius XI, who in a decree of 1928 had stated that
“anti-Semitism is not compatible with the sublime reality of the faith. It is a movement in
which Catholics cannot participate. We are all spiritually Semites.”61 Mooney‟s
sentiments, however, also implicitly alluded to Roman Catholic positions on Zionism,
even when pleading for closer Catholic-Jewish cooperation. “In the heroism of Christians
who have so often risked and not so infrequently given their lives to rescue their even
more unfortunate Jewish brothers, may we not find an augury that when the agony is over
Jews and Christians will work together to write a brighter page of history in liberated
Europe, and particularly in Poland which has, at least, the historic glory of offering Jews
a haven of refuge when they were driven out of other countries?”62
Fulton Sheen, the future archbishop and „television priest‟, and leading voice of
Catholic America both before and after the war, also tackled the issue of Nazi antiSemitism on his weekly radio program, The Catholic Hour, which had attracted an
audience topping one million by the early 1940‟s.63 In a broadcast delivered on 10
January 1943, Sheen reflected on Pius XII‟s Christmas allocution of 1942, in which the
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pontiff had bemoaned the totalitarian and militaristic ideologies which were destroying
Europe both physically and spiritually.64 Sheen‟s address, however, denounced Jewish
persecutions more directly than Rome had. He impugned Nazi racialism as a policy based
wholly on the warped ideology of a despotic madman, with no grounding in scientific
fact. In this vein, he deplored the persecution of European Jews in the most explicit
terms. To Sheen, Nazism, like communism, denied the basic equality of all humans, a
pillar of Nazism that had led to Jewish persecution. “The disdain of the human person,”
he observed, “is the first dogma of all totalitarian systems. It explains why the individual
Jew has no value or rights under Nazism: Because he is not a member of the
revolutionary race. The persecution of Jews arises, therefore, not because, as Hitler first
claimed, they were too wealthy, but simply because they were not Nordic.”65 Like
Maritain, Sheen linked Nazi disdain for Judaism and Christianity. Speaking at a
November 1942 meeting of the NCCJ, he announced that the world had entered into a
new historical phase, “in which there will be no persecution of Jews without persecution
of Christians.”66 In light of this view, he implored American Catholics to abandon
lingering isolationist sympathies and support the war effort. “What we were once
intolerant to as a wicked idea,” he urged, “we must now be intolerant to as a deed.”
Interestingly, Sheen appeared to be doing what many of the Pope‟s critics were
demanding- namely to issue specific, explicit denunciations of Nazi crimes rather than
the vague allusions and abstractions of the encyclicals. Sheen‟s sentiments, in fact, were
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reflective of the dual nature of the American Church. His words reflected, on the one
hand, the pronouncements of Rome, as expressed through the encyclicals, but they also
spoke to the American reality of confronting the Nazi threat, and to the need to rally
American Catholics to the war effort. It was the melding of two loyalties, as it were, at
once both Roman Catholic and American.
The American Catholic episcopate similarly expressed revulsion at the fate of
European Jewry. At a 1940 meeting of the National Conference for Christians and Jews
(NCCJ), Bishop Robert Lucey of Amarillo, Texas declared that “We, as Christians, as
citizens, as human beings, must cry out against the horror of this Nazi [debauchery]
against Jews.” In warning his listeners against the false comfort of isolationism, and in
rallying his audience to the defence of “Western civilization”, he intoned that “what is
happening to the people of Europe is our business.”67 The American bishop‟s annual
statement for 1941, issued through the Washington-based NCWC and titled „The Crisis
of Christianity‟, addressed the evils of “totalitarian systems”, singled out Nazism and
Communism as ideological forces which threatened both Christianity and indeed Western
civilization, and implicitly urged American Catholic to support the larger effort to defeat
these “systems.” The statement also referred specifically to the suffering of Europe‟s
Jews, stating that “Our sympathy goes out again to the peoples of those countries who
have been crushed under the heel of the invader, and indeed, to all upon whom war has
imposed so heavy a burden of suffering and sacrifice. We cannot too strongly condemn
the inhuman treatment to which the Jewish people have been subjected to in many
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countries.”68 The bishops annual statement for 1942, entitled „Victory and Peace‟,
addressed a range of themes. It endorsed the war effort emphatically, signalling a
definitive end of the hierarchy‟s lingering debate on isolationism. It urged an allied
victory under American stewardship as the only outcome that could guarantee an
enduring peace, in which Christian principles would guide and inform the international
order. The statement also deplored Nazi brutality, and specifically addressed the question
of European Jews.
...We feel a deep sense of revulsion against the cruel indignities heaped upon the
Jews in conquered countries and upon defenceless peoples not of our faith. We
join with our brother bishops in subjugated France in a statement attributed to
them: “Deeply moved by the mass arrests and maltreatment of the Jews, we
cannot stifle the cry of our conscience. In the name of humanity and Christian
principles our voice is raised in favour of imprescriptible rights of human
nature.” We raise our voice in protest against despotic tyrants who have lost all
sense of humanity by condemning thousands of innocent victims in concentration
camps, and by permitting unnumbered persons to die of starvation.69

Signing these statements was a cross-section of the nation‟s most prominent
churchmen, including Archbishops Francis Spellman of New York, Samuel Stritch of
Chicago, Edward Mooney of Detroit, John Mitty of San Francisco and John McNicholas
of Cincinnati.70

68

See Hugh J. Nolan, ed. Pastoral Letters of the United States Catholic Bishops, 1941-1961 (Vol. II)
(Washington, 1984): 28-35.
69

Archbishops and Bishops of the United States, Statement on Victory and Peace, 14 November 1942. See
Raphael M. Huber, ed. Our Bishops Speak: National Pastorals and Annual Statements of the Hierarchy of
the United States (Milwaukee, 1952): 110-114.
70

Other signatories included Archbishop Joseph Rummel of New Orleans, and Bishops John Gannon of
Erie, John Noll of Fort Wayne, Karl Alter of Toledo, and John Duffy of Buffalo.
122

American Catholic positions on political Zionism, however, remained unchanged
through the war, and adhered closely to Rome‟s longstanding position. If American
Catholic expressions of sympathy for the Jewish plight were expressed in terms starker
than those emanating from Rome, there was no substantive deviation on the question of a
return of the Jews to Palestine. The Zionist goal of a Jewish home in Palestine was an
aspiration that Roman Catholic leaders, both at the Vatican and in the United States,
continued to oppose on historical and theological grounds, despite the tragedy of the
Holocaust. On the whole, however, opposition to the Zionist program was a policy
discreetly espoused by the American Catholic leaders during the war, reflective of
Rome‟s public stance on the issue. An analysis of the wartime Osservatore Romano
reveals little on the question of a national home for European Jews, despite the fact that
the Holocaust severely underscored the growing importance of that very question.
Vatican ambivalence can be traced to its preoccupation during most of the war: namely to
maintain an apolitical neutrality designed to ensure the survival of the institutional
Church through the conflict‟s darkest days. Given the highly fluid and rapidly evolving
progression of the war, particularly to 1943, Vatican policymakers preferred to keep
discreet any public stance on the future of Palestine. Privately, however, Pius XII and his
Secretary of State, Cardinal Luigi Maglione, continued to express severe reservations
about the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine, fearing a loss of control over Christian
sites in the Holy Land, and concerned with the possibility of a Jewish „beachhead‟ for
communist influence and infiltration in the Near East.71 These sentiments were shared by
a number of the Vatican‟s most powerful Cardinals and diplomats, including Angelo
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Roncalli, the future Pope John XXIII, who as nuncio to Istanbul was noted for his efforts
to save Jewish lives, but was unreceptive to the solutions posed by political Zionism.72 In
a September 1943 letter to Maglione, Roncalli expressed discomfort about the degree to
which Vatican aid to Jews would be later considered an endorsement of their “messianic
dream”, adding that the “reconstruction of the Kingdom of Judah and the Israelites would
not create a utopia.”73
A similar circumspection was exercised by the leading American Catholic figures.
When the various organs of the American Church did weigh in on the question of
Zionism, however, its support was not forthcoming. A survey of a cross-section of the
American Catholic press reveals a remarkable unanimity on the question of Palestine. As
the war approached, and as tensions between Jews and Arabs in Palestine became more
acute in 1938 and 1939, America examined the competing claims of Jew and Arab in
Palestine, favouring neither for absolute political jurisdiction of the territory.74 James E.
Coleran, a Jesuit scholar and author of these articles, compared the claims of Jews and
Arabs, and sympathized with Britain in the precarious role she occupied as the
Mandatory Power. While denying Arab claims to complete control of Palestine, Coleran
did highlight the fact that Arab claims were based on a 1500 year occupation of the
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territory, and opined that if the Jews were to have any kind of national home in Palestine,
it should have to be in consultation with, and with the consent of, Palestinian Arabs.75
Given the rate at which Jews were successful in supplanting Arabs in Palestine, both in
numbers and in economic and political control, Coleran observed, he doubted that any
such co-operation could exist in a new state.
While he agreed that both Jew and Arab could rightfully appeal to the Wilsonian
principle of national self-determination, he questioned whether Palestine could be
considered the legitimate homeland of the global Jewish diaspora. In reflecting on Zionist
ambitions, he observed:
...Even after the Romans finally destroyed their nation they never ceased to look
upon Palestine as their land, and for the past centuries since that destruction
countless Jews have longed to return, and many have actually filtered back to live
and die in the „Land of Israel.‟ Some seem to think that these facts constitute a
sort of title to the land. However, if the fact that a people desire to regain their
land, and a few do return to it, constitutes a just title to the land, what havoc
might be wrought of the boundaries of more than one nation today, not excluding
the United States!76
Coleran did not deny the need for a Jewish national home, particularly in the
context of escalating Nazi brutality, but he did suggest, as did the Vatican both during
and after the war, that a Jewish state be established somewhere other than Palestine.
“Some part of this large earth,” he opined, “should be given to them as their own. Some
colony should be given to them where they would be their own masters, and never again
to fear that the people among them, where they live, would someday rise against them
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and send them bleeding and impoverished to seek the calculating charity of strange
lands.”77 He questioned, however, whether Palestine possessed the “absorptive capacity”
for such an endeavour. “All must admit,” he observed, “that Palestine cannot hope to
provide for all of these. The more prosperous nations are all hesitating about throwing
wide their doors to these unfortunates. Why insist that a poor Palestine do it?”78 Coleran‟s
notions on Palestine‟s “absorptive capacity” stood close to the Vatican‟s own position on
the future of the Terra Santa, and were emblematic of the growing convergence between
Roman and American Catholic views on the future of Palestine.
In a later article, on the eve of war, Coleran mused critically on the increasing
“force and vehemence of international Jewry,” observing that “the union of sentiment, the
similarity of method, the use of propaganda, the moral pressure of Jews in every nation,
particularly in the British Commonwealth and the United States, all manifest that Jewry is
an international power, that it is aggressive and may be ruthless, and that it is determined
to champion its interests against any and all who would question its aims.”79 The article
was a reflection of the concern, in segments of the American Catholic hierarchy, of the
growing stridency, profile and effectiveness of American Zionist lobby, particularly the
Zionist Organization of America (ZOA).80 In praising the even-handed neutrality of the
British „White Paper‟ of 1939, which Zionists regarded as a hindrance to their ambitions,
Coleran warned of the possible outcomes of unchecked Zionist zeal, and implicitly
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suggested that Washington act to brake Zionist demands in the interests of peace and
security. “The problem of Palestine may provoke a new orientation of ideas in regard to
the place of the Jewish race in world affairs. In the United States, likewise, there is in
process a new Jewish consciousness, characterized by militancy and acumen. This, also,
requires a new American evaluation and orientation.”81
The Brooklyn Tablet weighed in similarly on the „Palestine Question.‟ In a
number of articles published on the eve of the war, the paper presented a decidedly
Arabist perspective on the struggle for Palestine. It characterized Arab nationalism as
primarily defensive in character, in contrast to the hegemonic ambitions of Zionism, and
was supported by the majority of the Palestinian population, in contrast to the minority
position of the Zionists.82 As did America, the Brooklyn Tablet opined that “little
Palestine” had reached its “absorptive capacity”, and that further Jewish immigration to
the territory would only serve to deepen political tensions there. The Arab struggle was
likened to “the American struggle against British imperialism and the fight of George
Washington and his men against that same imperial power. They, too, wished to secure
themselves life, liberty and happiness.”83 The Brooklyn Tablet‟s articles emphasized the
fact that Palestinian Christians also opposed Zionist designs for the territory, echoing
Vatican concerns that Christian rights were being trampled by Zionist aggression in the
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Terra Santa. On this theme, the paper quoted Dr. George Ibrahim Kheirallah, a noted
Iranian academic and Secretary General of the Arab National League, who observed that
“One hundred thousand Christian Arabs stand should to shoulder with their Muslim
brothers- patriarchs, Bishops, priests, and ministers, all standing as one nation threatened
by this ruthless treatment. Our forefathers once before generously fertilized the sacred
soil of Palestine with their blood. May we be spared the necessity of doing it again.”84
Such allusions to a new crusade for the Holy Land would appear often in the Catholic
press from the beginning of the war onward.
As the oppression of European Jewry turned to violence and murder in the early
years of the war, Zionist leaders began to regard the emergency faced by their coreligionists as their last best chance to push for the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine.
The American entry into the war, furthermore, and the strength and vibrancy of American
Zionist organizations, the ZOA foremost among them, created a shift in the focal point of
Zionist lobbying from London to Washington during the war years. Zionists had been
bitterly disappointed by the British „White Paper‟ of 1939, and British reluctance to
support a proposed Jewish army marked a sea-change in relations between London and
leading Zionist groups. The American-Palestine Committee, which had been created in
1932 to foment high-level support for a Jewish state among non-Jewish leaders and
politicians, claimed 15,000 members by 1941, among them nearly two thirds of the
United States Senate, and many members of the House of Representatives. Though
Britain remained the Mandatory Power, the United States increasingly became the centre
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of the Zionist lobby, its leaders cognizant that the American government would likely
dictate the terms of an allied victory, and buoyed by the growing support of a large
Jewish-American community. The gathering of the leading Zionist organizations at New
York‟s Biltmore Hotel in May 1942, attended by Chaim Weizmann and David BenGurion, signalled a definitive shift that would see Washington as the new centre of the
international Zionist campaign. The platform of the „Biltmore Conference‟ not only
advocated for unlimited Jewish emigration to Palestine, but also forcefully endorsed the
creation of a sovereign Jewish state. Biltmore delegates saw this as not only a solution to
the immediate problem of Nazi persecutions, but as a permanent solution to Jewish
dislocation since the time of the Roman Empire.85
The rising tide of sympathy for Zionism in the United States did not escape the
attention of the Vatican. In May 1943, Cardinal Maglione instructed Amleto Cicognani,
the apostolic delegate in Washington, to keep the Holy See apprised of any developments
in the Zionist lobby, and to outline any shifts in public opinion toward or against the idea
of a Jewish state in Palestine.86 To this end, Cicognani filed several reports to Rome on
the emergence of new and robust Zionist associations in 1943 and 1944, including the
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„Hebrew Committee of National Liberation‟, which included among its leadership the
revisionist Zionist Eri Jabotinsky, and Peter Bergson, a prominent Zionist who had
escaped Nazi-occupied Poland in 1939, and who tirelessly lobbied the American
government for assistance to persecuted Jewry.87 Other groups identified by Cicognani,
with the assistance of the NCWC, included the „American Friends of a Jewish Palestine‟
and the „American League for a Free Palestine‟. In his reports Cicognani noted, with only
half-hearted relief, that mainstream Zionist organizations such as the ZOA and the
American Zionist Emergency Council (AZEC) considered these new groups overtly
aggressive and potentially disruptive, and sought to exclude them from serious
negotiations on the future of Palestine.88
He further urged Cicognani to remind the American bishops of the dangers of
political Zionism, and to delineate these concerns, where possible, through the American
diocesan press, particularly as sympathy for Zionism continued to expand in the United
States. Early in 1944, the Cardinal Secretary of State echoed these sentiments to
Cicognani, urging him to “appeal to the sentiments of the Government and public opinion
of America for the full freedom of people, and mention also the prestige which the U.S.
might achieve from their involvement in such a just cause as supporting the Christian
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communities in the Middle East and civilization.”89 In June 1943, Maglione forwarded
the Vatican‟s 1922 Aide memoire on Palestine to Michael Ready, the General Secretary
of the NCWC.90 The memo, which delineated the Vatican‟s opposition to a Jewish
Palestine on theological, historical and political grounds, was evidence that the Holocaust
had barely altered the Vatican‟s formal position of Zionism, and was intended to act as a
template for American Catholic responses to the „Palestine Question.‟ In May 1944,
Cicognani forwarded to Ready another memo on the Vatican‟s position, stating that
“since the question is one of much discussion at the present time, it may be well for the
point of view of the Holy See to be brought to the attention of the Most Reverend
Bishops.”91
On the same date, Cicognani forwarded a copy of the memo directly to Joseph
Rummel, the German-born Archbishop of New Orleans, who had been appointed by the
Vatican as the Chairman of the Catholic Committee for Refugees in 1941.92 Rummel‟s
case, in fact, reveals the extent to which the Vatican expected the American bishops to
speak with one voice on the question of Palestine and on Zionism generally. The
apostolic delegate rebuked Rummel for publicly expressing distaste with the limits placed
on Jewish immigration to Palestine in the British „White Paper‟ in an open letter to Rabbi
Emil Leipziger. Rummel‟s sentiments were reported on in the local diocesan press. “If
the Jews needed protection in 1917 and the solace of a homeland in 1922”, wrote the
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Archbishop in February 1944, “they stand in greater need of help after all the sufferings
endured in Europe, and Winston Churchill now has the opportunity to unmake what, in
1939, he criticized so vehemently in parliament as the violation of a pledge.”93 Cicognani
expressed to Rummel that he could “understand the humanitarian motives which induced
[you] to make the statement referred to. I believe it will be useful for [your] future
guidance to know the attitude of the Holy See, and to consider certain Catholic and
Christian aspects of the problem which are commonly neglected in the public agitation
being carried on in the United States for a Jewish Home Land.”94 The apostolic delegate
added that he hoped Rummel, in his influential capacity as Archbishop, would “be in a
position to utilize this statement of policy on many occasions.”95
The „statement of policy‟ forwarded to Rummel, which was identical to that sent
to the NCWC, amounted to a summary of the Holy See‟s longstanding „Palestine policy‟,
positions barely changed since the end of World War One. The statement outlined the
Holy See‟s recent efforts to spare European Jewry the worst of Nazi wrath, but stated that
Jewish suffering did not preclude the Vatican‟s longstanding opposition to a Jewish
homeland in Palestine, as expressed by Pope Benedict XV at a 1919 Consistory of
Cardinals, and re-iterated by Pope Pius XI in his 1922 Aide memoire to the League of
Nations. On the „Holy Places‟, the memo emphasized the importance of Catholic control,
stating that generations of Popes had “made every effort to keep them from falling into
the hands of infidels, and because their possession had now become secure, all
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precautions must be taken to see that it be protected and strengthened.”96 On Palestine
itself, it stated that “Catholics the world over are piously devoted to this country,
hallowed as it was by the earthly presence of the Redeemer, and esteemed as it is the
cradle of Christianity. If the greater part of Palestine is given to the Jewish people, this
would be a severe blow to the religious attachment of Catholics to this land. To have the
Jewish people in the majority would be to interfere with the peaceful exercise of these
rights in the Holy Land already vested in Catholics.” It further suggested that Jewish
occupation of Palestine two millennia previous did not legitimize a modern claim to the
territory, and it echoed a familiar Vatican refrain that while Jews would certainly require
a postwar home, that Palestine was not ideal. “If a „Hebrew Home‟ is desired,” in
concluded, “it would not be too difficult to find a more fitting territory than Palestine.
With an increase in the Jewish population there, grave, new international problems might
arise. Catholics the world over might be aroused. The Holy See might then be hindered in
its care of the Holy Places, and it might be kept from giving charitable assistance in the
measure which it would wish.” On 9 June, Ready forwarded copies of the memo to the
entire American episcopate.97 Rummel made no public utterances on the question of
Jewish refugees and Palestine after February 1944, despite his central role as Chairman of
the Catholic Committee for Refugees.
In the wake of Rummel‟s censure, some bishops took the initiative to make
certain that diocesan priests were fully cognizant of the Vatican‟s policy. On 24 July,
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Thomas McLaughlin, bishop of Paterson (New Jersey), forwarded his priests a memo
outlining the Church‟s historic, and unaltered, position on the “Jewish Homeland Idea.”98
He instructed clergy to discourage parishioners from “participating in the current
agitation on the British White Paper to the end that Britain may relax her immigration
laws to Palestine,” stating that as the issue “was economic and political rather than
strictly religious...the Church and its organs and representatives should not as such take
sides or make commitments on this matter.” The letter was far from a neutral statement,
however, clearly delineating the Vatican‟s historic position on the Holy Land. In addition
to reiterating the points in the NCWC‟s „Rummel memo‟ of 9 June, McLaughlin added
that “There is every reason to fear that were the Jewish people in the majority in that
region, there would be interference with the peaceful exercise of the present recognized
rights vested in Catholic in the territory. A noteworthy increase in the permanent Jewish
population there gives fear lest grave new international problems might arise. Catholics
all over the world might be aroused with the result that the Holy See might have
difficulty in caring for the places in the Holy Land.”99 In paraphrasing the Cardinal
Gasparri‟s 1922 aide memoire, which remained the backbone of Vatican policy on
Palestine, it continued that “there is no principle in history or justice to establish the
necessity of the return of a people to a country which they left nineteen centuries ago.
There are other places on this earth where a „Hebrew Home‟ could be set up without
causing international repercussions and difficulties.” In concluding, McLaughlin warned
his priests to remain cognizant of the papal line, while avoiding entanglements that a
98

Thomas McLaughlin to Michael Ready, 24 July 1944, NCWC/OGS/ACUA, Box 44, File 18. See also
enclosure, 1-4.
99

Ibid, 3.
134

defined public stance might produce. “In a word, we are to defend Catholic interests and
not lend ourselves to propaganda for a cause (lifting British immigration quotas) which
has no bearing upon our life here, but contains the seeds of difficulties for the authorities
of the Church in maintaining recognized rights.”100
Though Catholic leaders were wary of trumpeting an opposition to Zionism too
loudly, they were also concerned about the rising tide of support for it in the United
States, particularly among non-Jewish groups and in Congress. The Vatican, too, was
aware of the gravity of losing the battle for public opinion to the Zionists in these years,
and was keen to enlist the support of the American Catholic press on the issue, prompting
an August 1943 request from Cardinal Maglione that Catholics journals more clearly
delineate Rome‟s concerns on the Zionist program.101 American Catholic journals that
did comment on the „Palestine Question‟ from the summer of 1943 forward did not
disappoint him. The Catholic press cast a dubious shadow over the Zionist idea, and
continuously drew a line between the denunciation of anti-Semitism, and support for a
Jewish homeland in Palestine. The tragedy of the Holocaust, and the daunting refugee
crisis that it spawned, did not alter mainstream American Catholic positions on political
Zionism, which continued to be regarded as a dangerous experiment, and one which, in
combination with an emergent Arab national movement, threatened the position of
Roman Catholics in the Holy Land. America continued its assault on Zionism long after
the news of Nazi „death camps‟ had become common knowledge. In an October 1944
editorial, it advised that, despite the fact that European Jewry had suffered
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disproportionately during the war, the United States should be wary of supporting
“zealous Zionists.”102 The unchecked inflow of Jewish refugees, it warned, was a solution
“fraught with dangers that should be recognized now.” It cautioned Washington leaders
that had warmed to Zionism of the dangers of intervening in a dispute between Jews and
Arabs, and cited the example of Britain, whose “fingers had been burnt by competing
commitments.” In concluding, it suggested that while a home would need to be found for
Europe‟s displaced Jews, securing that home in Palestine would raise more problems than
it would solve.103
In a series of editorials in the fall and winter of 1945, America further elaborated
on its opposition to Zionist demands. It decried the increasingly violent tactics employed
by Zionists by the end of the war, and scolded the movement for its “violent
disagreement” with British foreign policy, referring specifically to the Anglo-American
Report of 1945, which many Zionists found as unpalatable as the 1939 „White Paper.‟104
America advocated an international settlement for the territory, and opined that, in
resorting to violence, it “appeared that the Zionist nationalists no longer fight the battle
primarily to seek a refuge for persecuted brethren, but rather to further nationalist
ambitions.” While the journal didn‟t fault Jews for seeking a place of refuge following
the war, it argued that the Jewish dilemma was a humanitarian question, not a political
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one, highlighting that “unity among [Jews] is based on religion rather than nationality.”
On that score, it advised against “a nationalistic treatment of a humanitarian problem.”105
It advised that the „Palestine Question‟ be turned over to an international body, such as
the UN, a position the journal claimed it shared with a majority of Jews who, it
suggested, found the claims of Zionists “embarrassing and politically dangerous.” In
concluding, it suggested a number of alternatives to the Zionist program, including the
reinstatement of Jews as free citizens of their homelands, increased immigration quotas
by Britain and the United States, and slight modifications to the 1939 „White Paper‟ to
allow more Jews to seek refuge in Palestine.106
A number of other Catholic journals also advised referring the „Palestine
Question‟ to an international body such as the UN, warning that leaving Jew and Arab to
their own devices would only lead to conflict and bloodshed. In a series of articles in the
Boston Pilot and the Michigan Catholic, Monsignor Michael Assemani, the
representative of the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem to Washington, raised these and other
issues.107 Assemani‟s articles emphasized that while Jews and Arabs had legitimate
historical and sentimental claims to the Holy Land, so too did Christians, and he implored
that their rights could not be undermined by the larger Jewish-Arab struggle. The Holy
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Land was sacred to Christians, he asserted, because “Jesus was born in Bethlehem,
walked the dirt roads to Nazareth, through Samaria and to Jerusalem. It is the land which
witnessed His miracles, the country in whose language He preached. It was on Mt.
Calvary that He was crucified. Palestine is the cradle of Christianity.”108 In concluding,
Assemani hinted that Catholics would be prepared to take a firm stand in defending the
neutrality of Christian holy sites in Palestine. “From the 12th century onward,” he intoned,
“Christians have fought and died to regain control of the holy sites in Palestine. And
while the crusades of the armed Knights who went out to fight the non-believers now
belong to history, the Christian world is no less keenly interested in the preservation of its
holy places in Palestine.”109 His appeal to Christian historical and spiritual ties to the
Holy Land were echoed by the Vatican in the early postwar years, and were intended to
elicit an emotional response in American Catholic attitudes towards the struggle for
Palestine. By re-emphasizing Christianity‟s own ancestral stake in the territory, the
diocesan press helped to shape Catholic opinion for later Vatican claims for the
internationalization of the Holy Places, a focal point of postwar Catholic efforts.
An April 1945 press release by Anthony Bruya, an American Franciscan who
served as the Palestine correspondent for the NCWC‟s news service, emphasized the
notion that no suitable solution for the territory could be found that did not address
Jewish, Muslim and Christian concerns in the Holy Land. In addressing the theme of
Palestine‟s „absorptive capacity‟, and implicitly questioning Jewish primacy in the
territory, he observed that “talk about providing a home for the persecuted millions of
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Europe is all very good and edifying, but is 10,000 square mile Palestine able to remedy,
or even to alleviate, the plight of those unhappy peoples- by no means limited to those of
the Jewish race, but knowing neither racial nor religious lines?”110 Bruya further
criticized a proposed Anglo-American partition plan for Palestine, inspired by a solution
presented by the influential London Economist, which would have ceded the Zionists a
large portion of Palestine, including important Christian centres, save only Jenin and
Nablus.111 Though the plan was never made official nor implemented, Bruya‟s dispatches
were reprinted in the American diocesan press under headlines such as „Christian Rights
Overlooked‟ and „Christianity Ignored in Verbal Battles Over Arab, Jewish Control of the
Holy Land‟.112 In concluding, Bruya re-emphasized the notion that no solution was
acceptable that did not preserve Christian control of the Holy Sites in Palestine. “Any
attempted solution of the „Palestine Question,‟” he declared, “which does not provide a
definitive and practical safeguard for the Christian position here, and hence for the
peculiarly Catholic rights which are as old as Christianity itself, will be no solution at all.
Such a make-shift will merely postpone the day when a real solution will have to be faced
by all concerned.”113

110

‘Failure to Safeguard Christian Rights Will Prolong Solution of ‘Palestine Question’: Warns Against Any
Plan Which Would Ignore Sacred Character of Holy Places and Desecrate Homeland of the Saviour’, 23
April 1945, NCWC/OGS/ACUA, Box 44, File 18.
111

See The Economist, ‘Policy for Palestine’, 29 September 1945, 450-451.

112

See, for example, the Michigan Catholic, 29 November 1945; the Boston Pilot, 1 December 1945; the
Brooklyn Tablet, 1 December 1945.
113

‘Failure to Safeguard Christian Rights Will Prolong Solution of ‘Palestine Question’, 23 April 1945,
NCWC/OGS/ACUA, Box 44, File 18.
139

As the war drew to a close, and as the Palestine question was about to enter a
decisive new phase, American Catholic opposition to Zionism had become firmly
entrenched, despite the full airing of the tragedy of the Holocaust by 1945. It was a
position, moreover, that drew direct inspiration from the Vatican itself. The political
lobby of the American bishops on Mexico, Spain, Ethiopia and, most recently, the allied
bombing of Rome, was set to press its case on the question of Palestine. American
Catholic anti-Zionist rhetoric was about to be applied as concrete political pressure. It
would contend, however, with an increasingly powerful American Zionist lobby, which
similarly sought to shape Washington‟s policy on the fate of the Holy Land.
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Chapter 3
“Impatient Zionism” and the Transnational Catholic Crusade for the Holy
Land
The end of the Second World War marked the beginning of the most crucial
historical phase of the two thousand year struggle for Palestine. In short order the horrors
of the Holocaust, and the refugee crisis it had spawned, became widely known, creating
significant pockets of sympathy for Zionism, even among groups previously benign or
hostile to the idea. This would come to include not only a majority of American Jewry,
but also the new President, Harry S. Truman, and a large group of senators and
congressmen. As the tide of sympathy for Zionism rose in the United States, British
mandatory control of Palestine rapidly weakened, as developments in the territory and the
wider region became difficult to manage for the circumscribed power. As a result, the
Zionist lobby became increasingly focused on Washington, as it became evident that the
American government, the preeminent political, economic and military power in the
West, and rapidly warming to the idea of a Jewish Palestine, would be instrumental in
securing such an end.
The Vatican and the American bishops, on their part, continued to cultivate their
informal yet effective „strategic alliance‟ with Washington. On a number of postwar
questions, including displaced Catholic refugees in Europe, the containment of
communism (particularly in Italy), assistance to persecuted Catholics in the Soviet
sphere, and American aid to Germany and Poland, Washington and the American bishops
did successfully collaborate. By the summer of 1947, the working alliance between
Washington and the Vatican had become explicit, and the Vatican abandoned its
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historically cherished neutrality for an open alignment with the West. For this reason, the
American hierarchy was hesitant to express its opposition to Zionism too explicitly, lest it
hamper progress on other areas of cooperation. Developments in Palestine in 1946 and
1947, however, pushed the Zionist dream of a Jewish state much closer to reality, which
in turn spurred a more focused and determined institutional response from the American
Catholic Church. The „Catholic lobby‟ on Palestine would finally emerge. American
Catholic activism, inspired by the Vatican‟s own policies for the territory, now reached
beyond the anti-Zionist rhetoric of the diocesan press to concrete action.
Cold War Consensus: The Vatican, American Catholics and Truman
In the early postwar years, the warming relationship between the Vatican,
American Catholics and Washington continued to congeal. It was an informal alliance
built on mutual dependencies. The Vatican clearly recognized the pre-eminent power of
the postwar United States, and was eager to solidify its ties to the strongest international
foe of communism. The Vatican similarly recognized the growing power of the American
Catholic Church, not least for its financial might, and moved to place a number of
American churchmen closer to the centre of power. Washington, on its part, regarded the
Roman Catholic Church as a useful ideological ally in the emerging struggle against
communism. Truman‟s maintenance of the Taylor mission after Roosevelt‟s death,
despite the end of the war and growing Protestant opposition to it, was evidence of his
commitment to preserving a Vatican channel.
After 1945, the Catholic Church in the United States entered a period of
unprecedented vitality, confidence and institutional expansion. It was growth mirroring
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that of the nation itself, which was embarking on an era of economic prosperity,
unrivalled military preponderance and global political and cultural influence. Ardent
Catholic participation in, and support of, the war effort, girded by the explicit
endorsement of the American hierarchy, squelched much of the anti-Catholic bigotry of
the prewar era, when critics charged that Catholic isolationism served as a cover for
deeper fascist and totalitarian sympathies. The war, to be sure, contributed significantly to
the „mainstreaming‟ of American Catholics in the postwar era, blurring remaining
distinctions between „Americanism‟ and Catholicism that had persisted for over two
centuries.1 The Catholic population stood at nearly twenty-five million in 1945 (nearly
20% of the population), and would rise to over forty-five million in the next two decades,
bolstered by high birth rates and waves of Catholic immigrants from Southern and
Eastern Europe.2 The Catholic clergy grew by nearly fifty percent in the decade following
the war, and numbers of enrolled seminarians nearly doubled. The prosperity of postwar
America was shared by the American Church. Over a hundred new hospitals, three
thousand new Catholic elementary and high schools, and ninety-four new Catholic
colleges were built in the postwar decade, evidence of the institutional vigour of the
postwar Church. Enrolment in Catholic educational institutions rose concurrently. The
1944 G.I. Bill, which provided college or vocational training for returning servicemen,
was a particular boon to Catholic colleges, which saw their enrolment increase by three
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hundred percent (from 92, 426 in the prewar era to 384,526 in 1950), a development that
further contributed to the „mainstreaming‟ of American Catholics after the war.3
The vitality of the postwar American Church did not escape the attention of the
Vatican, which had long since recognized the unique role of American Catholic leaders to
speak both as Catholics and as Americans. The steady integration of Catholics into
mainstream political and social life, partially facilitated by their unflinching support of
the war effort, and the pre-eminence of the United States in the postwar global order, only
served to enhance Rome‟s view of the growing importance of the American Church.
The institutional expansion of the postwar American Church reflected the
Vatican‟s growing cognizance of its power, both political and financial. Six new
archdioceses were created for the United States between 1941 and 1952.4 To minister to
its growing flock, particularly in the postwar decade, a legion of new bishops and
archbishops were appointed by Rome, bolstering the American episcopate by 1950 to
sixty percent above its prewar numbers. In private conversations, Pius XII expressed the
need to give prominent American prelates a more visible presence in the administration
of the universal Church, both in the College of Cardinals and in the Roman curia, to
reflect the growing clout of American Catholics. He expressed as much to Harold
Tittman, secretary to Myron Taylor, who recorded in July 1945 that the Pope “was
emphatic that the Holy See must „look to the United States‟ and that many non-Italians
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should be brought to the Holy See in important positions.”5 The Pope‟s words were
backed with actions, as he quickly moved to integrate American prelates into positions of
greater power. In July 1945, he named Cincinnati‟s Father Valentine Schaef the first
American director of the Franciscan Order, passing over more senior European
candidates. It was an appointment that allowed the Pope “to express his appreciation of
the generous donations extended for relief purposes to the Holy See by American
Catholics and the Catholic hierarchy in the United States,” as well as to make a “gesture
of appreciation and good-will to the Government and the people of the United States.”6
Perhaps not coincidentally, the Franciscans also controlled the office of Custodian of the
Holy Land, a centuries-old office which administered the order‟s extensive property in
the Holy Land, which included Jerusalem‟s Church of the Holy Sepulchre, Bethlehem‟s
Basilica of the Nativity, and Nazareth‟s Basilica of the Nativity.7
In his first postwar consistory, held in February 1946, Pius XII elected four new
American cardinals. Joining Archbishop James Dougherty of Philadelphia was the
mercurial Archbishop Francis Spellman of New York, and Archbishops John Glennon of
St. Louis, Edward Mooney of Detroit, and Samuel Stritch of Chicago. The fivefold
increase in American cardinals in a single consistory further underscored Rome‟s postwar
„turn‟ towards the United States. The Papal Curia also named a number of American
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bishops to key posting in the Vatican‟s diplomatic service. Bishop Joseph Hurley of St.
Augustine, Florida was named regent of the nunciature in Yugoslavia, Bishop Gerald
O‟Hara of Savannah, Georgia was named regent of the nunciature in Romania, and
Bishop Aloysius Muench of Fargo, North Dakota would soon be named apostolic
delegate to Germany.8 The promotion of American Catholics prompted Lord Halifax,
British ambassador in Washington, to observe that it was “an indication that the Vatican
recognized America‟s pre-eminent position as a world power,” and that “the greater voice
she will now have in Church affairs is regarded as only proper.”9 It did not escape Halifax
that “creeping bolshevism” drove the Vatican‟s renewed interest in the American Church,
commenting that “the lengthening shadow of the Soviet Union is leading to an increase in
the influence of its most inveterate antagonist.”10
The seriousness with which the Vatican sought to place American prelates at the
very height of curial power was made evident late in 1945, when Spellman was tabbed by
Pius XII to succeed Luigi Maglione as Secretary of State. Spellman‟s suitability was
emphasized on several fronts; to acknowledge a greater role for Americans in the curia, to
facilitate the continuation of the Myron Taylor mission (in light of the war‟s end, and of
Roosevelt‟s death), to tie the Vatican more closely to the strongest international foe of
communism, and to ensure the cooperation of the United States in assisting with the re-
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settlement of Catholic refugees displaced by the war.11 It also would have achieved the
Pope‟s objective of naming a close friend and confidant to the position which, by 1945,
Spellman certainly was. Spellman‟s candidacy was one of the worst kept secrets of the
period, as news of the potential appointment appeared in the Italian and American press
by early 1946. Giovanni Capobianco, a wartime wireless operator for the Vatican, broke
the story to the Italian press in January in Rome‟s Giornale del Mattino, much to the
chagrin of Vatican officials. “An American Secretary of State of a universal Church,” he
reported, “would be acceptable to the whole world in view of the high prestige which the
United States has gained for itself, during the last few years especially. Then, too, Mgr.
Spellman is an outstanding personality among American ecclesiastics, for aside from his
highly charitable nature, he had throughout the war years pleaded for justice and
universal brotherhood.”12 Spellman ultimately declined the nomination, a decision
mutually agreed upon by the Archbishop and the Pope, who both felt that he would be
more useful to the Vatican in the United States than in Rome. The seriousness of his
candidacy, however, spoke to a new era of closer cooperation between the Holy See and
the American Catholic Church.
Discussion of a formal diplomatic link between the Holy See and Washington was
also raised in 1945. The Vatican, clearly sensing a need for closer ties to the United

11

Gerald Fogarty, The Vatican and the American Hierarchy From 1870 to 1965 (Washington, 1982): 310.

12

NARA, RG 59, MTP, Gowen to Secretary of State, Vatican, 21 January 1946. See Il Giornale del Mattino,
18 January 1946, ‘Il Vaticano e gli Stati Uniti’. Sources in the Vatican expressed their disapproval of
Capobianco’s piece to Franklin Gowen, an assistant to Taylor, stating that the journalist’s view were
“entirely his own, and have not been inspired in any way by the Holy See which, pending the Pope’s
decision- which is final- as to who may be appointed Cardinal Secretary of State, appropriately refrains
from publicizing any particular candidate.”
147

States, particularly as the spectre of Soviet communism loomed ever larger, expressed
such a desire to Taylor in the spring of that year. In June, Taylor forwarded a lengthy
memorandum to incoming Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, outlining the practical
advantages of formal diplomatic recognition. He emphasized the Holy See‟s utility as a
Cold War “listening post”, given the range of ambassadors already stationed there. He
also emphasized the significant number of non-Catholic states represented (including
Great Britain, Germany and the Netherlands), and he contended that a Vatican
ambassador would strengthen America‟s „Good Neighbor Policy‟ with Latin America,
creating a “favourable impression” among these largely Catholic states.13 Taylor also
posited that a Vatican ambassador would be helpful in the “re-education” of occupied
Germany and Austria, owing to the Church‟s historic standing in both of these states. In
concluding, he emphasized that in the cause of peace, order and stability, the United
States and the Holy See “shared a fundamental similarity of purpose in the postwar era”,
and advised that mutual objectives could be better achieved through formal recognition.14
President Harry Truman opted not to exchange ambassadors with the Vatican in
1945, choosing not to pique the ire of Protestant opponents in the infancy of his
presidency. Truman did, however, choose to extend Taylor‟s mission as „Personal
Representative‟ to the Pope indefinitely, despite Roosevelt‟s assurance, in 1940, that the
mission was “both special and temporary,” highlighting the importance the new president
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placed on maintaining an informational channel with the Holy See.15 The very public
exchange of letters between Pope and President in the summer of 1947, where each
affirmed commitment to creating a world order based on peace, democracy, and freedom,
underpinned by Christian morality, also seemed to buttress the American-Vatican
relationship.16 Truman, furthermore, pressed Harold Tittman for a resident archbishop
for Washington, giving him a high-ranking member of the hierarchy “right at hand,
[whom] he could talk to whenever he wanted.”17 The Vatican erected the Archdiocese of
Washington in November 1947, installing Patrick O‟Boyle as its first Archbishop.
This informal strategic alliance of the American government, the Holy See and
the American Church was bound by a mutuality of concerns and objectives in the postwar
years. Chief among these was the containment of Soviet communism, an ideological
worldview long since condemned and vilified by the Vatican and American Church. The
American bishops‟ Annual Statement for 1945, „Between War and Peace‟, anticipated
George Kennan‟s „Long Telegram‟ of 1947 and even Winston Churchill‟s „Iron Curtain‟
speech of 1946 on the need for Soviet „containment‟.18 In it, the bishops emphasized the
need for peace, democracy, justice and religious freedom as the underpinnings of a stable
world order, and they expressed extreme reservations at the “soft hand” with which the
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United States and Britain treated the Soviet Union. Echoing Domenico Tardini‟s 1946
warning to Taylor, never to “trust lions disguised as lambs”, the bishops urged a firmer
hand in dealing with Stalin.19 A frank admission of the “clash of ideologies” which
existed between East and West, the statement continued, and an insistence on a universal
adherence to justice and democracy, were crucial to the shaping of a stable world order.20
The statement also emphasized the need for national self-determination, particularly in
Eastern Europe, and called upon American assistance for Italy and Germany, insisting on
a constructive, rather than punitive, peace.
To the spring of 1947, the Vatican continued to harbour hopes, increasingly faint,
that some sort of „peaceful accommodation‟ could be found between the Soviet Union
and the West, but its official „non-alignment‟ was becoming increasingly difficult to
maintain. Behind the facade of official impartiality, the pope remained deeply concerned
about Soviet expansionism, both for the predicament this created for Roman Catholics in
the Eastern bloc, and for the potential of communist party electoral successes in Western
Europe and beyond. The pope‟s paranoia of bolshevism indeed verged on the phobic,
lending credence to Peter Hebblethwaite‟s musing that Pius XII was “obsessed with the
possibility of Cossacks in St. Peter‟s Square.”21 This obsession led to a gradual yet steady
alignment with the West and its leading power from the spring of 1947 forward, despite
19
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the cherished neutrality and official impartiality which had historically comprised the
essence of papal diplomacy.
There were a number of signs that the Vatican was more openly aligning itself
with Washington from this point forward. The repression of the Roman Catholic Church
in the Soviet sphere caused escalating anxiety for the pope, and Tito‟s 1946 persecution
of the Archbishop of Zagred, Aloysius Stepinac, confirmed that the Church would not be
spared Moscow‟s drive to consolidate its control. At the behest of the Vatican, which
channelled numerous reports on the Church in the East to Washington, the NCWC
generated a massive campaign in the American Catholic press to bring attention both to
the trial of Stepinac and to the Soviet repression of the Christian churches generally. The
NCWC campaign, which included outreach to a number of high-ranking congressmen,
managed to attract the support of John W. McCormack of Massachusetts, the majority
leader in the House of Representatives, who presented a thunderous denunciation of
Stalinist aggression in a speech to the House on 27 July.22 Spellman, delighted with the
speech, sent copies to the entire American episcopate. The Vatican, anxious to bolster the
NCWC‟s publicity campaign, and anxious to elicit a firmer American hand in dealing
with Stalinist aggression, prepared its own memorandum on the Yugoslav situation,
which it forwarded to the State Department in August.
By the early winter of 1947, the American Catholic press was roundly lauding
Washington‟s „new‟ foreign policy objectives, as outlined in a speech by the President to
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Congress on 12 March.23 The „Truman Doctrine‟, in vowing military and financial
support to Greece and Turkey, signalled a shift in American policy from detente to
containment of Soviet expansion. The policy was extolled both at the Vatican and by
leaders in the American Church, who had advocated a tougher line on Moscow for some
time. Edmund J. Walsh, S.J., dean of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown
University and recent consultant to the American government at the Nuremberg Trials,
praised Truman‟s resolute policy in a March speech to 1200 foreign service and
diplomatic staff at Washington‟s Statler Hotel. In comparing the Monroe Doctrine with
the “equally historic Truman Doctrine”, Walsh exclaimed that “the non-colonization of
the world by communist aggression is now declared to be a cardinal principle of
American foreign policy. The speed with which the American principle of free
democracy rushed in to occupy the political vacuum created by the withdrawal of British
power from the Middle East is an index of awakened responsibility in high places. It was
a question of immediate response to an impelling emergency or else progressive
surrender to the calculated advance of world communism.”24
Walsh‟s statement was echoed by the Vatican itself, which offered its unqualified
endorsement of the Marshall Plan in a series of articles in the Osservatore Romano and Il
Quotidiano (the paper of the Church‟s powerful lay organization, Catholic Action) in the
summer of 1947. Though the Vatican had sought to maintain an impartial non-alignment
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through 1946 and 1947, despite private fears of Soviet encroachment, an endorsement of
the Marshall Plan amounted to a de facto alignment with Washington. The exchange of
letters between Truman and Pius XII in August 1947, circulated in the secular and
religious press to maximum effect, appeared to seal the Washington-Vatican axis. The
exchange coincided with Myron Taylor‟s return to Rome, following Truman‟s decision,
despite a rising tide of Protestant opposition, to send his „personal representative‟ back to
the Vatican indefinitely. That Moscow considered the exchange of letters nothing short of
a working alliance between the Vatican and the United States was suggested to Taylor‟s
office by Don Manuel Sotomayor Luna, the Ecuadorian ambassador to the Holy See.
Commenting that the Soviets considered the United States too strong for a “frontal
attack”, he suggested that Stalin would “weaken it by two major flank attacks”, namely
Latin America and the Roman Catholic Church.25 “The communists consider the
exchange of letters between the President and the Pope”, he offered, “as tantamount to an
alliance and as a source of moral strength to the United States. Accordingly, if it can
defeat and weaken the Holy See, they will also be weakening the United States.” In
concluding, the ambassador recalled a recent meeting with the pope, where he informed
Pius that in Moscow, he was now referred to as “that American.”26 Sotomayor‟s inference
was confirmed during a September 1948 meeting between Montini and James Dunn, the
American ambassador to Italy. Montini informed his guest that he saw little hope of
Vatican relations with any Soviet-controlled government, and that Moscow was “using
the Orthodox Church as a political instrument to undermine the Vatican, whose
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favourable attitude toward the Marshall Plan...was particularly resented by Stalin.”27 In
closing, however, he pledged the Vatican‟s unwavering support of the Marshall Plan,
repeating three times to Dunn that it “must succeed for the good of mankind.”28
Open cooperation between Washington, the Vatican and the American Church
reached an apogee during the 1948 Italian elections, which pitted a left-wing bloc of
communists and socialists, led by the Italian Communist Party (PCI), against a centreright bloc led by Alcide DeGasperi‟s Christian Democrats (DC). The Vatican, through
the organs of Catholic Action, organized a capillary-like network of diocesan and parish
organizations intended to steer Italian Catholics away from the PCI, and into the voting
booth on election day.29 The American government, through the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), channelled money, supplies and expertise to the Holy See and the DC. On
a public level, the Truman administration, until the eve of the election, subtly reminded
Italians that American aid, including Marshall Plan dollars, would not necessarily
continue flowing to a „red‟ Italy. The American Catholic Church, at the suggestion of
Luigi Gedda, head of Catholic Action, initiated a letter-writing campaign which saw
American-Italians writing relatives in Italy to warn them of the consequences of a PCI
victory. Coordinated by the NCWC, through the office of Cicognani, the apostolic
delegate, the campaign focused on dioceses and archdioceses with the highest
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concentrations of Italian-American faithful.30 By mid-March 1948, the United States Post
Office reported that mail to Italy had already doubled.31 American and Vatican efforts
appeared to have succeeded: DeGasperi‟s coalition achieved a comfortable victory in the
18 April election. The Vatican did not hesitate to thank the American Church for its
services rendered. Through Cicognani, it relayed to the NCWC the “deep gratitude” of
the Secretary of State “for the very active and efficient part taken by the NCWC in this
campaign and its promotion.”32
American designs for the postwar world dovetailed quite closely with the
American bishops‟ Statement of 1945. The episcopacy‟s call for “containment” became
American policy by 1947, as a firmer hand in dealing with Moscow became entrenched.
The Marshall Plan fulfilled the objective of foisting a judicious and measured peace on
Germany, designed to prevent its absorption into the Soviet sphere. In Italy, the informal,
yet highly effective, alliance of Washington, the American Church and the Vatican
helped deliver victory to Alcide DeGasperi‟s Christian Democrats in the 1948 Italian
elections, narrowly denying power to the communist-led Popular Democratic Front. If
Pius XII looked to Washington to shape a postwar order based the principles of
democracy, peace, justice and religious freedom, the United States could equally, by late
1945, view the Vatican and American Catholics as committed ideological partners in
such a task.
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Non Possumus: A New Roman Catholic Crusade for the Holy Land
Though a clutch of mutual, and vital, common concerns did draw Washington and
the Vatican closer together in the years after 1945, Roman Catholic attitudes towards
Zionism and the Holy Land grew increasingly at odds with positions beginning to prevail
in the Senate and State Department, where support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine
was growing. Favourable opinion on Zionism was also growing among the American
public. By the summer of 1945, newsreel footage of Auschwitz, Buchenwald and other
Nazi death camps had vividly brought the horrors of the Holocaust to bear on the
American conscience, creating a groundswell of support for Zionism that had been
building through the war years. It was a development that was about to put American
Catholic opposition to Zionism in much sharper relief.
The Vatican was certainly cognizant of the humanitarian crisis that the Holocaust
had created for surviving European Jews, yet this did not alter its longstanding opposition
to Zionism, as outlined in the 1922 aide memoire issued by Cardinal Pietro Gasparri to
the League of Nations. 33 A series of private audiences with Pius XII in 1945 confirmed
this. In a papal audience in April of that year, Moshe Sharett, future Prime Minister of
Israel and then head of the pre-state Jewish Agency government, assured the Pope that
there was “no clash between [Zionist] aspirations in Palestine and the high interests of
Christianity and the Catholic Church.”34 The Pope acknowledged his guest‟s concerns,
but continued to express the opinion on the unfeasibility of Zionism. “There are Arabs in
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Palestine...They are the majority”, Pius XII offered in response. Though Sharett tried to
emphasize the specific importance of Palestine to the Jewish diaspora, “the only place we
have in the whole world”, he remained unconvinced that the Roman Church would be
supportive moving forward.35 By his own later admission, his attempt to elicit some kind
of Vatican sympathy for the program of postwar Zionism, based on a rational explanation
of the political and humanitarian reality, and in the immediate wake of the Holocaust,
“went nowhere”.36
In September, Pius XII received Rabbi Philip S. Bernstein, a member of the
Zionist Emergency Committee, and who would be assigned in 1946 by President Truman
as an official advisor to the United States Army in Europe on the resettlement of nearly
200,000 European Jews. During the audience, held at Castel Gandolfo, Bernstein thanked
the Pope for his assistance to European Jewry during the war, and for his continuing
assistance to Jewish refugees in postwar Italy. 37 The rabbi was impressed by the Pope‟s
genuine anguish at the fate of European Jews, which he repeatedly described as
“dreadful”. On the question of Jewish resettlement, however, Pius XII continued to
disregard the option of a Jewish Palestine, informing his guest that Jewish immigration to
the United States or to South America would be a suitable solution to the postwar refugee
crisis. Bernstein then apprised the Pope of the resistance to Jewish immigration in the
United States and elsewhere, coupled with a desire among many displaced European
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Jews to settle in Palestine. “Yes, I recognize that as their desire”, the Pope admitted to
Bernstein, but he suggested that “the United States was best equipped to absorb them”.38
Bernstein left the meeting with Pius guardedly optimistic, noting that the Pope ended the
audience with “another handshake, not firm but with enough pressure to suggest a
positive clasp.”
That the American Catholic hierarchy was to maintain a line on Palestine parallel
to that of the Vatican was emphasized in December 1945, when prominent archbishops in
the American Church, including Spellman, Stritch, Mooney an Glennon, were again
forwarded copies of the Vatican‟s 1922 aide memoire, as well as copies of Cardinal
Gasparri‟s 1922 note to the British Minister to the Holy See, both of which outlined
Rome‟s opposition to a Jewish state in Palestine on political, theological and historical
grounds.39 Both statements, now thirty years old, and composed long before the rise of
the Nazis and the eventual tragedy of the Holocaust, were still to be regarded as the
definitive positions of the Roman Catholic Church on the question of Palestine. That the
statements were re-issued at the end of 1945, after having been distributed to the entire
American episcopate through the NCWC in June 1944, was evidence that the cessation of
hostilities in Europe, and a clearer appraisal of the tragedy of European Jewry, had not
altered the Vatican‟s fundamental position on the future of Palestine.40
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Generally speaking, however, Catholic resistance to Zionism was not a policy
aired too publically from the Holy See in the period immediately following the war. This
was chiefly because Vatican priorities in the immediate postwar years centred squarely
on “containment” of Soviet communism, which clearly posed the most severe threats to
the interests of the Church in this period. As American public support for Zionism
continued to grow in 1946 and 1947 (with a slim majority of Americans coming to
support the idea), and as the American government increasingly pledged its support, an
explicit Vatican opposition became increasingly difficult.41 President Truman‟s growing
personal commitment to the Zionist idea made an oppositional stance more difficult still.
In the interests of maintaining sound relations with Washington, and particularly not to
jeopardize the Taylor mission, the Vatican remained publically silent on the question of
Zionism, though resistance to the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine remained
the formal policy of the Church both in Rome and the United States.
Given the convergence of interests between the American Church and
Washington in the postwar years, leading figures in the American hierarchy were
similarly reticent to trumpet an opposition to Zionism too loudly, lest it hamper the
ability of the Church to work with the American government on other mutual objectives.
Seeking American aid for war-ravaged Italy was one such objective, in accordance with
the bishop‟s postwar commitments to building international democracy, justice and
religious freedom. In the weeks before he was raised to the College of Cardinals by Pius
XII, in April 1946, Chicago‟s archbishop Stritch emphasized the need for American aid
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to Italy during an hour-long meeting with President Truman at the White House.42 Stritch
emphasized the need for the United States to “make good” on its promises “in support of
the reconstruction of Italy on the basis of the core principles of Western civilization,”
warning that the devastation wrought by war had made communism a viable alternative
for many Italians. Though Stritch was not sure that the President understood the gravity
of the communist threat in Italy, he was confident that he shared the postwar ambitions of
both the Vatican and American Catholics.43 As increasingly important intermediaries
between Rome and Washington, however, American Catholic leaders shared the
Vatican‟s apprehensions on taking visibly oppositional positions with the American
government, including the divergence of opinion on Zionism. The American bishops
were well aware that a definitive public stand against Zionism could jeopardize other
areas of cooperation with Washington, precisely at the moment when relations with the
Truman administration appeared progressively fruitful. The bishops preferred to remain
circumspect, withholding public statements as they pursued other areas of cooperation.
The American Catholic press, however, expressed opinion more freely than the
bishops could. While the bishops exercised strategic restraint on the question, antiZionist musings continued to be expressed liberally through the diocesan and wider
American Catholic press, in line with Cardinal Maglione‟s call in August 1943 that the
Catholic press trumpet the Vatican‟s line on Palestine. By 1945, such delineation in
Catholic journals became increasingly important in shaping public opinion on the
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Palestine question, particularly as sympathy for a Jewish home in Palestine grew in the
wake of the war. As outlined in the previous chapter, a series of articles in the diocesan
press in the fall and winter of 1945 continued to heap criticism on Zionism. Anthony
Bruya, an American Franciscan and the Jerusalem correspondent for the NCWC News
Service, produced a series of such articles, eventually carried by the Brooklyn Tablet, the
Boston Pilot, the New World (Chicago), Catholic Mind, and other large circulation
diocesan papers.44 Bruya, closely echoing the Vatican, questioned the “absorptive
capacity” of Palestine to accommodate Europe‟s displaced Jews. He criticized Jews who
looked to the territory as a “new lebensraum for commercial enterprise and expansion”,
crassly linking Zionism to the Nazi drive for empire. As the Pope had expressed
privately, Bruya touted alternatives for Jews seeking refuge and settlement, suggesting
North and South America as ideal points of emigration. He also juxtaposed the
safeguarding of Christian holy sites in Palestine with Zionist dreams of a Jewish state,
arguing that the latter was wholly incompatible with the former, a position more firmly
expressed in the Catholic press from 1945 forward. “For thousands of years Palestine has
been the Holy Land”, Bruya observed, “and it must continue to be such in the years
which follow the devastation of this global war. In defence of its sacred character and its
Holy Places the flower of European manhood once purpled with Crusader blood many a
Palestine battlefield. It would be unthinkable that now, from the unspeakable wreckage of
this war, which in the Providence of God passed by this Holy Land, should come a new
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desecration of the home land of Jesus Christ.”45 The article reflected the increasingly dire,
crusade-inspired rhetoric that was coming to characterize American Catholic reportage on
Palestine. In concluding, Bruya suggested an international trusteeship for the territory,
under the auspices of the recently formed United Nations (UN), as the only solution that
could reliably protect Roman Catholic interests in the Holy Land. Once again, he floated
an idea that the Vatican, and American Catholic leaders, had only suggested in private
conversations.
Bruya‟s sentiments were echoed further in the Catholic press by Mgr. Michael
Assemani, the representative of the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem to the United States, and
also an NCWC correspondent in Palestine. In a series of articles in the fall of 1945,
Assemani defended Christianity‟s ancient claims to the territory, arguing that any
solution that handed political control of the territory to “either Jews or Mohammedans”
would represent a violation of Christianity‟s stake to the territory. He similarly suggested
a UN stewardship of the territory, and urged allied governments to “put a stop to the
religious and racial bickering” between Jew and Arab in the territory.46
As Assemani‟s condemnations of Zionist designs for Palestine grew progressively
more acerbic in the spring of 1946, the NCWC Press Department became increasingly
reticent to proclaim such a conspicuously anti-Zionist editorial line. This was particularly
so in light of the 1946 Anglo-American Report on Palestine, which suggested that a UN
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commission be established to administer the territory, much to the consternation of
Zionist leaders in the United States and Europe. As it appeared that Catholic designs for
the territory were being fulfilled by the recommendations of the report, the NCWC
adopted a guardedly neutral line on Zionism, preferring not to inflame public opinion,
particularly as sympathy for Zionism continued to rise. The NCWC was also concerned
with cultivating its closer ties to Washington, an objective that could be complicated by
an effervescent anti-Zionism among American Catholics.
Much like the Vatican‟s official organ, the Osservatore Romano, diocesan papers,
under the auspices of the NCWC, adopted an increasingly ambivalent line on Zionism
through the spring and summer of 1946, confident that a settlement on the territory
amenable to the Vatican and the American Church, namely a UN administration of the
territory, was unfolding. The NCWC‟s desire for a more ambivalent stance was revealed
in May 1946 when Frank Hall, director of the NCWC‟s Press Department, informed
General Secretary Mgr. Howard Carroll that Assemani‟s articles, increasingly critical of
Zionism, risked creating an anti-Catholic backlash against the Church in the United
States, hampering its ability to pursue common objectives with the American government
(where sympathy with Zionism continued to rise).47 Hall preferred a neutral stance,
reminding Carroll that neither the Vatican nor the American hierarchy had issued a
definitive and public statement “expressing positive agreement or disagreement with the
Zionists hopes for a Jewish homeland.” In touting the value of neutrality on the issue, he
continued that
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...we seem at present on the fence, in the sense that no one can say we took a
position for or against (I realize what some persons think on the subject, but they
haven‟t gone on record). Now, Father Assemani could be described as having an
official position of great importance with regard to Palestine. We could be
described as the news agency of the American hierarchy. If we sent out [his]
articles, it could be described as giving the Catholic position on the Zionist‟s
hopes for a Jewish homeland. It would be a position in the opposition.48

Carroll‟s handwritten response stated that Assemani‟s articles “should be held in
abeyance for the present.”
A Commonweal editorial on the Palestine question from May 1946 epitomized the
cautious position adopted by the American Catholic press in the early postwar period.
We have never been able to make up our minds on the subject of Jewish
immigration into Palestine. We fully recognize the desperate need of Europe‟s
remaining Jews for a homeland in which they can be reasonably confident of
living unmolested... But we are likewise equally suspicious of Zionist nationalism
and we cannot withhold our sympathy from the natives of Palestine who, however
short-sightedly, seem to prefer to keep their country for their own use. Americans,
of all people, can with the least grace criticize others for attempts to restrict
immigration. And hence we cannot make up our minds, especially since we
believe that the first duty of our own country is itself to provide a haven of refuge
for the harborless.49
The editorial closely mirrored the Vatican‟s position on the issue: that a refuge for
displaced Jews had to be found, but that the Zionist program was problematic on a
number of fronts, and that Jewish emigration, particularly to the United States,
represented a more viable solution.
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The restraint exhibited by the NCWC on the Palestine question in the spring and
summer of 1946 was not as evident in other organs of the American Catholic press. The
national Jesuit weekly America, for example, continued to openly criticize Zionist
demands, characterizing them as belligerent and wholly incompatible with Christian and
Muslim rights in the territory. Publishing outside the auspices of the NCWC, America
largely abandoned its wartime editorial line which alternated between a show of Catholic
solidarity with persecuted Jews and a stern scepticism for Zionism, to focus more
singularly on criticisms of the latter. The journal admitted that a viable solution had to be
found for Europe‟s displaced Jews, but it clearly expressed its reservations with Zionism
as that solution. As early as December 1945, America accused Zionist organizations of
exploiting the suffering of Jews as an expedient to the erecting of a sovereign Jewish
state.50 America suggested that unity among Jews was based on religion rather than
nationality, and that Zionism sought to create a question of national sovereignty out of
what was properly a humanitarian crisis. The journal seconded Hans Morgenthau‟s
November 1945 assertion that Palestine be placed “under the auspices of the UN,” and it
claimed to stand with Jews “embarrassed at aggressive Zionism.”51
Throughout 1946, America expressed consternation at Zionist impatience with the
Anglo-American Report on Palestine (which represented a repudiation of the Zionist
program), and criticized the increasingly violent tactics adopted by Jewish nationalists in
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Palestine.52 It regarded the Report as the most pragmatic solution to what was becoming
an intractable political situation. “A fairer compromise”, the journal described it, “in view
of the complications that thirty years have added to the original 1917 arrangement, could
scarcely have been forthcoming.”53 It charged that Zionist belligerence, which was
spilling into violence, hampered the “Jewish cause” more severely than even Arab
intransigence, and urged that British diplomacy, which favoured an international mandate
for the territory, be given a chance to succeed. America repeatedly criticized the “narrow
nationalism” of the Zionists, charging that it “[appeared] that the Zionist nationalists no
longer fight the battle to secure a refuge for persecuted brethren, but rather to further
national ambitions.”54 In a later editorial, the journal accused Zionist leaders of leaders of
exploiting the refugee crisis to fuel the “religio-nationalist mystique” of Zionism, all to
push forward “an obscure claim for a Jewish „nationality‟ and a small strip of land where
it may be expressed.” America also invoked the communist bogey with regularity,
suggesting in a number of editorials that the success of the Zionist program in Palestine
would only give a stronger toehold to the Soviets in the region, where Arab dispossession
would only worsen with the establishment of a Jewish state.55
That the Holy See endorsed the editorial line of America, including its critical
stance on the Zionist program, was made clear in May of 1946, when Pius XII issued a
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letter to John LaFarge S. J., the noted liberal Catholic leader who had edited the journal
since 1944.56 The letter, printed in the pages of America in July, praised LaFarge and his
editorial staff for principled and practical “Catholic” solutions to the myriad of problems
that faced the postwar world. The pope lauded America for calling “the attention of
statesmen and leaders in the social and economic field to the cankers that weaken the
body politic in its national and international life,” and for critiquing “exaggerated
nationalisms that would close [their] eyes to the unity of the human family.”57 Pius XII
further praised LaFarge for the “spirit of obedience constantly guiding the policy of [the]
review in analyzing in a careful and scholarly manner the complex issues of the day, and
pointing to the solution offered for them by the principles of Christian philosophy.” The
letter represented an implicit Vatican endorsement of America’s views on the Palestine
question, evidence that Rome stood behind the various criticisms of Zionism expressed in
the American Catholic press.
Events in Palestine itself would only harden Catholic opinion, as tensions there
continued to intensify through 1946. In the immediate aftermath of the war, Zionists were
confident that Britain would deliver on the promises of the Balfour Declaration and
acquiesce to their demands for a Jewish state. The victory of Clement Atlee‟s Labour
Party in the July 1945 British election only heightened Zionist hopes, given Labour‟s
previous endorsements for a Jewish National Home in Palestine. This optimism quickly
soured, however, when it became evident that Atlee‟s Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevin,
had no intentions of facilitating Zionist designs in Palestine. Bevin extended Britain‟s
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cautious course on Palestine, imposing renewed immigration quotas and promising only
to launch another inquiry into the situation. This inquiry, which became the 1946 AngloAmerican Report, represented a check on the momentum that mainstream Zionist
organizations appeared to have gained during the war, and contributed to decaying
relations between Jewish Palestinians and British occupying forces in the territory.
Maintaining stability in the territory from early 1946 forward proved a difficult
task for Britain, which stationed nearly 80,000 soldiers there to maintain order.
Underground Zionist organizations such as the Irgun and the Haganah, increasingly
frustrated with Britain‟s stonewalling of their ambitions, waged an intermittent campaign
of sabotage and bombings through the spring and summer. This resistance began with the
sinking of two British police boats in Haifa in October 1944, and continued with attacks
on other symbols of British control in the territory, including railroads, police stations
and military bases. By July, British authorities had arrested nearly three thousand Jews on
suspicions of sabotage and terrorism. Though the recognized Jewish Agency government
officially criticized the campaign of such clandestine groups, it became clear that
Britain‟s „Palestine policy‟ was an affront to mainstream Zionist organizations as well.
Irgun and Haganah attacks increased in frequency and severity from July forward.
Jerusalem‟s King David Hotel, which served as the Britain‟s administrative headquarters
in Palestine, was bombed on 22 July, followed by the bombing of the British embassy in
Rome in October, both incidences suspected work of the Zionist underground.
The intensifying of the terror campaign by the Irgun and other groups drew a
predictable response from America, which again linked Zionism to a crude “cryptonationalism” that was little interested in seeking a genuine solution to the Jewish refugee
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crisis.58 The violence of 1946, the journal suggested, “encourages the suspicion that
certain elements of the Zionists are no more responsible or politically mature, despite
superior material culture, than some Arab extremists who would resort to the same means
if they got the chance and hope of success. Zionism is now in the difficult position of
having to prove the possibility of peaceful government in Palestine.”59 America‟s position
closely reflected that of the Vatican, which viewed both Jewish and Arab nationalism
with deep suspicion, consistently preferring an international mandate over the territory
than the victory of either of these national movements.60
The escalation of violence in Palestine from the summer of 1946 forward, in fact,
marked the beginning of a more widespread condemnation of Zionism and its methods
across a wider spectrum of the American diocesan press. The Commonweal, which had
previously offered only a convoluted and cautious opinion on Zionism in the period
immediately following the war (in line with the Vatican‟s own circumspection), became
more hostile from this point forward. It linked the July bombing of the King David Hotel
not to the underground groups that had planned and undertaken it, but “to Zionism
itself...that must bear responsibility for an act that threatens all it ever aimed to create.”61
Like America, the Commonweal characterized the aims of Zionists as distinct and
separate from those of a majority of world Jewry who, in the opinion of these Catholic
journals, only sought to live in peace and security in the various states that would accept
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them as immigrants. “Zionists”, it commented further, “never in contemporary times a
majority of the Jews, sought to use intimidation and violence to achieve an end not
widely supported by their global co-religionists.” It further opined that it “could not
conceal [its] anger and distress now that a long and mistaken campaign has brought one
more bitter nationalism into a world that has too many of them.”62 Denunciations on
similar grounds could be found in a variety of American Catholic journals and papers,
including the Boston Pilot, Sign, Catholic Mind, Catholic Worker, the Brooklyn Tablet
and others, evidence that the circumscribed and cautious anti-Zionism of 1945-1946 was
giving way to a more uniform chorus denouncing the idea of Jewish statehood in
Palestine.63
The notion that Roman Catholic interests in the territory were taking a back seat
to the Arab-Israeli struggle was also emphasized from 1947 onward. Once again Anthony
Bruya, the NCWC‟s Jerusalem correspondent, provided the reportage. He decried the
“third rate status” of Christian claims, and frequently quoted the Anglo-American
Report‟s admission that “the great interest of the Christian world in Palestine has been
completely overlooked, glossed over, or brushed aside.”64 By the summer of 1947, Bruya
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assured his readers, little had changed. In June, Bruya fanned the flames of a “new
crusade” for Palestine, employing a motif which was appearing with increased frequency.
In commenting on the dangers of a solution which ignored the Christian stake, he quoted
an un-named former British High Commissioner to Palestine, who “bluntly expressed” to
Bruya that “the disregard of Christian sentiment and Christian rights in any settlement of
the Holy Land problem would arouse a new crusading spirit like that of ages past.”65 In
July, Bruya expressed the apprehension, shared by the Vatican and the American
hierarchy, of either Arab or Jewish control over the whole territory. “The process of
industrialization and modernization”, he observed, “rapidly carried out by immigrant
Jews in many parts of Palestine is taken as an ill omen even by progressive Church
leaders,” while “an Arab Palestinian state with a Moslem majority, it is feared, will clamp
down discrimination against the Christians, especially Western missions, forbidding their
missionary work and forcing them to leave the country as undesirables.”66 Bruya‟s
columns reflected the tone of the diocesan press for much of 1947, which lent tentative
support to the UN‟s search for a solution to the conundrum, while „holding to account‟
the world body on its promises to protect the Christian stake in the territory. Taken
collectively, it was an editorial line which reflected the Vatican‟s own position on
Palestine by the summer of 1947.
Similar patterns were found in other organs of the American Catholic press. The
thinly-veiled scepticism of UN efforts, so prominent in the diocesan press, was echoed in
the Jesuit weekly America, though this journal barely restrained its longstanding disdain
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for political Zionism. Though editorship of the journal had passed in 1944 to John
LaFarge, S.J., a liberal figure known for his tireless advocacy for racial equality and
justice in the United States, its editorial line on Zionism remained intact, further evidence
of an analogous and unchanging Roman Catholic position on the Holy Land. Throughout
1947, America characterized the demands of Zionists as opportune, cynical, perilous and
ill-advised. The stability of the whole region, let alone the interests of Roman Catholics,
the journal implored, was put at risk by “impatient Zionism” and its drive to create a
Jewish state.67 To this end, America consistently emphasized the fact that Zionism
enjoyed no universal support among Western Jewry, asserting in a May editorial that “In
no nation are the Jews found to be united on the political objectives of Zionism, however
universal the chorus of admiration for their prodigious social and economic
achievements.”68 In October, the journal presented the views of Elmer Berger, Director of
the anti-Zionist American Council for Judaism, which insisted that global Jewry, as a
religious and not a national group, should focus its efforts on securing legal safeguards
and religious freedoms and the inalienable rights of the individual, but not statehood.69
America conceded, however, that anti-Zionist Jewish groups “will scarcely prevail,
inasmuch as their insistence on religious unity, as against unified nationality, separates
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them too sharply from the Zionist tendency, which has been a half a century in
growing.”70
America placed similarly little faith in Arab control of the territory. It opined that
the Arab League “had put a bold face on their plea for self-government and
independence, with only vague and meagre promises that their first „democratic
experiment‟ would work in a land of such cynically divided loyalties.”71 It maintained
that while the Arabs presented a consistent claim for nationalism, “Arab intransigence”,
and “the strong Arab tendency to particularism, which could hardly be called
nationalism” would bedevil any successful Arab administration of the territory. The
journal initially its support behind an international trusteeship for Palestine, observing
that “to practically every [UN] member-nation Palestine- all of it, not merely this or that
enclave- is Holy Land first, and only by regrettable concomitance a political problem at
all.”72 As the situation in Palestine continued to worsen, the American Catholic press
placed Christian interests in the territory front and centre, girding Catholic opinion for the
coming struggle for the future of the territory at the UN.
The UN Partition Plan and the Birth of the „Corpus Separatum‟, 1947-1948
Events in Palestine after the bombing of the King David Hotel made it evident
that Britain‟s mandatory control over the territory was becoming increasingly fragile. The
Irgun, and other underground groups, were becoming progressively emboldened in their
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successes against British targets in the Holy Land, and stepped up their campaign in the
fall and winter of 1946 and the spring of 1947. The Irgun’s tactic of capturing and
executing British soldiers and administrators for each of their own casualties (often by
hanging) added a sinister odium to the struggle. As international sympathy for Zionism
continued to gain traction, particularly in the United States, and as the struggle against
underground Zionist groups continued to intensify, necessitating an occupying force of
nearly 100,000 personnel, the British Foreign Office began to seriously question its
commitment to the mandate.
As domestic and international pressure mounted, Britain finally decided in
February 1947 to turn the question of Palestine over to the United Nations, stipulating
only that any proposed solution would have to be acceptable to both Arabs and Jews in
the territory.73 The General Assembly promptly established the United Nations Special
Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), a body created to investigate the conflict in the Holy
Land, and to propose a viable solution.74 Throughout 1947, UNSCOP delegates examined
a variety of political solutions for Palestine, including a Jewish state with guaranteed
rights for Arab minorities, an Arab state with guaranteed rights for Jewish minorities, UN
trusteeship for the territory, and a partitioned state. By the fall, the committee had
prepared a majority report, which favoured a partitioned state with UN trusteeship for the
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„Old City‟ of Jerusalem, and a minority report which recommended a federated
Palestinian state to be administered by the Arabs, with constitutional protections for the
Jewish minority. The majority report prevailed, and on 29 November 1947, the UN
adopted a resolution to create both a Jewish and an Arab state in the territory, while
maintaining Jerusalem as an “international zone” under the auspices of the UN.
News of the UN resolution on Palestine elicited little official reaction from either
the Vatican or the leading figures of the American Church. The Holy See remained
opposed to the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, but it continued, on an official
level, to cloister this policy, cognizant of the broad international support for the partition
plan, and desirous to maintain its growing strategic and ideological alliance with the
United States (which had firmly supported the UN plan). Though the Vatican remained
opposed in principle to a Jewish Palestine, it was equally wary of an Arab state in the
territory, a prospect that it had long since regarded, like Zionism, as a threat to Roman
Catholic interests in the Holy Land. The views of the Vatican on Arab nationalism were
shared by Myron Taylor, who expressed his apprehensions in a memo to Cordell Hull
during the closing months of the Second World War:
I have repeatedly expressed the opinion that no encouragement should be given
to the establishment, after the war, of a pan-Arab confederation. I have serious
doubts as to the opportuneness of encouraging a similar racial and religious bloc
that would put in motion such external and internal controversies as would render
vain any effort to control, influence or deal with problems concerning [its] single
parts...It seems to me that the whole plan to encourage a consolidation of the Arab
world is full of dangers of many kinds.75
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Similar apprehensions towards Arab nationalism in Palestine could be found both
in the Vatican‟s press organs and in American Catholic periodicals from the 1920‟s
forward.
The plan to divide Palestine appeared to create for the Holy See a „worst of both
worlds‟ political scenario: a situation whereby two non-Christian states would be created,
each of which would presumably pose challenges to Roman Catholic influence in the
region. Given the broad-based support for partition, however (particularly that of the
United States, Britain, and a clutch of predominantly Catholic South American states), an
outright denunciation of the plan to divide Palestine between the Arabs and the Jews,
either from Rome or from leaders of the American Church, was fraught with risks. The
Vatican remained keen to maintain sound relations with the United States, and was
reluctant to create a breach with Washington by an open rejection of the partition plan.
This was particularly so considering that the Italian Communist Party (PCI) continued to
expand its political influence on the peninsula, a threat the Vatican would need continued
American assistance to contain.
In lieu of UN trusteeship for Palestine, which Maglione considered optimal,
Vatican policymakers seized upon promises made in the partition plan to maintain
Jerusalem as a UN administered international zone, a „corpus separatum‟ protecting the

synthesis between the Arab peoples of the Middle East, and specifically proposed a ‘Greater Syria’ which
would encompass, among other territories, most of Palestine. The idea was as alarming to the Vatican as
was the program of Zionism, as both threatened the Church in the Holy Land.
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Holy Places by placing neither Jews nor Arabs in control of the Old City.76 In this way,
the holiest sites of Christendom would remain outside of the political jurisdiction of a
non-Christian sovereign power, preserving for the Roman Catholic Church at least a base
for continued influence in the region.
Leading figures in the American hierarchy were similarly wary of the prospects of
either Arab or Jewish control of Palestine. New York‟s Mgr. Thomas McMahon, who
would advocate tirelessly on behalf of the Holy See as the head of the New York Based
Catholic Near East Welfare Association (CNEWA) from 1943 to 1955, expressed
American Catholic support for UN trusteeship of Palestine as early as June 1945, when
he weighed in on the options for the territory: “Palestine is international, an international
UN government is another idea proposed; the idea is good, in fact far better than the
others, because it does safeguard the sacred character of Christ‟s homeland.”77 By 1947,
however, American churchmen, in accord with the views of the Vatican secretariat, had
accepted the partition of Palestine as a virtual inevitability, and focused their efforts on
guaranteeing the maintenance of Jerusalem as an international „corpus separatum‟.
Spellman, the foremost figure in American Catholicism, expressed as much to an
American diplomat in January 1947, stating that though the Catholic Church “strongly
[opposed] any form of partition, primarily on the ground that the whole of the land [was]
sacred to Christ”, he conceded that “a carefully conceived, detailed regime of guarantees
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and safeguards for the Holy Places and for the Christian minorities, both under the
supervision of appropriate organs of the United Nations”, would be the least that the
Church would expect in properly resolving the „Palestine Question‟.78
That the Vatican and the American bishops so quickly conceded defeat on the
partition plan spoke volumes on the limits of Vatican diplomacy in the early Cold War.
The close cooperation of the American bishops and Washington on a number of areas of
mutual concern, combined with staunch American support of the partition plan,
effectively nullified the Vatican‟s longstanding opposition to a Jewish homeland in
Palestine. Within a matter of weeks, Gasparri‟s 1922 Aide Mémoire, which had been
trotted out frequently to outline the Vatican‟s longstanding policy, had been rendered a
dead letter. The prospect of a corpus separatum for Jerusalem, however, appeared as a
chance to salvage a victory from the jaws of defeat, a chance for the Vatican to save-face
on the Palestine question, and to preserve the very heart of the Terra Santa from either
Jewish or Jordanian sovereign control. Supporting the plan, moreover, would allow for a
continuation of fruitful relations between the Vatican, the American bishops and
Washington, a tripartite relationship which appeared to be bearing fruit. Vatican figures,
no doubt, also saw in the plan the potential for papal control in Jerusalem, another factor
contributing to Catholic acquiescence on the partition plan. Though anti-Zionist
sentiment continued to be expressed in both Vatican and American Catholic quarters,
particularly in the context of delays to the internationalization of Jerusalem, the
establishment of a corpus separatum became the focal point of Catholic lobbying from
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the summer of 1947 forward. Truman, on his part, sensing the Catholic stand down on the
partition plan, specifically vowed “support for the internationalization of Jerusalem and
the protection of the Holy Places in Palestine” in the Democratic platform for 1948,
evidence of the President‟s careful politicking on the Palestine question.79 American
Catholics, both in Washington and at the UN, would now strenuously advocate for just
such an outcome.
The NCWC „Office for UN Affairs‟ and the „Jerusalem Question‟
The NCWC, established in 1919 as a permanent replacement for the National
Catholic War Council (NCWC) had, by 1945, served as the organizational nerve centre of
the Catholic Church in the United States for nearly three decades.80 Essentially a council
of the American bishops, its various bodies and departments had lobbied the American
government on a variety of domestic and international questions pertinent to Roman
Catholic interests, which had included Washington‟s interwar relations with Spain and
Mexico.81 As the first bureaucracy of a major religious denomination to be headquartered
in the national capital, the NCWC was specifically mandated to “organize, unify and
coordinate Catholic activities for the general welfare of the Church, near the seat of

79

‘Excerpt from the Democratic Platform for 1948’, May 1948, NCWC/OGS/ACUA, Box 20, File 44. The
same document also provides an excerpt from the Republican platform, which makes no mention of
internationalization, and instead outlines a robust support for Israel from the Republican Party, which was
“the first to call for the establishment of a free and independent Jewish Commonwealth.”
80

On the origins and establishment of the NCWC, see Joseph M. McShane, Sufficiently Radical:
Catholicism, Progressivism and the Bishop’s Program of 1919 (Washington, 1986).
81

On American Catholic pressure on the State Department regarding American policy vis-a-vis Mexico and
Spain, as discussed briefly in chapter 2, see George Q. Flynn, Roosevelt and Romanism: Catholics and
American Diplomacy, 1937-1945 (London, 1976); Flynn’s American Catholics and the Roosevelt Presidency,
1932-1936 (Lexington, 1968); and Matthew Redinger’s American Catholics and the Mexican Revolution,
1924-1936 (Notre Dame, 2005).
179

federal power.”82 By 1945 the organization, emboldened by an increasingly intimate
relationship with the American government and by the steady growth of the Church in the
United States, continued in its attempts to shape domestic and international questions
along lines amenable to the Roman Catholic Church.
An American Catholic presence at the UN was deemed vital, both by the Vatican
and by the NCWC, in attempts to communicate a „Catholic‟ worldview to the nascent
world body, and was in line with Pope Pius XII‟s support of the new world organization
and its objectives. Though the Vatican was wary of an international forum that afforded
the Soviet Union a significant „seat at the table‟, it remained optimistic that the UN would
be central to the construction of a peaceable world order. Soon after the war, the Pope
expressed his admiration for the global body and its quest for world peace. “Nobody”, he
intoned, “who has taken to his breast, as a sacred obligation, the fight for a worthy peace
should renounce the use of this possibility, however limited it may be, to stir up the
conscience of the world from a place so high and clear.”83
That the UN was based in the north eastern United States, first at Lake Success,
New York and later in New York City itself, made the NCWC a natural focal point for
Roman Catholic advocacy at the new world body. The NCWC first appointed consultants
to the 1945 United Nations Conference on International Organization (UNCIO) at San
Francisco, where delegates lobbied to modify the Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta proposals
along lines suggested in Pope Pius XII‟s Five Point Peace Program of 1945, and the
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American hierarchies annual statements On International Order (1944) and On
Organizing World Peace (1945).84 Though American Catholic delegates experienced
frustration at San Francisco in placing a Catholic stamp on the UN charter, the NCWC
was sufficiently encouraged to appoint a permanent observer at the UN, someone who
could track developments at the various agencies, prepare summaries of debates for use
by the bishops and by the Catholic press, and who, when opportunity merited, advance
Catholic perspectives and positions among members of the world body. The NCWC‟s
Father Edward Conway, S.J., who was charged with creating the organization‟s UN
office, also envisaged the post as creating a bridge between the American Catholic
Church and the American delegation to the UN, producing an envoy who could serve in
the dual capacity of “rapporteur to the NCWC and as liaison between the NCWC and the
American delegation.”85
On 11 September 1946, the NCWC‟s „Office for UN Affairs‟ was formally
established, using office space in Spellman‟s New York archdiocesan headquarters. The
establishment of the office was not a surprise, given the growing consensus among the
bishops of the advantage of having an NCWC observer at the UN.86 The choice to lead
the new office was, however, unorthodox. In August, at the behest of Chicago‟s Cardinal
Samuel Stritch, Catherine Schaefer, an officer in the powerful lay National Council of
Catholic Women (NCCW) was tabbed to head the new endeavour. Schaefer‟s selection,
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given the availability of more senior candidates, and given the male-dominated culture of
the NCWC, was significant. It was particularly so as Conway, who had been central to
conceiving the mandate of such an office, had also coveted the position. Dr. Ross
Hoffman, chairman of the department of history at Fordham University, who had served
as an occasional NCWC observer at the Security Council sessions, had also expressed an
interest.87 Schaefer‟s selection, then, spoke volumes on the faith which senior figures
placed in her ability to succeed in such a role.
In addition to her role with the NCCW, Schaefer had also been employed in the
NCWC‟s Social Action department, where she worked as an assistant to its director,
Father Raymond McGowan. The Social Action department had been established in 1920
to promote the social thought of the Roman Catholic Church in the United States, and
used Catholic doctrine and papal teachings as guides to framing solutions to modern
social questions. The department examined questions both domestic and international,
with a particular eye on the threat that communism posed to the interests of the
international Church. Schaefer‟s role in working with McGowan in this capacity, which
included the writing of speeches and the production of books and pamphlets, impressed
upon him her potential in an even larger capacity. In August 1945, Schaefer was
appointed by McGowan as the NCWC observer to the UNCIO meetings in San
Francisco, further evidence of his growing confidence in his assistant. Her appointment to
the new office was a clear reflection of her growing reputation at the NCWC. As the
office expanded in importance in the years after 1946, and as it became central to
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American Catholic attempts to shape the Palestine question, the bishops would be well
pleased with the selection of Schaefer.
Once in New York, her ambitions extended beyond the initial mandate of the
office. Though she had been authorized to observe and report on developments at the UN
for the purposes of keeping the American bishops updated and informed, it was clear that
her vision for the office extended further. She clearly conceived of an activist office that
sought contact both with other Catholic organizations at the UN, as well as international
NGO‟s and delegations. Six months after she had established the office, she revealed this
vision in an annual report to Carroll. “As Catholics at the UN get to know each other
better,” she apprised Carroll, “and as Catholic organizations are admitted to consultative
relationships, the utility of the NCWC‟s Office for UN Affairs should increase, in the
informational, liaison and other assistance it may be able to render, and in its efforts to
integrate Catholic principles into the formal action and atmosphere of the UN and of
international life, and to inform Catholics of developments to which these principles
might be applied.”88
As such, in addition to observing and reporting on the numerous sessions and
committees, Schaefer actively sought to build bridges between the major American and
international Catholic organizations accredited to the UN. In this respect, her objectives
appeared to have been the establishment of an “international Catholic circle” along the
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lines of which had existed among the Catholic powers at the League of Nations.89 She
also envisioned the NCWC‟s office as the co-ordinating body for those delegations.
Within months of the establishment of the office, Schaefer had established links with a
number of international Catholic observer groups at the UN, including the International
Federation of Christian Trade Unions, the International Union of Catholic Women‟s
Leagues, Caritas International and Pax Romana. By the end of 1946, the NCWC office
was already established as the “convening agent” for American Catholic observer groups
at the UN, which included the powerful NCCW and the Catholic Association for
International Peace (CAIP).90
Schaefer‟s office monitored a number of issues relevant to Catholic interests,
including the development of the UN‟s Bill of Human Rights, the status of and assistance
to European refugees (particularly Catholics), religious freedom in Eastern Europe, the
development of UNICEF, and a variety of other questions. No issue, however,
commanded the time and attention of the office as did the „Palestine Question‟ and,
specifically from the spring of 1947 forward, the status of Jerusalem as an internationally
administered corpus separatum. In addition to producing a monthly bulletin on UN
affairs entitled „Foreign Affairs‟, which summarized aspects of the various debates
winding through the UN, the office also produced numerous reports specifically
examining the debates on Jerusalem. By 1950, Schaefer and her later assistant, Alba
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Zizzamia, had produced nearly forty lengthy and detailed memoranda on a variety of
aspects on the Palestine issue, providing a key source of information on the debate for
both the American hierarchy and the Catholic press.91 On a number of occasions over the
same period, the Holy See also requested Schaefer‟s memos and monthly bulletins,
evidence of the importance the Vatican placed on the NCWC‟s UN office as a source of
information.92 It would not be until 1964, in fact, that the Vatican appointed its own
permanent observer to the UN, underscoring the importance of Schaefer‟s office as a
clearinghouse of information for the international Church.93
From the formulation of the partition plan in the summer of 1947 to the creation
of the State of Israel in May 1948 (when Britain formally absconded from the mandate
and withdrew its troops from the territory), Schaefer‟s office (which consisted,
remarkably, of herself and a secretary) kept the NCWC apprised of the myriad debates on
the „Palestine Question‟. This included a series of reports in the spring of 1947 which
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revealed the stands of various states on the partition plan itself, from Arab (Egyptian,
Iraqi, Lebanese, and Syrian) calls for an Arab-dominated state, to a disparate collection of
states (including the United States and Britain, but also Czechoslovakia, Guatemala and
Uruguay) who favoured the creation of both an Arab and a Jewish state (as was
ensconced by the partition plan).94 Schaefer consistently tracked the question of the
protection of the Holy Places in Palestine, an issue central to both the Vatican and
American Catholic interests. She expressed concern in the early stages of the UNSCOP
meetings that Christian rights in the Holy Land were not a priority to delegates, citing the
refusal of UNSCOP to grant a hearing to the CNEWA, who wished to speak “in the
interests of universal Christendom in the Holy Places.”95
During the April-May 1947 meetings that led to the creation of UNSCOP
Schaefer, while reporting that the Christian stake in Palestine “did not receive much
formal discussion”, was encouraged by a draft resolution passed by El Salvador on 7
May, which recommended that careful consideration be given to “the interests of the
Christian world in the Holy Land and of the Christian population of Palestine.”96 The
following day, the Brazilian delegation, along with a number of smaller South American
states, endorsed the “religious interests” clause. The inclusion of the clause was
eventually passed by a vote of twenty-seven in favour, nine opposed and sixteen
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abstaining, with Russia, which had been steadfastly opposed to its inclusion, representing
the most notable of opposing states. In later meetings, both Schaefer and representatives
of the CAIP raised the issue of the Christian stake in Palestine, receiving the assurances
of the American ambassador to the UN, Warren Austin, that concern for Christian rights
in the territory would receive the full consideration of UNSCOP delegates.97
It was at this point, in the spring of 1947, that Schaefer‟s office began to more
actively press the Catholic case at the UN. The positions presented by Schaefer were, of
course, formulated by the American bishops, and closely mirrored the Vatican‟s own
desires for the territory. In April, the NCWC formulated a detailed position paper on
Roman Catholic demands for the future of Palestine. In May, Schaefer forwarded copies
of the NCWC‟s „Resolution on the Holy Places‟ to both Austin and Chester Williams,
public liaison of the American delegation to the UN, which stated that:
...all our sanctuaries will be respected and continuously and unconditionally
accessible, and that the Christian minority will actually enjoy not merely that
vague, frequently distorted and facetiously neutralized right of freedom of
religion, but also freedom of religious assemblage, freedom of religious
organization in conducting schools, orphanages, hospitals, and other institutions
of welfare and mercy and freedom from civil, social and economic
discrimination.98
In the same month, Schaefer presented the lengthier NCWC position paper on the
future of the Holy Land to UNSCOP. Penned by James Griffiths, who had been
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appointed by Spellman as chancellor of the Military Ordinariate in 1943, the statement
represented as comprehensive an American Catholic position on the future of Palestine
yet.99 It argued, chiefly, that the Palestinian problem was “not merely bipartite, but
tripartite” and that Christian rights had for too long been ignored in the struggle between
Jews and Arabs for control of the territory.100 It emphasized that for the world‟s 700
million Christians, the territory was sacred, representing “the cradle of their religion.”
The document emphasized the historical legitimacy of Christian claims to the territory,
and rejected suggestions that they be relocated to neighbouring Christian states, such as
Lebanon. “The Christians of Palestine are not new arrivals”, it declared. “They have been
there for nearly twenty centuries. They are rooted in the subsoil of their Holy Land. They
have suffered every type of totalitarian persecution and countless thousands have shed
their blood precisely because they would not disavow the principles of the Master whose
land was their land. The Christian minority has been reluctantly tolerated, civically
ostracized and economically pauperized because they have clung to the teachings of
Christ in the very footsteps of Christ.”101 The document continued to endorse the British
„White Paper‟ of 1939, which advocated an international trusteeship for the territory,
while permitting the complete internationalization of Jerusalem and its environs as the
minimally acceptable solution to the Roman Catholic Church. Finally, the statement
raised the Bolshevik spectre, tying Roman Catholic concerns for the future of Palestine to
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wider Cold War objectives. In insinuating that Moscow had already “infiltrated” the
territory through the state-controlled Russian Orthodox Church, it argued that the
protection of Christian (and specifically Roman Catholic) rights was imperative to
checking the spread of communism in the region.102 The statement was disseminated by
Schaefer during the UNSCOP special committee, and it received wide coverage in the
Catholic press, apprising American Catholics of the Church‟s detailed position on the
Holy Land.103
The activism of American Zionist observer groups at the UN was not unknown to
Schaefer, and provided additional impetus to her lobbying efforts. The importance
Schaefer placed upon disseminating and publicizing the American Catholic viewpoint
was lauded by Karol Krczmery, a Catholic and member of the Czechoslovakian
delegation, who assured her that the influence of observer organizations such as the
NCWC and the CAIP was significant, and that Jewish observer organizations at the UN,
including the Jewish Agency for Palestine (which included powerful American Zionist
leaders such as Nahum Goldman and Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver), the American Jewish
Committee and the World Jewish Congress, were “operating like mad” with UNSCOP
delegates.104 Along with advocating Catholic positions, Schaefer‟s office also tracked the
positions of the various American Jewish and Zionist observer groups at the UN which,
in general, favoured the partition plan and accepted the internationalization of Jerusalem
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as a necessary concession in gaining a sovereign Jewish state. This also included,
however, a number of anti-Zionist Jewish groups, which often worked at cross-purposes
with mainstream Zionist organizations, and emphasized the need for a strengthened
international Jewish consciousness and greater protections under international law, but
which did not advocate for a political and juridical state. In May, Schaefer forwarded the
policy of one such UN-accredited group, the Agudas Israel World Organization, back to
the NCWC for the use of the bishops and the press office.105 In May and June, the
diocesan press delineated the program of Augudas Israel in a range of papers,
emphasizing that Zionist designs for Palestine were not the only viable solutions for the
territory.
By the fall of 1947, Schaefer had developed a significant list of contacts within
the various delegation and committees to the UN. Among American delegates, this
included Austin and Williams and later Secretary of State George Marshall, who confided
to Schaefer and other Catholic observers in October that Jewish groups were concerned
that the United States was not “pressing its position on Palestine with enough strength”,
and was not doing enough in “getting the votes out” for the partition plan.106 Schaefer
also maintained contacts with members of delegations sympathetic to Roman Catholic
concerns on Palestine, which often included Catholic and Arab states. These delegates,
which comprised numerous chiefs of missions, included Mahmoud Hassan Pasha of
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Egypt, Asaf Ali of India, Dr. Fadhil Jamali of Iraq, and Dr. Ramon Muniz of Brazil,
among others. Schaefer‟s closest contact at the UN between 1947 and the early 1950‟s,
however, remained the head of the Lebanese delegation, Dr. Charles Malik (whom
Schaefer described as an “intensely sincere Christian”), who consistently pressed
positions amenable to Roman Catholic interests in Palestine, and who consistently
apprised Schaefer of committee-level progress, and setbacks, on the „Palestine Question.‟
107
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debate on fate of Jerusalem wore on in the later 1940‟s. His own reputation undoubtedly
lent additional credence to Roman Catholic claims at the UN. A graduate of Harvard and
a student of philosophers Alfred North Whitehead and Martin Heidegger (on whom
Malik wrote his doctoral dissertation), he had served as the Lebanese ambassador to the
United States and the UN from 1945 to 1948. As a rapporteur for the Commission on
Human Rights, he was instrumental in the drafting and adoption of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. In the same year, he was named president of the
UN‟s Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), underscoring the influence and clout
that he wielded at the world body.
Though both American Catholic and Protestant groups were present at the UN in
observer roles, evidence suggests that coherence and cooperation between them,
particularly on the question of Palestine, was not particularly close. This was despite the
fact that both Catholic and Protestant groups shared a basic concern for the future of
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Palestine, particularly in regard to the protection of the Holy Places.108 Most mainline
Protestant Churches, like the Roman Catholic Church, favoured neither Arab nor Jewish
control over Palestine, but rather an international trusteeship for the territory administered
by the UN. This sentiment was expressed by the Rev. William Clark-Kerr, moderator of
the Jerusalem Presbytery of the Church of Scotland, in July 1947. As one of the first
Christian leaders to testify before the UNSCOP special committee on religious freedoms
in Palestine, he declared that “at least, to the Western Christian mind, this whole country
is holy”, suggesting that plans to protect only Christian heritage sights and their
immediate surroundings were futile and ill-advised.109 Clark-Kerr‟s notion was seconded
by a majority of Protestant leaders on both sides of the Atlantic, including Dr. Cyril
Forster Garbett, Anglican Archbishop of York, who intoned in a radio address early in
1948 that “no one who has personal knowledge of Jerusalem believes that it is practical to
divide it in this way”, and warned that any such attempt “would lead to endless trouble
and bloodshed.”110
In the same address, the Archbishop urged American Christians to “do all they
[could] for the protection of their fellow Christians in Palestine from persecution, and of
the Holy Places from desecration.” He asked them, in addition, “to use their great
influence to save Palestine from lapsing into anarchy.”111 Despite his sentiment, CatholicProtestant joint action on the question of Palestine was not particularly strong. Schaefer
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alluded to this early in 1948, when she revealed that relations with Protestant observer
groups at the UN “were friendly and cooperative when possible”, but that in some cases,
“it had been impossible to enlist active cooperation.”112 Eliciting a joint CatholicProtestant statement on the Palestine issue was one such area of contention. In April 1947
Samuel McCrea Cavert, General Secretary of the (Protestant) Churches of Christ in
America (CCA) approached the NCWC‟s General Secretary, Howard Carroll, on the
possibility of releasing a “parallel Catholic-Protestant statement on Palestine”,
emphasizing to Carroll that “it was not only Jews and Arabs that had a vital interest in
Palestine.”113 At an NCWC board meeting later in the same month, the question of a joint
statement was raised, and it was determined that no such parallel stand would be issued.
It was also determined that any Catholic statement would be vetted by the Apostolic
Delegate, Amleto Cicognani, “so that the Holy See...would have the opportunity, if time
permitted, to offer suggestions on the topic.”114 At the same meeting, the Holy See‟s 1922
aide memoire on Palestine was again circulated to attending bishops, emphasizing the
degree to which Roman policies continued to guide American Catholic responses to the
issue, despite rapid developments „on the ground‟ in Palestine. No Catholic response on
the question of a parallel statement was issued until early May, when the CCA forwarded
the NCWC a draft of their own statement, at which time Carroll informed the Protestant
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body that his organization had not yet formulated their own definitive statement.115
Schaefer, as noted, presented the NCWC‟s position to the UNSCOP special committee on
Palestine just weeks later, evidence that the American bishops had, in fact, been
preparing a policy statement for the UN. While Catholic and Protestant groups shared a
cluster of concerns on the future of the Holy Land, the NCWC preferred to steer an
independent course, advocating in parallel lines with Protestant organizations on certain
issues, but rarely in close cooperation or conjunction.
Contributing to tenuous Catholic-Protestant cooperation on the Palestine question
was the demand by certain Protestant groups for the recall of Myron Taylor from Rome,
on the grounds that his appointment violated the American constitutional separation of
church and state. From the fall of 1946 forward, groups such as the Northern Baptist
Convention agitated loudly for the removal of Taylor, publicly urging Truman, a Baptist
himself, to terminate the office of his „personal representative‟ to the Holy See. This was
despite a general support of the Taylor mission in the secular press, including an editorial
in New York‟s Herald Tribune by former Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles,
which emphasized the strategic advantages of Taylor‟s posting. The Taylor mission was
also endorsed by several prominent Protestant leaders, who similarly noted the benefits of
a Vatican link.116 These included Harold Staasen, a Baptist and former governor of
Minnesota, who expressed in May 1947 that “in this postwar situation of world
emergency and of conflicting ideological views, if President Truman wishes to have a
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representative at the Vatican, that it is not the kind of situation either constructive or
helpful for [Baptists] to protest.”117 He was seconded by Dr. Everett Clinchy, founder and
first president of the interfaith National Conference for Christians and Jews (NCCJ), who
stated that there was “nothing in the [Taylor] mission which need alarm any sincere
Protestant.”118 Despite this, the chorus of anti-Taylor rhetoric among a number of
mainstream Protestant groups continued to grow. Spellman, in his customary fashion, did
little to assuage Catholic-Protestant tensions over the Taylor mission, attributing
opposition to the mission to “the anti-Catholicism of un-hooded Klansmen sowing seeds
of dissension and disunion.”119 The situation was strained further in August 1947, when a
public exchange of letters between President Truman and Pope Pius XII, which
emphasized the common stand of the United States and the Vatican in the postwar world
order, also served to strengthen the president‟s commitment to Taylor‟s mission, and
further piqued Protestant groups committed to his recall.120
The representations of Schaefer‟s „UN Office‟, then, were to remain distinctly
Roman Catholic in character, advocating for positions that emanated specifically from the
American bishops and, ultimately, the Vatican. Joint statements with other Christian
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denominations were to be avoided, a reflection of the Vatican‟s desire to claim its own
independent stake in the future of Palestine. Schaefer‟s efforts over the spring and
summer of 1947 did not go unrewarded. That the internationalization of Jerusalem was
ensconced in the November partition plan could be credited to the persistent pressure of
both Catholic and Arab states and observer organizations to the UN, exemplified by the
NCWC‟s „UN Office‟, which raised the issue clearly and consistently over these crucial
months.
The CNEWA and the „Palestine Question‟
The NCWC‟s „UN Office‟ was seconded on the Palestine question by the New
York based and Vatican funded Catholic Near East Welfare Association (CNEWA).
Founded in 1926 by Pope Pius XI, and headed from its inception by American
churchmen, the association‟s original mandate was to develop links between the Roman
Catholic Church and Russia. The provision of aid to famine-stricken Russians was
intended to create a beach-head for future evangelization, as well as create a modus
vivendi with bolshevism, which the Vatican had long since identified as a grave
ideological threat. By 1945, the Vatican had long since abandoned any pretence of
normalized relations with Moscow, particularly in light of the severe repressions against
Roman Catholic bishops and cardinals in the Soviet sphere.
The CNEWA, however, was never formally suspended, and in 1931 was placed
under the perpetual control of the American hierarchy. The Archbishop of New York,
resolved Pope Pius XI, would serve in perpetuity as the association‟s president. In 1945,
the CNEWA received a revived mandate in to deal specifically with the Christian
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populations of Palestine and the wider region. Spellman, who as Archbishop of New
York also assumed the presidency of the CNEWA, took a keen interest in the advocacy
of the association, particularly as it pertained to postwar Palestine. In June 1943 he
named thirty-three year old Mgr. Thomas McMahon, a priest in the New York
Archdiocese, as the association‟s assistant national secretary, a position he would hold
until 1955. Upon his appointment, McMahon had been professor of Church history at St.
Joseph‟s Seminary in Yonkers, having recently completed a doctoral degree at Fordham
University.121 Though he had served, in 1935, as a secretary at the Sacred Congregation
for the Oriental Churches in Rome (the Vatican congregation which controlled the
CNEWA), his selection was unexpected, given his age and the gravity of such a posting.
His appointment as Master of Ceremonies to Spellman in the same month, however,
indicated the close working relationship between McMahon and the most powerful figure
in American Catholicism.122 The appointment would move McMahon from the obscurity
of the seminary to the head of an association which wielded significant financial clout,
and with a mandate to defend Roman Catholic interests in the Holy Land. In short order,
in fact, Spellman and McMahon would become leading advocates, both for the American
hierarchy and for the international Church, on the question of Palestine. Under their
leadership, the CNEWA would play a crucial role in the Vatican‟s attempts to steer
American and UN policy toward lines amenable to the Church. In the immediate postwar
period, this of course meant an international trusteeship for Palestine, which both the
Vatican and American Catholic leaders considered optimal. McMahon had proposed
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trusteeship as early as 1945, when in the Catholic journal Sign he advocated for the
internationalization of the whole territory, citing the example of Trieste (which was
internationalized in July 1946). “No partition of the Holy Land can satisfy us”, he
exclaimed, “because some part of it would thereby be without Christ.”123
By the summer of 1947 the Vatican and American Catholic leaders, for a number
of factors (not least the surging support for Zionism in the United States), had come to
regard the partition of Palestine as a fait accompli, and had turned their attention to
ensuring the internationalization of Jerusalem as a means of preserving a base for Roman
Catholic influence in the region, and protecting the rights of their co-religionists in the
territory. Given the widespread support for partition, the Vatican did not publically
oppose the plan. Spellman, however, apprised the state department of the Vatican‟s
revised objectives in January 1947. During a meeting with the American ambassador to
Iraq, George Wadsworth, he expressed continued dismay with the partition plan, but he
revealed that the Vatican would be willing to accept partition if it could be guaranteed the
sanctity of Jerusalem and protection for Roman Catholics in Palestine.
If partition be imposed, the opportunity must not be lost to prescribe a carefully
conceived, detailed regime of guarantees and safeguards for the Holy Places and
for the Christian minorities, both under the supervision of the United Nations
and the latter (i.e. provisions for the protection of Christian groups) to be such as
might serve as a model, accepted by the Arab and all other Eastern states for the
treatment of their religious minorities.124
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The statement would represent the essence of both Vatican and American Catholic
visions for Palestine from the spring of 1947 forward, providing a mission statement for
Roman Catholic advocacy both in Washington and at the UN.
The CNEWA, like the NCWC, attempted to transmute a Roman Catholic vision
for the future of Palestine directly to the UN, commencing with the UNSCOP special
committee on Palestine in the spring of 1947. As an „observer‟ group at the UN, however,
the CNEWA, like its sister organization, was not permitted to present petitions or
testimonials directly to UNSCOP, a situation which both Spellman and McMahon
regarded as a threat to vital Roman Catholic interests in the territory. In early February
McMahon, at the behest of Spellman, was granted a meeting with Senator Warren Austin,
head of the American delegation to the UN, and Ambassador Wadsworth.125 During the
hour-long visit, McMahon detailed the Vatican‟s demands for the territory, citing the
internationalization of Jerusalem and its environs as a minimum starting point.
McMahon, as he had in his 1945 Sign article, used the example of Trieste as a model of
functional internationalization, and suggested a similar scheme be employed at the UN
for Jerusalem. This suggestion, he reported optimistically to Spellman, “awakened a
responsive chord in the Senator.”126
Spellman, on his part, took full advantage of a meeting with the UN‟s Political
and Security Committee in early May, emphasizing the need for observer groups such as
the CNEWA to be heard in committees and sub-committees, particularly on issues as
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crucial as the future of Palestine. During this meeting, Spellman presented the CNEWA‟s
formal petition, penned by McMahon, which emphasized the necessity for a Christian,
and specifically Roman Catholic, voice at the UNSCOP hearings. The statement refuted
suggestions that the CNEWA did not directly represent the Christians of Palestine (a
charge made by certain USNCOP delegates who refuted the need to consider petitions
and testimonies from faith organizations), emphasizing both the universality of the
CNEWA‟s voice, as well as the international nature of the Palestine question itself. “It is
our considered opinion that the CNEWA,” it stated, “an international body, qualifies as
an organizational representative of a considerable portion of the population of Palestine,
since it officially represents the Roman Catholic population of Palestine. Moreover, the
CNEWA, by its very nature and constitution and activities, is intimately concerned with
the spiritual, moral educational and social interests of the Roman Catholic population,
whether of the Latin or Eastern rites.”127
McMahon‟s petition also drew attention to the 1946 Anglo-American report,
which maintained that no solution to the Palestine problem could be found without
addressing the “religious phase” of the problem. The Catholic stake in the territory,
McMahon insisted, had to be addressed. In emphasizing the international nature of the
problem, and the legitimacy of the CNEWA‟s right to present its views, the statement
continued that
...our Association foresees the necessity of honestly confronting other more
extensive problems which are inextricably involved in the Palestinian question
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and its solution which are the responsibility of Christians throughout the
world...The character of Palestine sets it in a unique class, totally different from
all other nations. The interests of universal Christendom in the Holy Land
transcend the political and national interests of the minority Christian population
of Palestine, which numbers 130, 750. Although there may be included in the
personnel of the Arab Higher Committee one or two spokesmen for the Christian
minority, nevertheless the Committee itself, by reason of its tradition, its
leadership, its overwhelming Moslem majority and by the fact of its purpose to
present the case for a predominantly Arab Moslem population of one million,
cannot reasonably be charged with the task or expected to represent adequately
the interests of universal Christendom in the Holy Land.128
The statement suggested not only that the CNEWA would advocate for the rights
of Roman Catholics in Palestine, but that it would represent “the interests of universal
Christendom” on the question, clearly inferring that Spellman‟s organization represented
the desires of the Vatican and the international Church on the question of Palestine.
Despite stiff opposition to the consideration of religious factors in debating the future of
Palestine, including that of Soviet delegate Andrei Gromyko, who considered religious
concerns “superfluous detail”, the „religious clause‟ was accepted by UNSCOP after a
heated two hour debate on 22 May.129
Having won the right to submit its views to UNSCOP, the CNEWA presented a
report to the Committee on 5 June 1947.130 It stressed that the Roman Catholic Church
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did not favour or endorse any particular political arrangement for Palestine, so long as the
sanctity and the sovereignty of Jerusalem and the Holy Places was preserved, and that
protections would be guaranteed for the Catholic population of the territory. Its
commitment to political neutrality marked a shift away from the Vatican‟s early postwar
desire for an international trusteeship for the whole territory. The statement echoed Pius
XII‟s August 1946 address to the Arab Higher Committee for Palestine, when the Pope
informed his guests at the Vatican that his Church did not favour either Jewish or Arab
control of Palestine, proclaiming that the papal office “had always observed this attitude
of perfect impartiality, even in the most diverse circumstances, and [intended] to conform
thereto in the future as well.”131 While the Pope‟s 1946 stance continued to implicitly
endorse trusteeship, the CNEWA‟s 1947 representation to the UN revealed the Church‟s
moderated demands, accepting internationalization of Jerusalem and juridical protections
for Roman Catholics in lieu of its previous demands. As it was the CNEWA that
officially represented the international Church in the Middle East, the 1947 statement can
be read as a change in the „official‟ policy of the Vatican itself. Gasparri‟s aide mémoire
of 1922 had definitely been superseded by the circumscribed demands presented by
McMahon. It was evidence, no doubt, of papal pragmatism on the question of Palestine,
and was a policy designed to salvage core, non-negotiable rights in the territory while
maintaining amicable relations with Washington.
As such, the statement strongly defended Roman Catholicism‟s ancient stake in
the territory, highlighting twenty centuries of unbroken presence in Palestine, a presence
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that had been “uncontrovertibly and juridically established since the thirteenth
century.”132 It further asserted that “although persecuted and, indeed, decimated, [Roman
Catholics] have never left or given up.”133 It specifically refuted the claims of the ESCO
Foundation for Palestine, which maintained in a 1946 publication that Christianity “was
not an indigenous force in Palestine, although it [was] based on the life and teachings of
Jesus. As an organized religion it is the creation of Rome and always represented in the
East the introduction of a foreign civilization.”134 McMahon termed this “spiritual
jingoism and an intolerant indictment of Roman Catholics throughout the entire world.”
In evoking the Crusader imagery that the Catholic press had so prominently employed in
its anti-Zionist editorials, McMahon spoke to the centuries-long Roman Catholic struggle
for the territory. “If only for these centuries of heroism, sacrifice and blood-letting,” he
intoned, “Christendom can hardly be expected to stand by silently and be ignored, as your
estimable Committee seeks an answer to the riddle of Palestine.”135
The statement, however, did not dwell on historical precedent, analyzing the
contemporary Roman Catholic stake in the Holy Land, including the extensive charitable
and educational activities administered by the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem (the official
representation of the Holy See in Palestine). This network included over 200 churches
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and religious houses, 130 schools (which educated male and female students in almost
equal numbers), and 30 charitable institutions, all of which, the statement continued,
contributed to the stability and prosperity of both the Roman Catholic and wider
community. McMahon, therefore, sought tangible guarantees for Roman Catholics and
their institutions, which included “a freedom of religious organization and development,
unimpaired by confiscatory taxation or disabling legislation, in building and conducting
churches, schools, orphanages, hospitals and similar institutions of welfare and mercy.”
In essence, McMahon sought concrete guarantees for the institutional livelihood of the
Church in Palestine, regardless of the form of the regime decided upon by UNSCOP. His
objective reflected that emanating from the Vatican secretariat itself, where safeguarding
Roman Catholic interests through legal guarantees and the internationalization of
Jerusalem had supplanted the grander desire of establishing a UN trusteeship for the
entire territory.
That it was the CNEWA that spoke at the UN for Roman Catholic interests in the
Holy Land, and not the Vatican directly or the Latin Patriarchate in Jerusalem
(represented, at that time, by Monsignor Louis Barlassina), was made clear in the
conclusion of McMahon‟s statement.
This Association, under the presidency of His Eminence, Francis Cardinal
Spellman of New York, is the sole official mission and relief agency of the
Sacred Oriental Congregation in Rome. This Congregation, of which Pope Pius
XII is direct superior, and Eugene Cardinal Tisserant, Secretary, has jurisdiction
over all the above-mentioned activities of the Catholic Church in Palestine.
Thus, our Association has an international scope and is expected to supply not
only financial aid but also intellectual support, wherever the interests in the Holy
Land are at stake. We fear that these Christian and Catholic interests may be
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disregarded, and we consider it our bounden duty to indicate this to your Special
Commitee.136
The statement concluded with a veiled warning that an infringement of the
freedoms of Palestinian Roman Catholics, whose claims were as ancient as any of their
compatriots, would be considered a “crime” against not only the indigenous Catholic
community, but against the international Roman Catholic Church. “Indeed, because
Palestine is the Holy Land for millions of Christians all over the world,” it exhorted, “this
gigantic injustice would rightfully be resented by them and by all men of good will.”137
In the weeks after the submission of the CNEWA statement, McMahon received
the assurances of both Arab and Jewish leaders that Roman Catholic rights would be
protected in a partitioned Palestine. On 16 June, a week after issuing the CNEWA
statement, McMahon received a cable from Issa Nakleh, the New York representative of
the Arab Higher Committee for Palestine, who assured him that the Committee “gave all
assurances and guarantees the rights of Christians and access to the Holy Places.”138 On 1
July this was followed by a personal visit from Nakleh, a Palestinian Christian and
virulent anti-Zionist, where he again assured McMahon that the Arab Higher Committee
was committed to protecting Christian rights in the territory.139 Nakleh suggested,
moreover, that Arabs and Catholics shared a common cause and a common foe in the
territory, and that the Roman Catholic Church should “more openly come out against the
136
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Jews and proclaim itself for the Arabs.”140 McMahon, of course, offered no such
assurances, emphasizing the purely apolitical nature of papal demands in the territory.
In the autumn of 1947, McMahon received similar sentiments from Rabbi Gold of
the Jewish Agency for Palestine and Rabbi Lander who, in a visit to CNEWA offices,
pledged unconditional Jewish support for Christian rights in a partitioned state, while
confiding that “in a Jewish state”, Roman Catholics could expect “far greater security
than they could ever expect from the Arabs.”141 McMahon‟s guests, however, expressed
the “impression that Catholics [in the United States] were opposed to the creation of a
Jewish state”, and asked if “the powerful Catholic Church in America could help the
cause in an unofficial way by letting leaders, especially in government, know her
sympathy with the majority report.”142 McMahon challenged the Rabbis to provide
evidence of official Catholic reticence to the creation of a Jewish state, a response that
spoke volumes on the position of the Church on Jewish statehood. In November,
McMahon lauded American Catholic efforts to secure an internationalized zone for
Jerusalem, reporting to Spellman that CNEWA efforts had “forced both Arab and Jewish
leaders to approach us, and it has influenced [UNSCOP] in making its report.”143
Evidence does suggest that Roman Catholic pressure through 1947 was a factor in
securing a corpus separatum for Jerusalem in the 1947 partition plan. American officials,
on their part, seemed particularly reticent to raise the ire of the Christian churches. State
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Department officials Gordon Merriam (head of the Near East desk) and Fraser Wilkins
(head of the Palestine desk) opposed entreaties to limit the internationalization of
Jerusalem to the „Old City‟, in the belief that many sites sacred to Christians fell outside
this area. This led them to conclude that “the majority of Christian establishments would
fall within the area of either Jewish or Arab states. Considerable Christian opposition to
such a move could be expected.”144 Jewish Agency officials, moreover, revealed the
efficacy of Roman Catholic pressure at the UN. Eliahu Elath, Israel‟s first ambassador to
Washington and a leading participant in the discussions surrounding adoption of the
partition plan, reflected on the influence of the Roman Catholic lobby at Lake Success.
The Christian states were clearly determined to prevent the Jews or the Moslems
from establishing their sovereignty over the city and to avoid this by according a
special status to Jerusalem under the auspices of the UN...Definition of the
function of the Governor made it almost inevitable that a citizen of a Christian
state would be appointed to this office, and this would afford him considerable
leverage to turn Jerusalem into an independent political entity.145
Moshe Sharett, then head of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency,
elaborated further on the specific influence of the Vatican and the Roman Catholic lobby
in securing a corpus separatum.
It became evident that the requisite majority for the Partition Plan could not be
mustered if the internationalization of the Holy City was omitted from it... The
Vatican regarded the latter measure as [one which would]...vest the Catholic
Church with predominant influence...[thus] warranting acquiescence in the
elevation of the Jewish people to the level of sovereign statehood.146
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That the internationalization of Jerusalem and its environs was ensconced by
UNSCOP‟s final resolution of 19 November 1947, then, could only be considered a
victory for the Vatican and for international Roman Catholic interests. While acquiescing
to the partition plan, the Church had at least appeared to have preserved a base for
continued influence in the region, free from the interference of a sovereign power. By the
resolution, the city of Jerusalem was indeed established as a corpus separatum under an
international regime to be administered by the UN. The area was to encompass Jerusalem
and its surrounding hinterland, including southern Bethlehem and Nazareth, other regions
of spiritual and historical importance to the Roman Catholic Church. Other provisions,
such as freedoms guaranteed to charitable and educational institutions, and pledges not to
tax or deny access to any churches or houses of worship, also appeared to appease Roman
Catholic concerns.147 The representations of American Catholic agencies at the UN on the
Palestine question were crucial to securing these ends. Indeed, the advocacy of the
NCWC‟s „UN Office‟ and the CNEWA represented the leading edge of the Roman
Catholic lobby on the shape of postwar Palestine. These concessions won, however, were
about to be challenged by the newly formed state of Israel, and the American Catholic
„lobby‟ was about to encounter some of its stiffest challenges.
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Chapter 4
Chimerical Triumph: The International Catholic Orbit and the Corpus
Separatum
Though the Vatican and American Catholics considered the 1947 UN partition
plan a victory, insofar as it preserved Jerusalem as an international corpus separatum, the
outbreak of violence immediately following its ratification confirmed the fears long held
in Catholic circles: namely that Israel would seize through force what it could not obtain
by international consensus. The instability in Palestine in early 1948, in fact, caused the
Vatican to reconsider its very support for the partition plan. The nascent state of Israel, on
its part, challenged the UN‟s internationalization of Jerusalem, favouring a modified
compact for the city that would see only the protection of „holy sites‟, a position
buttressed by Israeli military victories. In December 1948, the increasingly intractable
question was referred to a UN body, the Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC),
which was tasked with devising a solution to the Jerusalem question. Throughout 1949,
American Catholics remained at the forefront of the Vatican‟s efforts to steer the PCC,
and the American delegation at the UN, towards a favourable Palestine solution. The
American Catholic lobby, however, was confronted with a powerful American Zionist
lobby, comprised of Jews and Protestants, determined to secure a Jewish Jerusalem. That
the American government, including President Truman himself, favoured a modified
agreement on Jerusalem (one unsatisfactory to the Vatican) only complicated American
Catholic efforts. The survival of the corpus separatum after the December 1949 vote on
the PCC proposal, therefore, exemplified the leadership of the American Catholic
Church, and its various organs, in securing an outcome long sought by the Vatican.
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The Dies Fatalis: The Roman Catholic Church and the Birth of Israel
Despite a deep and genuine convergence on the question of communism and
Soviet containment, Rome and Washington drifted apart on the question of Palestine
from the winter of 1947-1948 onward. The Vatican continued to lend tentative support to
the November 1947 UN partition plan on the condition that Jerusalem, which it
considered the inalienable cradle of Christian faith, be protected by an international
mandate, preserving a crucial and symbolic base for Roman Catholic influence in the
region and beyond. The outbreak of violence almost immediately following the
December ratification of the partition plan, however, tested the Vatican‟s tentative
support, confirming fears that the plan only facilitated open competition between Jewish
and Arab nationalisms, producing bloodshed and disorder. In the months that followed,
tensions and outbreaks of violence between Jews and Arabs only intensified,
compounded by the Jewish underground‟s continuing struggle against the British
presence in the territory. The April 1948 capture of the Arab town of Deir Yassin by the
Irgun, which resulted in the murder of dozens of civilians, followed by an Arab attack on
a Jewish medical column just days later, resulting in the deaths of doctors, nurses and
patients, epitomized the vitriolic atmosphere in the territory on the very eve of Jewish
statehood.
The escalation of violence caused the Vatican to question whether the functional
internationalization of Jerusalem and its environs could be achieved. The establishment
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of a corpus separatum, and the guarantee of rights for Roman Catholic institutions and
faithful had, after all, constituted the basis of Vatican support for partition. Added to this
were Vatican fears that instability in the territory would lead to the spread of communism
in Palestine and the wider territory. The Holy See‟s diminishing support for partition (in
light of the worsening violence in the territory), was revealed to Taylor‟s office in
February 1948 by Domenico Tardini, Pope Pius XII‟s acting Secretary of State. In a
“brutally frank” discussion with Taylor‟s assistant, Graham Parsons, Tardini spoke of the
“mistakes of the United States now replacing the mistakes of Britain [in Palestine],”
suggesting that partition, as conceived in the UN plan, could produce no lasting peace in
the Holy Land, producing a chaotic situation in which only Moscow could profit.1 In
linking Zionism and bolshevism, he apprised Parsons of the observations of Mgr.
Tommaso Valeri, former apostolic delegate to Egypt, Palestine and Cyprus, who had
“repeated twenty years ago the existence of flourishing communist cells in Tel Aviv.”2
Similar sentiments were echoed later in the same month by Mgr. Gustavo Testa,
the recently appointed apostolic delegate to Palestine and Jerusalem.3 The posting
replaced the former nunciature to Egypt, Palestine, Jordan and Cyprus, creating a
structure where Egypt, Palestine and Jordan received separate nuncios, reflective of the
Holy See‟s desire to have a singular ambassador committed to the rapidly evolving
1
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situation in the Holy Land.4 During a lengthy conversation with Parsons in late February,
Testa reiterated Tardini‟s apprehensions on the partition plan, expressing frustration that
the American government, and leading papers such as the New York Times, couldn‟t see
that “only Russia would benefit from carrying through the tragedy of partition.”5 He
continued that the full implementation of the partition plan would only lead to deepening
violence, and was confounded by Washington‟s willingness “to oppose Russia at the
Dardanelles and yet promote conditions [in Palestine] which will place her so much
nearer to important objectives.”6 “Once astride in the eastern Mediterranean”, he warned,
“Russia will not leave.”
The conversation, in fact, hinted at a formal reversal of Vatican policy. Testa
suggested reconsideration of partition by the UN General Assembly as the only viable
solution, detailing to Parsons his idea of a federated state with Swiss-style cantonal
governments, akin to the proposal put forward by the Colombian delegation to the UN,
which was already urging the General Assembly to repeal the partition plan. Throughout
the conversation, Parsons reminded Testa of the growing public support for political
Zionism in the United States, summarizing for him the points contained in the January
1948 „Confidential Survey of American Opinion‟, and alluded to the difficulties, both
domestic and international, of an American reversal on the partition plan.7 It was a
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reminder to the Vatican of the power of public opinion, particularly in the United States,
on the question of Palestine. Parsons‟ conversations with these leading Vatican figures, in
sum, confirmed that Washington and Rome were drifting apart on Palestine, even if the
Vatican maintained a stoic public silence on the issue. In his report to George Marshall,
Parsons noted the similarities of Tardini and Testa‟s positions, observing that “however
much they represented [Testa‟s] personal views, they also represented the official Vatican
viewpoint.”8
The Vatican‟s apparent reversal of policy did not take long to register with a
number of Latin American delegations at the UN, where dissatisfaction with the partition
plan in the wider Roman Catholic firmament became quickly evident. In February 1948,
the Colombian delegation, as noted, officially submitted a motion to reconsider the
partition plan, on the grounds that subsequent strife had proven its futility. On 27
February, a day after meeting with Testa, Parsons received Mauricio Nabuco, the
Brazilian ambassador to the Holy See, who admitted that should the Colombian
resolution pass, and the partition plan were re-submitted to a vote, Brazil would reverse
its position and vote against partition.9 He continued that voting for partition in
November 1947 was a “Brazilian mistake”, and that Brazil had supported it in solidarity
with the United States, that “the real act of friendship was not to vote with the United
States in this instance.” He informed Parsons that should the partition plan be submitted

outlined American public opinion leaning increasingly in favour of partition, a position that the American
government was finding increasingly difficult to oppose.
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to another vote, Brazil would carry other South American states in voting against it,
providing the necessary majority. Nabuco coyly denied that the Vatican was instructing
South American states on the matter, but hinted at the quasi-theological wellsprings of his
position. “As a good Catholic”, he exclaimed to Parsons, “[I adhere] to the biblical
prophesy that the Jews will be dispersed and not return to the land of Palestine.”10
Vatican and wider Roman Catholic scepticism of the feasibility of partition was,
in fact, shared by segments of the State Department and the American delegation to the
UN, including its head, Warren Austin. This led to Austin‟s March resolution to reverse
the US position on the partition plan, favouring instead an international trusteeship for the
territory, a development applauded by Schaefer‟s „UN Office‟, as it represented a
position long advocated by both the Vatican and by representative organizations of the
American Catholic church.11 Ultimately, Austin‟s proposal did not pass, a result
considered a setback in Roman Catholic circles. Complicating Austin‟s motion was
Truman‟s growing support of Zionism in the spring of 1948. Though the president had
been only recently „converted‟ to the Zionist cause, expressing disdain for Zionist
pressure tactics into the winter of 1947-1948, and while he had endorsed Austin‟s
February speech to the General Assembly which detailed American concerns as to the
10
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feasibility of the partition plan, he was, by late March, convinced that the partition plan
would go ahead as devised in November 1947. Recent scholarship has explored a number
of factors in Truman‟s fairly rapid „conversion‟: the influence of Jewish political and
industrial advisors, the successes of American Zionist lobby groups (particularly the
ACPC), the importance of courting the „Jewish vote‟ in the 1948 federal elections, and
Truman‟s own Baptist millenarianism, which envisioned the return of the Jews to
Palestine.12
The success of the American Zionist lobby, it was known, was bolstered by a
widely circulated and read press, which galvanized Jewish support for American Zionist
organizations.13 Zionist successes impressed upon Catholic editors the need to counter
this with a specifically Catholic viewpoint, particularly as it appeared that Zionist
sympathies had spread among the American public and policymaking establishment,
extending to Truman himself. The „Confidential Survey of American Opinion‟ which
Parsons had discussed with Testa only confirmed the importance of public opinion on the
Palestine question. That 1948 was an election year made the issue all the more pressing,
as the Catholic vote could be tied to a Palestine solution acceptable to the Vatican and
American Catholics. On several occasions in 1948, Montini expressed the Vatican‟s
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hopes that American Catholics, given their institutional strength and political
organization, might exercise their power in gaining a resolution for the territory amenable
to the Vatican and to the international Church.14 In January Montini also expressed,
through the apostolic delegate, the hope that American Catholic press organs would raise
the issue of Palestine clearly and consistently in order to shape Catholic opinion for the
ongoing struggle for the territory.15
In short order, Catholic editorials in the United States began to reflect the
Vatican‟s growing dissatisfaction with the partition plan. Though Catholic journals had
issued a tentative endorsement of the partition late in 1947, subsequent violence had
quashed any remaining optimism, sparking renewed calls for an international trusteeship
for Palestine. America, one journal that had considered partition “the best of many
unsatisfactory alternatives”, denounced the plan from February 1948 onward, observing
that the violence it had prophesied for months had indeed come to pass.16 While
American Zionist groups continued to advocate for the implementation of the partition
plan at all costs, including the use of American troops to secure it, America warned of the
security risks of armed American intervention. Highlighting the State Department‟s own
reservations on the partition plan, the journal chastised the Zionists and the UN for
rushing to support a solution that was “too much wishful thinking.”17 The journal also
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flayed the Truman administration for “acting against its better judgement” and, in an
ironic allusion to the American Zionist lobby, “bending to the will of a strong domestic
pressure.”18
The diocesan press largely echoed America’s stern disapproval of the partition
plan, characterizing it as an un-principled and un-workable scheme, implemented mainly
to pander to American Zionist demands. In the spring of 1948, Catholic papers gave wide
circulation to a series of declarations by the Christian Union, a semi-official group of
Christian leaders in the Middle East who denounced the partition plan in the strongest
terms.19 Issuing their statements directly to national governments and to the UN (directly
through Schaefer‟s „UN Office‟), the Christian Union expressed “deep sorrow and strong
indignation at the lamentable situation in which the Holy Land, cradle of peace, has been
placed as a direct result of the erroneous policy which has been imposed on the country
and which has culminated in the partition plan.”20 In June, just weeks after the formal
establishment of the Israeli state, the Brooklyn Tablet published a „manifesto‟ issued by
the Christian Union which excoriated Jewish forces for damage to Christian churches and
sites, particularly in Jerusalem. Hardly a neutral statement, it proclaimed that “the largest
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part of the shells falling on the Holy Sepulchre and on churches, convents and Christian
institutions are of Jewish origin. To declare the truth and an objective fact as well: The
Arabs have stated they respected the Holy Places the convents and the Red Cross
institutions. In fact they have respected them up to the present time.”21 Diocesan papers
such as the Brooklyn Tablet, the Boston Pilot and the Michigan Catholic continued to
give wide circulation to Christian Union statements, despite the fact that the Vatican did
not officially endorse the group, and regardless that Israeli officials at the UN had
accurately identified the Christian Union as “a group of Arab clergymen with
predominantly Arab congregations which has completely identified itself with the Arab
Higher Committee.”22 The New York Times, which also published the Christian Union‟s
„manifesto‟ of 31 May, juxtaposed the group‟s claims with reports that Jewish shrines
had, in fact, suffered a majority of the damage, and that “only a couple of bullet holes”
had pierced the dome of the Holy Sepulchre.23 Verity on all sides, it appeared, was
secondary in the larger battle for public opinion.
These reports coincided with the emergence in May 1948 of a public Vatican
stance on the question of Palestine, a development indicative of the Pope‟s desire to air
the Vatican‟s views to the world on the very eve of Jewish statehood. The encyclical
Auspicia Quaedam, issued on 1 May, lamented the ongoing war in the territory, and
called upon Catholics worldwide to pray for an end to the conflict. While not offering
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specific policy prescriptions, the document still emphasized the precedence which the
Holy See accorded the situation in Palestine. The Pope followed this with an allocution,
several weeks later, to the College of Cardinals in Rome, when he issued a plea to Roman
Catholics worldwide. “How could the Christian world look on unconcernedly,” he
exhorted, “or in fruitless indignation, as that sacred ground which everyone approached
with reverence most profound to kiss it with warmest affection, was being trampled by
troops of war and bombed from the air? Reduce the „Great Sepulchre‟ of Christ to a mass
of rubble? God grant that the danger of so terrible a scourge may be finally dispelled!”24
The allocution, forwarded to the NCWC in June, amounted to another call to action, both
to the American bishops and the diocesan press, to raise the issue of Palestine clearly and
consistently.25
The apprehension felt by both the Vatican and American Catholics on the
expiration of the British mandate for Palestine, set for 15 May, was expressed succinctly
by John J. O‟Rourke, S.J., the American director of the Pontifical Biblical Institute in
Jerusalem, who described that date as the “dies fatalis”, (the „fateful hour‟). “What is
coming next, God only knows” he intoned in a letter to the editorial board of America
magazine.26 His sentiments were reflected by Spellman just a week before the expiration
of the mandate, when he asserted that “War must not bloody the soil nor desecrate the
scene of the sacrifice of the Prince of Peace, for if men and nations who profess to
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believe in God defile His Holy Homeland, how can they condemn godless barbarism in
others?”27 The archbishop‟s words, carried in an America article, were a clear allusion to
Truman‟s commitment to Jewish statehood, despite the risks, and to the Roman Catholic
imperative to protect the Holy Sites of Jerusalem.
In a private meeting on 20 April with the B‟nai B‟rith‟s Ben Epstein and Rabbi
Bernard Lander, Mgr. Thomas McMahon was even more succinct. In a meeting he
described to Spellman as “rather violent”, he spiritedly defended Roman Catholic claims
to an internationalized zone for Jerusalem, and denied his guests‟ assertions that the
Vatican was “pro-Arab”, or that the Pope had “asked Catholics to play politics” in the
encyclical Auspecia Quaedam.28 On the question of Jerusalem, McMahon excoriated his
guests for their suggestion that Roman Catholic rights could be negotiated in a Jewishcontrolled territory. “There is nothing to talk over,” McMahon snapped. “The Jews have
stolen what is not theirs. Talking things over is like taking my coat and leaving me the
sleeve.”29
America published a series of editorials in the late spring which reflected Vatican
and American Catholic anxieties regarding the expiration of the British mandate, casting
doubt on both Zionist and Arab commitments to a peaceable transfer of power.30 The
journal yet again emphasized that Jerusalem was “not merely a historical city”, but a
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centre of vital importance to global Christianity. The journal offered an endorsement of
the Garreau Plan, which proposed an international police force for Jerusalem (a scheme
which was coolly received by the Israeli provisional government). America also endorsed
the proposal of the American Episcopalian Bishop Charles Gilbert, who in an April letter
to the New York Times called for a “Truce of God” for Jerusalem, harkening the medieval
notion that halted wars as they reached their most acrimonious points.31
The establishment of the Israeli state in May and Washington‟s immediate
diplomatic recognition of the fledgling state drew a predictably terse response from a
wide cross-section of the American Catholic press. The Catholic World‟s editorial for
July, penned by McMahon, was particularly acerbic. McMahon criticized the “unseemly
haste” with which the United States recognized Israel, abandoning political precedent and
acting with “a cold-blooded disregard of ethical principle” in establishing relations with
Tel Aviv before the cessation of conflict.32 He further drew parallels between American
and Soviet statecraft, suggesting that Washington had abandoned its cherished neutrality
in the region in hastily recognizing Israel. “What Stalin had done in Czechoslovakia we
did in Palestine”, he charged. “We had blamed him for interference in the internal affairs
of another nation, but when our turn came for trickery, we proved ourselves quicker and
slicker than the master criminal.”33 In concluding, McMahon intimated that the
“breakneck speed” with which Tel Aviv was recognized could be traced to Truman‟s
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courting of the Jewish vote in the November elections, and he expressed doubts that
either Zionist groups or the Truman administration, both of which purported to act in the
interests of humanitarian concern, would extend the same treatment to other groups.
“Will they love humanity in December, after the elections, as they did in May?” he
observed acidly. “We shall see.”34 That it was McMahon who acted as the de facto
Vatican minister to Tel Aviv in this period spoke volumes on the tensions of the IsraeliVatican relationship. Though his words were meant to galvanize American Catholic
opinion, they also hinted at a growing frustration with Truman, whose growing support
for Israel created challenges for the American Catholic lobby.
Following the establishment of Israel, and the summer of bitter struggle between
the new state and its Arab neighbours, who invaded almost immediately, the American
Catholic press shone a bright light on the desecration of Roman Catholic property in the
territory, often laying blame for these transgressions at the feet of the nascent Israeli
Defence Force (IDF).35 A majority of these reports were penned by Anthony Bruya, the
NCWC‟s Jerusalem correspondent, and were channelled to the diocesan press by the
NCWC‟s press office, which often relied on Bruya‟s reports as a sole source from the
region. The articles detailed a host of atrocities perpetrated by the IDF in and around
Jerusalem, which included the destruction and looting of churches, convents and
monasteries, as well as the desecration of relics, religious artworks, vestments and
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books.36 In September, Bruya quoted from a Vatican commissioned report by Mgr.
Antonio Vergani, the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem, who, in detailing damage to the Terra
Sancta Hospice in Haifa, reported the discovery of broken crucifixes, an overturned altar,
torn missals and a smashed tabernacle. In the same report, Vergani expressed shock at
“acts of profanation in the chapel”, where he “surprised soldiers of both sexes dancing to
the tune of the harmonium.” “We have seen mattresses in the main chapel”, he added.
“Jewish soldiers must have slept there.”37 Bruya‟s articles were intended to refute Israeli
claims that acts against Catholic properties were merely “isolated transgressions by
irresponsible individuals” who had already been brought to justice.38 The articles were
also intended to highlight, through lurid and scandalous reportage, Jewish complicity in
the ongoing delay to fully internationalize Jerusalem and its environs.39
Concrete action complemented press coverage. Charges of Jewish complicity in
the desecration of Catholic property and violence against Catholic religious in and around
Jerusalem reached an apex late in August, when McMahon, acting as national secretary
of the CNEWA, put forward a request to the UN that alleged mistreatment of Catholics
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by Jews in Palestine, and the desecration of Catholic holy sites in the territory, be
formally investigated by the world body. In a letter to Trygve Lie, Secretary General of
the UN, McMahon highlighted “documented accusations” against the IDF in Jerusalem,
citing Vergani‟s report and the numerous articles in the Catholic and secular press as
proof of Jewish violations.40 McMahon lamented the lack of progress on the
internationalization of Jerusalem since the partition plan of November 1947, and cited
“authoritative sources” of apprising him of “the criminal acts of Jewish forces against
twelve Roman Catholic institutions in northern Palestine.” In expressing the Vatican‟s
anxiety on Jewish hegemony over Jerusalem (again highlighting his role as a primary
Vatican emissary to the world body), McMahon expressed the fear that “the Jews might
start a continued expropriation of ecclesiastical properties which may have no small
repercussions in the Christian world.”41 In concluding, he warned that sustained Jewish
transgressions would not be accepted by Christian leaders. “It is our considered opinion
that if these overt acts continue or are explained by ascribing them constantly to
irresponsible forces,” he explained, “then the entire Christian world is justified in its
apprehension over the disregard of Christian spiritual and material interests in the new
born State of Israel.” The letter, carried widely in the mainstream press, drew a terse
response from American Zionist groups. Eliahu Ben-Horin of the American Zionist
Emergency Council (AZEC) accused McMahon of “atavistic anti-Semitism”, though he

40

Archives of the Archdiocese of Detroit [Hereafter AAD], Bishop Edward Mooney Papers, Box 39, File 6,
Thomas J. McMahon to Trygve Lie, 23 August 1948.
41

Ibid.
224

pledged to emphasize the CNEWA‟s concerns directly the Israeli Foreign Minister,
Moshe Sharett.42
In the same month the Vatican, through the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem,
requested the assistance of the American Knights of the Holy Sepulchre to contribute
funds to the repair of Catholic property damaged in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. This was
another sign of Rome‟s cognizance of the leadership, and financial might, of the various
organs of the American Church.43 The Order, which included Spellman in its
membership, represented a cross-section of prominent American Catholics, including
academics, jurists, industrialists, publishers and politicians. The statement produced by
the order, issued through New York financier Luigi Criscuolo, not only appealed to its
membership to assist the Church in Palestine, but called upon American Jewish groups to
shoulder a significant burden for the damage, clearly implying Jewish culpability in the
molestation of Catholic sites. In appealing, in general terms, to the “friendly relations”
between Catholic prelates and Jewish rabbis in the United States, it called upon Jewish
groups to “cut the Gordian knot of diplomatic procedure and make a large donation out of
Jewish relief funds to the to the restoration of Catholic Church properties which were
destroyed.” The statement, which appeared in both the secular and Catholic press, was
also forwarded to the heads of a number of prominent Jewish organizations, including
Henry Morgenthau, chairman of the Jewish Appeal.
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In October, Amleto Cicognani, the apostolic delegate to Washington, again urged
the NCWC to do all it could, through the diocesan press and its network of organizations,
such as the National Council of Catholic Men (NCCM), the NCCW and the CAIP, to
promote the desire of the Vatican for a “just settlement on the Palestine conflict and for
the internationalization of Jerusalem and the Holy Places.”44 Cicognani‟s letter was sent
in conjunction with the 24 October release of Pius XII‟s encyclical In Multiplicibus
Curis, his second encyclical of 1948 which spoke directly to the conflict in the Holy
Land. As Silvio Ferrari has observed, the encyclical marked a decisive evolution in the
papal stance on the Holy Land. Firstly, it announced, publically and explicitly, the Pope‟s
own position on the future of the territory (in line with the policies already advocated by
the CNEWA). Secondly, it signalled the expansion of Vatican demands for Jerusalem,
replacing previous requests for legal guarantees for the Holy Places (as expressed
privately by a number of Vatican figures), with demands for the complete
internationalization of Jerusalem and its environs.45 The encyclical also constituted an
explicit call to action to the Roman Catholics of the world. “We do not believe that the
Christian world could contemplate indifferently, or in sterile indignation,” it proclaimed,
“the spectacle of the sacred land (which everyone approached with the deepest respect to
kiss with most ardent love) trampled over again by troops and stricken by aerial
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bombardments. We do not believe that it could permit the devastation of the Holy Places,
the destruction of the great sepulchre of Christ.”46
That the Vatican shared the view of the American Catholic press that Jewish
elements bore the burden of guilt for damage to Catholic property in Palestine was made
evident in September. Montini, in explaining to Taylor‟s office why the Vatican would
not recognize Israel diplomatically, offered that the decision was, in part, based on the
fact that “unwarranted attacks on Catholic institutions and members of religious orders by
irresponsible Jewish elements have caused a painful impression.”47 “Arabs”, he
continued, “have not attacked or molested Catholics, and have generally shown
consideration and tolerance.” While he expressed that the Vatican did not hold the Israeli
government responsible for ordering the attacks, he concluded that it did expect Tel Aviv
to exercise greater control over the IDF and other Jewish factions.48
In the same month, Spellman announced that McMahon, as national secretary of
the CNEWA, would be leaving in November to confer with the Pope at the Vatican.
McMahon would then journey on to the Holy Land, where he was to assess the state of
the Roman Catholic community there, and to coordinate relief efforts for refugees with
Dr. Bernard Joseph, the Military Governor of Israel. Though the trip was officially
deemed an aid mission, Israeli and American officials quickly deigned its larger
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significance, as McMahon would, in a mission lasting nearly five months, discuss all the
main issues of contention between Tel Aviv and the Vatican, acting as the Pope‟s envoy
to the Israeli government. James McDonald, the American special advisor to the Israeli
government, recalled in his memoir that although McMahon arrived as an aid envoy, he
was certain that he “held wider powers as unofficial representative of the Holy See on
political matters”, an impression that was confirmed during McDonald‟s audience with
Pius XII early in 1949.49 McMahon‟s mission, in fact, spoke volumes on the critical role
of the American Church in the Vatican‟s struggle for influence on Palestine.
Throughout October and November, the diocesan press continued to detail IDF
transgressions, giving prominence to Bruya‟s steady stream of dispatches from
Jerusalem.50 In addition to Vergani‟s report, Catholic papers also gave wide coverage to
the report of two American Franciscan priests stationed in Jerusalem, Patrick J. Coyle and
Theophane Carroll, who had both served as wartime chaplains in Europe. Their
statement, which was also broadcast on Palestine Radio on 22 October, highlighted
Israeli attempts to downplay damage to Catholic sites, and theorized more ominously of
Tel Aviv‟s plans to supplant Christianity in the Holy Land altogether.51 In stoking fears
of Israeli plans to erase Catholicism‟s institutional presence on the Holy Land, it stated
that “a further consideration causing anxiety to Christians in Jerusalem is that there seems
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to be an overall plan to gradually replace Christian institutions. Of various Catholic
schools in the Jewish section of Jerusalem, four have been filled so far, one way or
another, with Jews. At the time of this report, Jewish authorities are ready to move into
the Terra Sancta College to make it a part of the Hebrew University.” In underscoring the
validity of Catholic reportage on Jerusalem, and the emptiness of Tel Aviv‟s claims to be
acting to curtail it, it continued that “The desecrations that have happened, [the Israeli
government] wants to minimize, especially in the press. The well-founded suspicions of
Christians must remain: that these acts reveal only too well the mentality of a section of
the Jewish people.”52 As in Vergani‟s report, it also detailed Jewish expropriations of
Catholic properties, the harassment of Catholics by the IDF and other Jewish groups, and
specific vandalizations of Christian relics, including a crucifix in the Benedictine Church
of the Dormition, which had been shorn of its arms as well as its head. Undoubtedly, such
details were intended to shock and to galvanize American Catholic support for the
internationalization of Jerusalem.
In November, the American Catholic press gave wide circulation to the public
appeal of British Archbishop Arthur Hughes, the apostolic inter-nuncio to Egypt, who
charged that continued delays to the internationalization of Jerusalem, and the
prolongation of the growing refugee crisis in the region, were the result of “deliberate
Jewish efforts to decimate the Arabs and destroy Christianity in Palestine.”53 Hughes
declared himself “appalled by the callousness with which the world accepts the intention
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to expose to death and hardships the Arab refugees, in order to make room for 600,000
Jews.” In citing the “particular hatred” that Jews had demonstrated against Catholic
institutions, he urged Catholics worldwide to support relief efforts for Palestinian
Christians, and to urge their governments to press for an imminent cessation to the
violence. This was followed by the wide press circulation, in December, of a petition sent
by the leaders of Iraq‟s Catholic community to Spellman, which decried the “ravages
caused by the war in Palestine on the part of a pitiless enemy devoid of respect for the
Holy Places or for religious and charitable foundations.”54 It further lamented the
“flagrant injustice and barbarous treatment meted out to the Christian and Moslem Arabs
of Palestine”, and it expressed “alarm at the fate in store for Christians and Moslems in
danger of becoming prey of intolerant and materialist Zionism.” In closing, it urged
Spellman to use his “great influence” to inform public opinion and shape Washington‟s
views before the entrenched establishment of “a Zionist government which will be a
permanent source of discord and trouble among the peoples of the Middle East.”55
Spellman, receptive to the concerns of Iraqi Catholics would, in short order, be taking this
message directly to Truman himself.
The Catholic press also drew increasing attention to the Palestinian refugee crisis
that was becoming progressively grave in the latter half of 1948. Esther Feldblum has
observed that Catholic papers, from the end of the war onward, had consistently decried
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the success of American Jewish organizations in linking the postwar Jewish refugee
problem to the imperative of a Jewish homeland.56 This was highlighted by 1947 report
presented by the State Department to Congress, that stated that of a total of 794,735
confirmed European refugees, only 193, 332 (roughly one quarter) were Jewish.57
According to estimates presented in the Catholic press, more than half of these refugees
were Roman Catholics, yet American Catholic demands for „open door‟ immigration
policies appeared to be consistently upstaged by American Jewish groups, and their
success in linking the Jewish refugee question to the need for a Jewish homeland in
Palestine.58 By the summer of 1948, the Catholic press attempted to tie the Arab Christian
refugee crisis into its general critique of Israeli incursions, and to use it as another
argument in favour of the immediate internationalization of Jerusalem and its environs.
Fed by a steady stream of reports from Schaefer and the NCWC‟s „UN Office‟, the
diocesan press gave wide coverage to the unfolding crisis.59 True to form, the articles
generally traced the spread of the refugee problem to the “revised” Jewish state, which
had expanded through war to encompass a larger territory than it had been allotted in the
1947 partition plan.60 As a result of “Jewish imperialism”, several Catholic papers noted,
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the number of Christian refugees in the Holy Land had risen to over 100,000 by October,
“the vast majority”, the papers claimed, “of whom were Roman Catholic.”61
In connection to the crisis, the CNEWA, designated by the Vatican as the official
relief organization for Palestinian refugees (both Arab and Christian), established the
„American Appeal for Holy Land Refugees‟. Offertory collections at masses raised nearly
one million dollars for the initiative by the fall of 1949, further proof of the financial
power wielded by the American faithful. The initiative, while providing essential aid to
refugees, also placed the CNEWA at the forefront of the Vatican‟s efforts to press its
demands on the Jewish state, which included guarantees for the survival of Catholic
institutions in Israel, and the full and effective internationalization of Jerusalem. Given
the growing importance of the refugee question in the Palestine equation, the initiative
also ceded more clout to both Spellman and McMahon in advocating the Roman Catholic
position in Washington and at the UN. America reminded its readers of the connection
between refugee aid and the Catholic stake in the territory.
Long before governments began to assist in the present emergency, our Catholic
parishes were feeding and sheltering many thousands of refugees in their parish
halls, in their churchyards and their schools. The Catholic Church has been
associated with all the problems of the Near East since the birth of Christ. The
purposes of our Catholic personnel, native and missionary, are non-political. That
Catholic missionaries remained through the fighting, that Catholic institutions
continued to care for the homeless and helpless, is proof of their non-political
purpose. It is proof, too, that they expect their rights to be protected and, where
infringed, restored.62
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“There is scarcely a religious house in Palestine that is not sheltering refugees,” it
concluded. “The officials at Tel Aviv know this.”63
Israeli and American Zionist Groups Respond to the Catholic Threat
Though a furor among American Catholics against IDF actions in Jerusalem
might have seemed relatively inconsequential, considering Israeli successes in both
establishing a state and indeed expanding it during the 1948 war, archival evidence
suggests that the nascent state indeed considered negative publicity, particularly from
American Catholic circles, as detrimental to Tel Aviv‟s larger ambitions. This was
particularly so as Israeli officials and American Zionist organizations such as the
American Christian Palestine Committee (ACPC) lobbied the UN and the Truman
administration for Israel‟s admission to the world body in the summer of 1948.64 Wide
publicity of IDF transgressions posed a clear danger to Israel‟s candidacy, raising
legitimate questions on the legitimacy of its application. A continued delay in the
functional internationalization of Jerusalem, moreover, prolonged Tel Aviv‟s strained
relationship with the Vatican, bringing international Catholic pressure to bear against the
ambitions of the new state. David Ben-Gurion, Israel‟s first Prime Minister, greatly

63

Ibid.

64

The ACPC, which was the most important Christian Zionist advocacy group in the United States,
addressed Truman, Warren Austin (head of the American UN delegation), and secretary of state George
Marshall directly in June 1948 in support of Israel’s admission to the UN. In the same month, the
organization notified a range of US senators of its opposition to British support of Arab interests in
Palestine, and of the use of European Recovery Program funds to support the Arab war against Israel. See
WSUA, WRL, Philip Slomowitz Papers, File 65, ‘Israel and the Catholic Church’, Karl Baehr, Executive
Secretary (ACPC) to Truman, 22 June 1948; WSUA, WRL, Philip Slomowitz Papers, File 65, ‘Israel and the
Catholic Church, Karl Baehr to Alexander Cadogan (UK representative to the UN), 22 June 1948; WSUA,
WRL, Philip Slomowitz Papers, File 65, ‘Israel and the Catholic Church’, Karl Baerh to Senator H. Styles
Bridges, 22 June 1948.
233

feared the negative impact of such publicity, and in July issued explicit instructions to
Israeli officers: “It is your duty that the special force in charge of defending the Old City
makes merciless use of machine guns against any Jews, and in particular Jewish soldiers,
who tries to defile a Christian or Muslim Holy Place.” He further instructed local Jewish
leaders in Jerusalem to send a cable to the Pope reporting that “all is well with the
Christian communities, and the Holy Places have not been damaged.”65 Despite these
precautions, damages ensued, prompting the discussed plethora of reportage in the
Catholic press, which an Israeli official described as “a wave of poisonous propaganda
directed against us in the Catholic world, based on stories of a campaign of desecration of
churches allegedly conducted by the IDF...They are inflating each incident of damagehowever slight- caused by a handful of uncultured and irresponsible people.”66 Jacob
Herzog, an attaché to the Israeli Minister of Religious Affairs, deigned the significance of
Catholic reportage on Jerusalem when he observed that “these incidents sowed seeds of
suspicion in influential Vatican circles,” piquing “the anxieties of Vatican policymakers”,
and generally creating challenges for Israeli statecraft vis-a-vis the United States, the UN
and the larger Catholic world.67
The Israeli provisional government considered the unfolding Catholic furor over
fighting in Jerusalem and the wider territory sufficiently dangerous enough to dispatch a
secret mission to the Holy See to discuss guarantees for Roman Catholic faithful,
Catholic institutions and the Holy Sites. In late September, Herzog and Dr. Chaim

65

Quoted in Bialer, Cross on the Star of David, 8.

66

Ibid.

67

Ibid.
234

Wardie, a director in the Ministry of Religious Affairs, journeyed to Rome to discuss
such guarantees directly with leading members of the Vatican secretariat. The mission
was facilitated by James McDonald, Washington‟s Special Representative to Israel,
Gustavo Testa, the apostolic delegate to Palestine, and Vergani, the Latin Patriarch of
Jerusalem, whose damning reports on IDF damages in the city had been so widely
covered in the Catholic press. The mission represented an attempt by Israeli officials to
blunt the severe criticisms launched against Tel Aviv which were clearly regarded as
detrimental to the new state.68 Herzog was under no illusion that the mission would be
considered a formal diplomatic visit, but he expressed that such a meeting “[could] help
materially in preventing misunderstanding in a field in which the Catholic Church takes
so keen an interest.”69 While Montini himself assented to the meetings, neither he, nor
Tardini or the Pope, men who were clearly the most influential figures in the Vatican, met
with Herzog and Wardie. Instead, meetings were granted with Enrico Galeazzi, a close
advisor to Pius XII, Mgr. Pietro Sigismondi of the Secretariat of State, and Archbishop
Valerio Valeri, former apostolic nuncio to France.70 Herzog described the mandate of the
three week mission to “pay our respects to the Holy See, and to seek informal counsel on
the manner in which the Catholic Church would wish Israel to define, in its legal and
administrative machinery, the religious rights of the Catholic communities in its midst.”71
Given the “unique place which the Holy Land occupies in the religious sentiments of
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mankind,” he assured Vatican representatives that “the question would be given the most
careful consideration on the highest level.”72
Though Pius XII was encouraged by Israeli efforts to bring forth proposals
directly to the Vatican itself, a stumbling block remained the full and effective
internationalization of Jerusalem, upon which the Vatican secretariat continued to insist.
Just weeks after the departure of the Israeli delegates from Rome, Tardini forwarded to
Taylor‟s office the Pope‟s detailed position on Jerusalem, which continued to insist upon
full internationalization as outlined in the 1947 partition plan.73 The Vatican rejected,
however, proposals put forth by the UN that would give civil judicial authorities the right
to decide disputes pertaining to religious tribunals, as well as rights to determine cases at
issue between religious groups and the civil courts. The Vatican was further concerned by
the UN proposal‟s insistence that residency in Jerusalem would have to be proven for
three uninterrupted years, meaning that Roman Catholics who had fled to the Holy City
since the outbreak of Arab-Jewish conflict would not be granted resident status. Such a
regulation would clearly have limited the Roman Catholic presence in the city, and
hindered future Vatican claims for jurisdiction there. Only full and effective
internationalization, the document concluded, would protect the Roman Catholic
presence in Palestine. Privately, moreover, Vatican officials expressed that the purpose of
the Israeli mission had been to offset the international Catholic clamour over fighting in
Jerusalem, which they maintained was legitimate, and which they agreed was detrimental
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to the prospect of Israeli admission to the UN.74 Nonetheless, the Vatican agreed to study
the Israeli proposals for a period of three months, despite the Pope‟s confidential
memorandum on demands for full internationalization of Jerusalem just weeks later.
Herzog and Wardie, by all indications, departed Rome in early October confident that
their mission had at least begun to thaw the relationship between the Holy See and Tel
Aviv, and even expressed the hope that it had laid the groundwork for the Vatican‟s
future diplomatic recognition of Israel.75 In alluding to the importance of blunting
American Catholic criticisms of Israel, Wardie “hoped that Catholics in the United States
might perhaps learn of this visit and thereby be reassured of Israel‟s feelings of respect
and friendliness for the Holy See.”76
Wardie correctly surmised that American Catholic criticisms had the most
damaging potential to Israeli objectives. American Jewish organizations and
representatives of the Israeli provisional government in Washington, therefore, were
anxious to quell Catholic anti-Israeli sentiment in the United States, cognizant of the
threat it posed to Tel Aviv‟s strengthening relationship with the American government.
This initiative began in the summer of 1948, with a concerted effort in the Jewish press to
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emphasize Arab culpability in the destruction of Christian sites, in order to counter, as an
AZEC press release described, “the propaganda from Arab and pro-Arab sources on the
question of the holy places in Jerusalem, which tends to present a distorted picture of the
situation.”77 By August, a number of mainstream national papers such as the New York
Times, the New York Herald Tribune and the Boston Globe were also increasingly
emphasizing Arab transgressions in the Holy Land.
Jewish editors also rebuked Catholic journals directly for what they regarded as
an ongoing campaign of misrepresentation on the fighting in Jerusalem. Philip
Slomowitz, for example, editor of the influential Detroit Jewish News, reproached the
editorial board of the Commonweal, stating that as a reader and a former contributor to
the journal, he had been “shocked in the past few months to read some of the biased and
unfair comments you have made on the Jewish position in the State of Israel.”78
Slomowitz detailed a host of Arab damages to Christian sites, citing reports both from the
Jewish and mainstream press, and raised examples of Jewish-Catholic cooperation in the
territory, which included Jewish troops providing access to Christians into the Tomb of
David, a practice which had been forbidden under Ottoman rule. In concluding, he
maintained that there was “a mass of evidence not only to disprove the charges of Jewish
abuses, but to point on the contrary that while Arabs have destroyed Jewish and Christian
holy places the Israeli have protected them. Surely Christians ought to be the first to
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challenge libels against our people. And I am personally deeply grieved that the liberal
Commonweal magazine should have fallen prey to the rumours instead of disproving
falsehoods.” Slomowitz forwarded copies of his correspondences with Catholic journals
to officials in the Israeli provisional government in Washington and New York.79
As discussed above, Catholic editors were scarcely deterred by the disproving of
American Jewry, and relentlessly highlighted Israeli misdeeds in Jerusalem throughout
the summer and fall. Commonweal‟s response to Slomowitz was indicative of the
editorial resoluteness of the Catholic press. Penned by Anne Fremantle, the British-born
author, essayist and noted convert to Catholicism, it defended, chapter and verse, the
assertions made in the journal, and insisted that Catholic sources in the Holy Land were
sound and un-biased.80 Catholic responses also included the direct refutation of their
positions in the mainstream press itself. In November, the New York Herald Tribune
carried an article by Howard Carroll, General Secretary of the NCWC, which challenged
a series in articles in the same paper by Ruth Gruber, who claimed that the situation in
Palestine was “idyllic”.81 Carroll sternly took Gruber‟s views to task and, in quoting
Vergani‟s report liberally, he laid out the full extent of Jewish abuses in the large
circulation daily.
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Attempts to quell American Catholic opinion extended beyond the press. Eliahu
Epstein, the special representative of the Israeli government to the United States, took
pains to assure the NCWC that Tel Aviv took seriously the charges against Jewish
elements in and around Jerusalem, and he drew attention to formal Israeli investigations
into these misdemeanours.82 In quoting the Israeli Minister of Religious Affairs, Rabbi
I.L. Fishman (who in August had ordered a formal investigation into charges against
Jewish transgressions in Jerusalem), Epstein assured the NCWC that “the suggestion that
our state has or ever had any intention of expropriating Church property is wholly
without foundation”, and labelled coverage of the situation in Jerusalem as “fantastic
slander typical of anti-Israeli propaganda.”83 Epstein, further, assured the NCWC that he
would seek immediate clarification from Tel Aviv of any future charges against Israeli
elements in the territory. Similar assurances were forwarded to the NCWC and the
apostolic delegate, Amleto Cicognani, by AZEC, in an attempt to mitigate the negative
coverage so prevalent in the Catholic press.84 Despite these pledges, Catholic coverage
remained harshly critical of alleged Israeli transgressions, spurred by the Vatican‟s
consistent message, issued through the apostolic delegate, to “raise the issue of Palestine
clearly and consistently” in the American Catholic press.85 The Vatican and American
Catholic leaders, increasingly aware of the power of public opinion on the issue of
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Palestine, were not about to allow the disproving of American Zionists groups, or
representatives of the Israeli provisional government, to derail a potentially successful
campaign. Just weeks after the Israeli and AZEC assurances of accountability, in fact, the
diocesan press ran a series of damning articles by Father Raimond Naveau, renewing
charges of grave atrocities committed by Israeli forces in and around the Holy City.86
Digging In: Israeli Consolidation and a Renewed American Catholic Offensive
Criticisms of Israeli transgressions in the American Catholic press were intended
to underscore the need to create a genuine territorial internationalization for Jerusalem (a
corpus separatum) as opposed to the various schemes for protecting only the Holy Places
themselves, as suggested by the Israeli government. The establishment of a corpus
separatum, as outlined in the 1947 partition plan, and the repatriation of Christian Arab
refugees to Palestine, had become the clear focal points of Vatican efforts from the spring
of 1948 onward, a policy that the Vatican had again communicated to Myron Taylor‟s
office in November.87 On these fronts, however, the Vatican was gradually losing the
support of Washington. The Truman administration increasingly favoured a modified
condominium for Jerusalem, under which Israel, Jordan (which controlled West
Jerusalem) and the UN would share the administration of the city under a rotating
chairmanship.88 American plans would also have required a limited UN
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internationalization of the Holy Sites themselves, guaranteeing physical protection to the
sites, and guaranteeing access evenly to Christians, Jews and Muslims.
American designs for the city were largely reflected in the September 1948 report
submitted by Count Folke Bernadotte, the UN Mediator on Palestine. Bernadotte‟s
murder in Jerusalem on 17 September by Irgun terrorists disguised as IDF soldiers,
however, highlighted the increasing intractability of the „Jerusalem question‟, and
necessitated a deeper and more comprehensive consultation process to determine the fate
of the ancient city. On 11 December, the UN established the Palestine Conciliation
Commission (PCC), a body charged with mediating, inter alia, between the disputants in
the Israeli-Arab conflict in order to reach a final settlement. The status of Jerusalem, and
the question of the refugees, were the central issues in the PCC mandate. The General
Assembly specifically instructed the PCC to present to its Fourth Session in the fall of
1949 “detailed proposals for a permanent international regime for the Jerusalem area.”89
The establishment of the PCC signalled to the Vatican another chance to shape a
favourable solution on the fate of Jerusalem and its environs, despite flagging American
support for full internationalization.
Throughout 1949, the Vatican remained unmoved in its insistence on full
territorial internationalization for Jerusalem, the „corpus separatum‟ promised in
November 1947. The October 1948 encyclical In Multiplicibus, in terms more stark than
April‟s Auspicia Quaedam, called for a genuine territorial internationalization for the
city. In a key paragraph, Pope Pius XII implored those “in high quarters, where the
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problems of peace are discussed” to “give Jerusalem and its outskirts, where are found so
many and such precious memories of the life and death of the Saviour, an international
character which, in present circumstances, seems to offer a better guarantee for the
protection of the sanctuaries.”90 The pontiff further called for “international guarantees
for Holy Places throughout Palestine”, and called for the repatriation of Christian
refugees to the Holy Land. The Vatican maintained a cautious optimism that the UN
could still secure such an outcome. As Tardini explained in March 1949, the Pope had
frequently expressed approval of the UN, even though he had never been invited to
submit his views, and his “attitude toward the UN has always been one of outspoken
sympathy and encouragement.”91 The Vatican, however, specifically identified the
internationalization of Jerusalem as a policy priority for 1949, along with the diplomatic
recognition of several Arab states, objectives clearly intended to strengthen its hand on
the future of Palestine.92
Faith in the UN did not preclude Vatican efforts to continue discussions directly
with the Israeli government. Once again, the Vatican relied on the American Church as
an intermediary with Israel and Washington. The first official approach to Tel Aviv after
the creation of the PCC was made by the CNEWA‟s Mgr. Thomas McMahon. His
mission, which lasted almost four months, was ostensibly to manage Catholic aid efforts
in Egypt and Palestine, given his chairmanship of the „American Appeal for Holy Land
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Refugees.‟ McMahon‟s agenda had a diplomatic assignment attached as well, however,
namely to advocate for the repatriation of Christian Arab refugees, and to campaign for
the territorial internationalization of Jerusalem. Though McMahon had not been
designated as an official Vatican envoy, his private audiences with the Pope both at the
beginning and the end of his mission suggested such a role. James McDonald, the
American Special Representative to Israel, noted that though McMahon “received his
orders from his immediate supervisor, Cardinal Spellman, he is in fact so close to the
Vatican in his work here that in reality, if not in form, he is a Papal representative.”93
Officials in the Israeli government, including Herzog, concurred with this assessment.94
Once in Palestine, McMahon wasted little time in seeking out the power brokers
on the Jerusalem question, despite an official and frenetic agenda of coordinating the
distribution of CNEWA relief aid in the entire region. On the evening of 11 December
1948, McMahon had a lengthy discussion with Jacob Herzog, the Israeli Minister of
Religious Affairs (who dealt with the question of Jerusalem for Tel Aviv). McMahon
described the affable Herzog as “a young man, endowed with an Irish accent owing to his
youth in Dublin,” and “a pleasure to speak with.”95 On the question of the Holy City,
Herzog actually suggested that McMahon‟s August memo to the UN “hadn‟t gone far
enough” in insisting that Church property, religious education and Catholic marriages be
protected. Herzog, in fact, expressed full agreement on the principle of corpus separatum,
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but lamented “that he could not [speak] officially, especially since there were elections
coming up here, and the matter of a constitution.”96 Herzog further hinted at a division
between the civilian and military leadership in Israel complicating the Jerusalem
question. “There is a definitive division of the victorious army from the political leaders,
and the former has its way,” McMahon reported to Spellman, little assured by the Herzog
meeting. On the Catholic course going forward, the monsignor was unequivocal. “I think
the party line in New York should be to press always for internationalization, including
everything, for some of the shrines in the New City,” he opined. “Acceptance of partition
is enough, but the UN will have to devise some formidable way of implementing the
internationality of the Holy Places, or all is lost.”97
Two weeks later, McMahon took the Vatican‟s concerns to the Jordanians, who
occupied a section of the Holy City, and who also rejected the corpus separatum. On the
evening of 20 December, he was received at the winter home of King Abdullah in
Shureh, where he chatted for nearly two hours with Abdullah and Dr. Musa Husseini, a
liaison officer for the monarchy.98 McMahon remarked that Abdullah was “very cordial
and paternal,” growing “eloquent in his affirmations that Christians and Moslems are
equal in his regime.” On the subject of internationalization, however, the King was
reticent, “especially since his soldiers had shed their blood to defend the Holy Places.”99
Upon the King‟s departure, McMahon continued on with Husseini, who assured him that
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although Abdullah didn‟t understand the Jerusalem question fully, he would take it up
with him further. The monsignor reminded his host that Roman Catholics “had no more
assurances from the Arabs than from the Jews that Christians could live [in Palestine] in
peace,” emphasizing that “the internationalization of Jerusalem would be proof from both
sides that they respected Christian feelings.” Though Husseini offered vague pledges to
study the question in more depth, McMahon remained pessimistic. In his report to
Spellman, he again urged a firm line on Jerusalem, and alluded to the fragility of peace in
the region, which underscored the need for action. “The present „armistice‟ seems to be a
prelude, but let us pray otherwise. This little world is not much further ahead- in fact, it
has gone back. We must be loud on rightful claims.”100
On 11 January 1949, McMahon held a two hour meeting with McDonald, in
which he laid out the Vatican‟s demands for a Palestine solution. While the protection of
the Holy Places was important, he insisted that the “maintenance of the status quo”
(meaning the corpus separatum promised in 1947), was the only solution acceptable to
the Vatican. Significantly, McMahon stressed the supreme importance of the repatriation
of Christian Arabs to Palestine, suggesting that the establishment of Jerusalem as a
corpus separatum would facilitate the return of displaced Christians. The Vatican had
long considered the maintenance of a Roman Catholic population in Palestine as central
to the legitimacy of its presence there. As such, McMahon informed McDonald that the
Roman Catholic Church would prefer “that all of the [Holy Sites] be destroyed rather
than the Christian population be eliminated,” alluding to the importance with which the
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Vatican considered the territory a base of influence.101 He further suggested a benefit to
Israel in the repatriation of Christians to Palestine: namely as a buffer population between
Jewish “liberals” and “excessive Rabbinical control or any tendency toward a
theocracy.”102
In February, McMahon presented similar points in a second meeting with Herzog,
who could only offer his guest assurances that Israel, which was eager to negotiate a
solution amenable to the Vatican, supported an international regime for the Holy Places,
and not a corpus separatum. Herzog‟s tone was decidedly less conciliatory than in early
December, evidence that he was acting on instructions from Tel Aviv. Growing Israeli
obstinacy on the issue could be traced to plans for Jerusalem, which had always been
considered the natural capital of Israel by the founding fathers of Zionism. Clearly
sensing a growing upper-hand in the struggle for Palestine, the Israeli cabinet had decided
in January to terminate the military governorship of Jerusalem and replace it with a
civilian government- an arrangement which would affect the application of Israel‟s
national civil law. Israel further declared that it would conduct municipal elections in the
city in March, and made it known that it intended to hold the opening meeting of the First
Knesset (Constituent Assembly) in Jerusalem on 14 February.103 Though Tel Aviv
claimed that these measures were “administrative and not annexation of Jerusalem”, the
demands put forth by the Vatican through McMahon were clearly incompatible with
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Israel‟s longer-term plans. The Jesuit journal America, which was kept apprised of
McMahon‟s mission, observed accurately that “despite protestations by Israeli officials
that the [February Knesset meeting] was held in Jerusalem purely because of Israel‟s
historical association with the Holy City, we have little doubt that they hoped to use the
location of the Constituent Assembly as a weapon to strengthen their annexation
plans.”104
In early March, a frustrated McMahon discussed his Israeli meetings in a private
audience with Pope Pius XII, where it was determined that a renewed pressure had to be
applied both at the UN and in Washington. Clearly dissatisfied with his rebuff in
Palestine, McMahon, upon his return to New York later in the month, penned his third
open letter to UN General Secretary Trygve Lie.105 In stating that Roman Catholics “most
understandably could not agree” with recent Israeli statements opposing the
internationalization of Jerusalem (a clear reference to his recent meetings), he
emphasized that “the Christian world has complete justification in requesting
international status for the Holy City.” He further seethed at “certain officials” in the
Israeli government that denied the repatriation of Catholic Arab refugees to their
“ancestral homes.” “Who shall have the right”, he offered, “to say they cannot or may
not?” In closing, McMahon again raised the supranational character of the Jerusalem
question, and urged the PCC directly to find an amenable solution. “Jerusalem and the
Holy Places engage not only the sentiments but the sacred interests of the great mass of
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mankind,” he instructed. “We insist that your Conciliation Commission (PCC) be
motivated by these considerations of elementary justice.”106
McMahon made a second impassioned plea for Palestine during an address at his
alma mater, New York‟s Fordham University, on 2 April. In a speech entitled „Rites and
Rights in the Homeland of Our Saviour‟, he referred to Jerusalem as a “capital of
Christianity”, clearly challenging Israel‟s own designs for the city as a national capital. 107
While he credited Israeli sincerity in dealing with the 1948 attacks on Roman Catholic
sites, he expressed dismay at the plight of displaced Arab Christians. “While I, for one,”
he stated, “wish the State of Israel well, because the footsteps of returning Jews bear
traces of bloody persecution, I have come back here with my eyes full of the misery of
homeless human beings, and my heart even more sensitive to the rights of
Christendom.”As in his UN letter, McMahon again referred to the supranational character
of Jerusalem, calling it “a microcosm, the crossroads of the world and the capital of three
religions, whose rights make it imperative that the land can never be exclusionist and that
no solution will be lasting that will obscure these indigenous rights.” McMahon linked
outstanding Roman Catholic grievances to the debate on Israeli UN membership, which
had begun in April, warning Washington that American Catholics would be watching
these talks closely. “During the next week the admission of the State of Israel to the UN
will be discussed and voted on. During the same time, the Conciliation Commission
(PCC) will be discussing the internationalization of Jerusalem and the repatriation of
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refugees. Millions of Christians in this country will be wondering and will have a right to
wonder what will be the policy of our government in the face of the assertion of Christian
rights.”108 The speech, carried widely in the diocesan press, was a clear signal to Truman
and the Democrats that American Catholics would be closely monitoring developments
on Jerusalem, accepting nothing less than the corpus separatum promised in 1947.
McMahon‟s Fordham address initiated a more vocal and public Catholic lobby on
Palestine that extended through the spring and summer of 1949. Vatican demands were
again laid out in the 15 April encyclical Redemptoris Nostri, Pope Pius XII‟s third
consecutive encyclical on the Palestine question, a clear sign of the priority with which
the Vatican viewed the Jerusalem question. The document again called for the
internationalization of the Holy City, citing the damages to ancient sites, “not a few
[which have] suffered serious loss and damage owing to the upheaval of war.”109 The
encyclical also urged global Catholics to action. “Let [Catholics], wherever they are
living, use every legitimate means to persuade rulers of nations and those whose duty it is
to settle this important question.” It instructed religious to “encourage the faithful
committed to your charge to be ever more concerned about the conditions in Palestine
and have them make their lawful requests known, positively and unequivocally.”
The Vatican took pains to assure that the American Church would lead the charge
for Jerusalem. Shortly following the release of the encyclical, Montini issued a direct
appeal, though the apostolic delegation in Washington, imploring the American bishops
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to advocate heartily for the internationalization of Jerusalem. The letter, forwarded by
Cicognani to the entire American episcopate, underscored “the indispensable and urgent
necessity to make known among Catholics and the general public, in a truly effective
manner, the desire and the will of the Catholic Church to defend and protect the sacred
and century-old rights which She has had in Palestine.”110 The letter urged specific
political advocacy by the American Church, stating that the question “be made known
and emphatically stressed with the public authorities who are taking part in the
negotiations to determine the permanent status of the Holy City of Jerusalem and the
surrounding sacred shrines.” It exhorted bishops to encourage their faithful to “make their
voices heard by the responsible government authorities” and to further “do whatever may
be in your power...to create a strong movement of your faithful and to undertake the
necessary steps with the civil authorities for the purpose of obtaining the desired goal.”111
It was an appeal of uncommon directness, speaking both to the immediacy with which the
Vatican regarded the issue, and to the credence it placed in the potential political clout of
the American Church.
On 27 April a pastoral letter, composed by the most influential figures in the
American episcopate, was issued after the spring meeting of the NCWC in Washington.
Signatories included Spellman, Mooney, Stritch, McNicholas and Richard Cushing,
Archbishop of Boston. Titled „The Internationalization of Jerusalem and its Environs‟,
the letter, carried widely by the Catholic and mainstream press, and read from thousands
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of pulpits nationwide, characterized the urgency with which the American bishops
regarded the future of Jerusalem.112 The statement mirrored the demands made in the
papal encyclical (in demanding full territorial internationalization), and emphasized that
American Catholics “had the right to expect that these sentiments, firmly rooted in the
decisions of the United Nations, will now be respected by those whom we should all
appeal for their continuous affirmation.” Like McMahon‟s address, it sought to politicize
the Jerusalem issue among American Catholics, in “[exhorting] our people to use their
democratic privileges in this free nation to obtain from these in our government and in the
United Nations continued assurances that the original commitments as to Christian rights
in Palestine will be carried out.”113
While McMahon and the American bishops sought to raise the issue of Palestine
at the UN and among the American Catholic public, Spellman communicated Catholic
concerns directly with the White House. In correspondence with Truman that extended
throughout the spring and summer of 1949, Spellman apprised the President of the
urgency with which American Catholics viewed the Palestine question, and specifically
the fate of Jerusalem. In doing so, Spellman also commuted the Vatican‟s own policy
demands to the Oval Office. The care with which Truman responded to Spellman, and the
breadth of his letters suggests the extent to which he sought to assuage American
Catholic concerns.

112

See Raphael H. Huber, Our Bishops Speak: National Pastorals and Annual Statements of the Hierarchy
of the United States, 1919-1951 (Milwaukee, 1952): 364-365. The other signatories were Francis Keough,
Archbishop of Baltimore, Robert Lucey, Archbishop of San Antonio, Patrick O’ Boyle, Archbishop of
Washington, John Gannon, Bishop of Erie, John Noll, Bishop of Fort Wayne, Karl Alter, Bishop of Toledo,
and Michael Ready, Bishop of Columbus.
113

Ibid.
252

Spellman initiated the correspondence on 29 April, when he expressed concerns
that the PCC appeared to be favouring a watered-down solution for Jerusalem, which
would guarantee universal access to the Holy Sites, but would cede political jurisdiction
of the city to the Israelis and the Jordanians.114 He reminded Truman that neither was this
acceptable to the Vatican, nor was it the original UN scheme of November 1947,
“advanced by the friends of Israel to fend off opposition to obtain the support and the
votes of the Christian nations for partition in the General Assembly of 1947.” Spellman
also expressed frustration that the Israeli provisional government did not support the
repatriation of Catholic Arab refugees to Palestine (another of the Vatican‟s key
concerns.) In closing, he urged Truman to take a stronger tack against the “fait accompli
policies of Israel, which disregards United Nations decrees”, and to honour the “Christian
stake” in the Palestine question.115
Truman‟s response, which was reiterated in various forms throughout the
summer, did not fill the Archbishop of New York with tremendous optimism. He assured
Spellman that he considered the repatriation of Arab refugees “essential to a lasting peace
in Palestine.”116 On Jerusalem and its environs, however, the President appeared to favour
a modified compact, “whereby Israel and Transjordan could accept a large share of
governmental responsibility in the Jerusalem area under the overall supervision of some
representation of the United Nations.” Though Truman assured Spellman that he didn‟t
consider the solution optimal, he did regard it as practicable, taking into account the
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realities in the territory. He reminded Spellman, however, that “the United States
government has not reached a final decision on the question, and its attitude...will be
determined by the proposals to be made by the Palestine Conciliation Commission
(PCC), upon which the responsibility for this task has been placed by the General
Assembly.”117
This was cold comfort to Spellman, as the 19 April release of the PCC „Progress
Report‟ to the UN strongly suggested a diluted international regime for Jerusalem, one
acceptable to both Israel and Jordan, in place of the full corpus separatum sought by the
Vatican and the American Church (and proffered by the UN in 1947 and 1948).118 In
response, the NCWC produced an eight page memorandum titled „The Christian Factor in
the Palestine Equation‟ which sought, with legal precision, to outline the demands made
by the Vatican and the American bishops on the status of Jerusalem.119 The memo traced
the question from the Balfour declaration forward, and focused specifically on the form
of internationalization ensconced by the General Assembly in November 1947 (which
was a corpus separatum). The memo expressed concern over Israel‟s “gradual
annexation” of Jerusalem, asserting that “military or civil conquest does not liquidate or
neutralize the previous decisions of the General Assembly,” and that “if „force majeur‟ is
thus recognized and legitimated, there can be little effectiveness attributed to United
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Nations activities.” It further warned that there remained a significant gulf between the
form of internationalization acceptable to Israel (protection of the Holy Places only), and
that insisted upon by the Vatican, despite the “chatter” in UN circles that suggested
otherwise. In closing, it admonished the “mitigated internationalization” favoured by Tel
Aviv, suggesting that diplomatic tact and malleability could only achieve so much, and
urged a firmer hand on Israel. “The necessity of good will is unquestionable,” it
concluded, “but something else is also necessary. Clear understandings make good
friends.”120 The memo was clearly intended as a short handbook for legislators and UN
delegates on the question. On 5 May, Schaefer forwarded translations to Latin American,
Arab and “various other delegates” at the UN. The following day, copies were also
distributed widely among members of the American, Canadian and Australian
delegations, as well as to a number of American legislators.121
Though the Vatican had long valued the role of the American diocesan press in
shaping Catholic opinion, it made pointed appeals to Catholic editors in the spring of
1949 to highlight papal and wider Roman Catholic demands for the Holy Land. Requests
for intensified Catholic coverage were often issued through the apostolic delegation to the
NCWC News Service.122 Though the Vatican also began to forward reports of damage to
Roman Catholic shrines to the NCWC News Service “to offset the false statements made
in recent months by the representatives of Israel,” the apostolic delegate urged the
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diocesan papers “not to mention the Holy See as a source”, cognizant of the challenges
this might create for dialogue with Tel Aviv.123 Diocesan papers, hardly needing the
prodding of Rome, gave unprecedentedly wide coverage to a number of issues salient to
the Vatican and the wider Church. Brother Anthony Bruya, who remained as the
NCWC‟s correspondent in the territory, penned a long series of articles that amplified
familiar themes: the desperate plight of displaced Arab refugees, Arab-Christian strife at
the hand of the IDF and other Jewish elements, Catholic aid in the refugee camps, and
continued Jewish agitations against Christian rights in Palestine.124 To this was added a
list of Roman Catholicism‟s primary demands for the territory: namely an
internationalized Jerusalem and the repatriation of Arab refugees. The emphasis of these
themes was not limited to the diocesan press. Catholic journals such as the Jesuit weekly
America, the Paulist weekly Catholic World, the independent lay Commonweal and Sign,
among others, echoed these demands, producing a largely unitary and coherent public
voice on these questions.125 On several occasions the Vatican also requested that
American Catholic journals reprint relevant articles from official papal organs such as the
L’Osservatore Romano and the Civilta Cattolicà, in order both to harmonize demands put
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forth by Catholics, and to clearly inform American Catholic laity of the Vatican‟s
desires.126
So anxious was the Vatican to cultivate this chorus that it monitored the American
Catholic press closely, calling attention to articles that did not accord with papal views on
Palestine. The Vatican secretariat was anxious to avoid a repeat of Bishop Rummel
incident, where the New Orleans prelate was rebuked for views on Palestine that did not
accord with those of Rome. In May, for example, Cicognani wrote the NCWC News
Service, calling attention to a March article which quoted a British Labour MP, Dr.
Samuel Segal, who had cast doubt on the feasibility on internationalizing Jerusalem.
Cicognani continued that Tardini himself had “expressed wonderment at the fact that the
NCWC News Service had given prominence to such remarks”, and the apostolic delegate
implored Frank Hall, director of the service, to prevent such articles from appearing
again.127 In his response, Hall explained that the piece had appeared in the diocesan press
“before the intensive Catholic campaign for internationalization had started”, but assured
that the NCWC would “be alert to prevent a recurrence.”128
Intensified American Catholic critiques of Israeli policies and actions drew a terse
response from American Zionist groups and from the Jewish press, a situation the NCWC
appeared to have anticipated. In January, the NCWC News Service produced a series of
form letters, to be used by editors of the Catholic diocesan weeklies, to refute the
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potential criticisms that might be levelled against the Catholic press over its coverage of
events in Israel and the wider region.129 In response to what was becoming “a
considerable number of communications and visits from Israeli, Zionist, and Jewish
agencies, organizations and individuals expressing much concern over [NCWC]
dispatches from the Holy Land,” the letters were intended to present a unitary American
Catholic response to inevitable Jewish critiques.130
Despite this preparedness, Jewish critiques were indeed forthcoming, as Zionist
agencies continued to grasp the potential dangers of an ongoing American Catholic
propaganda campaign against Israel. In a February memorandum, the AZEC encouraged
its members to counter negative Catholic reporting whenever possible, observing that
reports in the press “had an unfavourable effect on Jewish-Catholic relations in the
United States and the world over. If left unchecked, this development could have the
most undesirable results both for the State of Israel and for Jewish communities in many
lands.”131 Leading Jewish American commentators surmised the fairly direct links
between Vatican policy on Palestine and American Catholic activism. Eliahu Ben-Horin,

129

Howard Carroll to Editors, ‘Memorandum- Editorial Information’, 7 January 1949, NCWC/OGS/ACUA,
Box 22, File 44, 1-7.
130

The NCWC News Service provided editors of diocesan papers three form letters with which to respond
to critiques from Jewish editors and Zionist figures. The first amounted to a defence of the reportage of
Anthony Bruya, “an American religious with a remarkably fine record,” as the letter described him. The
NCWC letter vouched for the veracity of his reporting from the Holy Land, pointing up the fact that the
Catholic press had given fair coverage to Tel Aviv’s attempts to rectify the situation. The form letter
concluded that “If this reply seems strong, I call to your attention the fact that the accusations against this
Service were palpably irresponsible.” The next two letters provided more general refutations of charges
that the Catholic press unfairly criticized Israeli transgressions. See Ibid above.
131

WSUA, Philip Slomowitz Papers, File 65, ‘Israel and the Catholic Church’, Abe Tuvim to Chairmen of the
Local Emergency Committees, 17 February 1949. See also attached memo, ‘Jewish-Catholic Relations in
and Over Israel’, 1-3.
258

journalist and advisor to the AZEC on Middle Eastern affairs, observed in July that “the
Catholic propaganda machine is at the moment engaged in a campaign directed against
Israel. The campaign derives its inspiration from the Vatican, and its main slogan is the
internationalization of Jerusalem.”132 J.L. Teller, director of the Office of Information for
the American Jewish Congress, observed that his “familiarity with the religio-imperialist
designs of the Vatican in the Middle East” had apprised him of the wider Roman Catholic
campaign to undermine Israel.133 This extended to the American Catholic press, where he
deemed that a “Catholic campaign of intimidation has gone to the length of attempting to
intimidate American Jews into siding with the Vatican against Israel.”134 Criticisms of
Catholic press coverage, in fact, extended to the Israeli government itself, when Foreign
Minister Moshe Sharett condemned what he called “the growing propaganda with regard
to the holy places” and urged that “His Holiness, the Pope, whose prayers for peace in
this country found an echo in the hearts of all of us, will deem it good to examine the
facts and inform everyone concerned of the truth in order that religious matters and the
question of holy places should not serve as a source of libellous propaganda against
us.”135
Throughout the spring and summer, Jewish papers such as American Hebrew,
Congress Bulletin, Congress Weekly, Detroit Jewish News, National Jewish Monthly,
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Reconstructionist, The Rubicon, and others consistently defended Israel‟s right to
Jerusalem, and its right to regulate the entry of dispossessed Arab refugees, articles
clearly refuting the Vatican and American Catholicism‟s own claims for the territory.136
In August, an American Hebrew editorial identified a clear hardening in American
Catholic attitudes towards Israel in May, just weeks after the Vatican had asked
American bishops to intensify their campaign for Jerusalem and the refugees.
A further worsening of the crisis occurred during the second half of May, when
distinguished Catholic prelates and numerous Catholic periodicals began to direct
particular vigorous criticism at Israel. Prior to that time, it was understood that
the Catholic Church was interested in securing certain Catholic interests in the
Holy Land, especially in the Jerusalem area. Negotiations with the Israeli
government regarding these interests were proceeding apace, and there was good
ground to believe that an agreement would be reached. In the course of May,
Catholic spokesmen appeared to have changed their attitude: they were no longer
negotiating for limited objectives, they indulged in attacks upon Israel which were
immoderate, and [they] seemed permeated with a feeling of hostility to the very
existence of the new State.137
The editorial rhetorically asked why it appeared that leading figures in
Washington, including Acheson and Truman himself, appeared to be gradually aligning
with Rome on the Palestine question, suggesting a Vatican-Washington axis at play. “Is it
the newly strengthened opposition of Catholic circles to Israel that provides an
explanation,” it concluded, “or has the Catholic Church itself been persuaded by the old
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opponents of Israel in Washington and London to join the opposition?”138 No such axis
existed, of course, and the Truman administration, in fact, lent increasing support to Tel
Aviv‟s ambitions, but such reportage was successful in fomenting sympathy and political
support from American Jewry.
The Jewish press buttressed the strident and largely successful American Zionist
lobby, where groups such as the AZEC, the AJC and the Zionist Organization of America
(ZOA), along with Truman‟s strong personal relations with a clutch of leading Jewish
industrialists and political figures, were able to steer Washington‟s „Israel policy‟ in
directions amenable to Tel Aviv‟s interests.139 Added to this was the support and
lobbying of the ACPC, the largely Protestant proponent of Israel which had played, as
recent scholarship contends, a significant role in Washington‟s recognition of Israel in
1948, and which continued to advocate for the nascent state.140 The existence of a vocal
Christian Zionist lobby (primarily Protestant), in addition to robust Jewish Zionist
advocacy, underscored the unique demands of American Catholics for Palestine, which
set Catholics apart from the growing American consensus on the issue, and highlighted
the link between Vatican policies and the political demands of its faithful in the United
States.
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In spite of the intensive and growing American Zionist lobby, or perhaps in part
because of it, Catholic activism on Palestine continued to broaden throughout the summer
of 1949. Catholic discontent with American and UN positions on Jerusalem and the
refugee question were further piqued in June, when it became apparent that the PCC,
which had relocated to Lausanne, had reached an effective stalemate, decreasing the
likelihood of a settlement agreeable to the Vatican.141 International Catholic ire was also
aroused by ongoing tensions between Jewish authorities and Catholics in Jerusalem,
where ongoing disputes over the return of property to the Church served to perpetuate
fragile relations.
The barring of Catholics from praying in the Cenacle (the building which
purportedly contained the room in which the Last Supper was held) in April struck a
particularly raw nerve. On the evening of 6 June, nearly 40,000 faithful attended a rally
for the Holy Land at Boston‟s Fenway Park, where Archbishop Richard Cushing led a
dramatic ceremony from “a majestic high altar, bedecked in white gold and decorated
with palms, rhododendrons and tall white lilies.” The Brooklyn Tablet described the
spectacle in detail, which was “heightened by the rich robes of the prelates, the
Monsignori, and the contrasting colours of the various religious communities.”142
Referring specifically to the Cenacle incident, Cushing led an impassioned plea for the
internationalization of city. “How can Christendom, how can universal Catholicism”, he
thundered, “fail to take a prayerful but passionate interest in the future fate of these
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sacred places? We pray that those who determine the permanent status of Jerusalem and
the sacred shrines of Palestine will be conscious that they are not merely the agents of
men, but they are also instruments in the hands of God.”143 In emphasizing the spiritual,
rather than political, imperatives for internationalization, Cushing delivered a barely
concealed censure of Washington‟s growing alignment with Israel. “Please God will they
put aside the cynicism and the callous indifference to spiritual values shamelessly
revealed in some recent declarations by political spokesmen of so-called „Christian
nations‟.” Cushing also invoked ancestral Roman Catholic tenets in demanding action on
Palestine. “I make this plea as we seek the blessing of the God of Abraham and Isaac and
Jacob through the sacrament which Christ left us the night before he died when his
disciples gathered in Jerusalem to receive his testament of love, the charter of his peace,”
he intoned. “Surely the sublime events of that night have given Jerusalem an international
character which no political convention should attempt to annul.” At the conclusion of
Cushing‟s stirring address, the lights of the park were turned off, and there appeared on
the playing surface “a great crucifix and a heart-shaped rosary chain which spread over
most of the field.” The men who formed this human rosary carried torches and coloured
flashlights, “illuminating the crucifix and the Our Father beads in red, the Hail Mary
beads in green, and the links between in gold”, leading a solemn rendition of the Lord‟s
Prayer, as the mysteries were enacted on the tableaux. The Fenway rally represented only
the most stirring of a number of demands from Catholic laity for an international
Jerusalem. In August, the Queens County chapter of the Catholic War Veterans of
America presented a petition outlining similar demands to Truman, Trygvie Lie, George
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Marshall, the American delegation to the UN, and representatives of all of the UN
member states, bringing the war veteran‟s unique clout to bear on the Palestine
question.144
The Cenacle incident also prompted another exchange of letters between Truman
and Spellman, when the Archbishop again pressed the President for guarantees on
Jerusalem. On 10 June, Spellman expressed disappointment that the admission of Israel
into the UN, “due in no small degree to the attitude and influence of the United States
delegation,” was passed without a resolution on Jerusalem, to be determined “at a later
date” by the PCC in Lausanne.145 In imploring the President to defend “the spiritual
heritage of millions and millions of American Christians,” he reminded Truman that “the
„later date‟ and, in fact, the last date that will affect the Christians of this country and of
the world is now, and the place is Lausanne.” The Roman Catholic Church, Spellman
continued, sought full territorial internationalization “to prevent ...the sacred scenes of
Christ‟s life from becoming secularized, confiscated, taxed out of existence and rendered
inaccessible.” To the point that such concerns might be “alarmist,” Spellman referred
specifically to “recent, authentic reports received from Jerusalem which showed an
adverse Israelistic attitude, based on alleged provisions of security, which denied
Christians- several of them Americans- access to the scene of the Last Supper in the
Jewish „New City‟ during Holy Week...while Jews were permitted to visit the tomb of
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David in the same area.”146 Given the precariousness of Catholic interests in Jerusalem,
Spellman urged action from Truman. “The traditions and interests of millions of
Christians in the United States and of the entire world, who look to Palestine also as their
Holy Land, must be articulated at Lausanne by your representative, if the United States is
not to be regarded by the whole Christian community as having failed them by default.”
Truman‟s response, penned on 22 June, sought to assuage Spellman‟s concerns by
assuring the Archbishop that he “firmly believe[d] in the necessity for the international
guarantee of free access and protection of the Holy Places.”147 It was clear, however, that
Truman‟s interpretation of the evolving debate leaned decidedly towards a guarantee of
access to the sacred sites themselves, and not the territorial internationalization sought by
the Vatican. On this score, Truman reiterated the potential cost of policing such an
international city, with a figure “in excess of thirty million dollars” estimated by
“competent officials in this government.”148 Truman concluded that he was in complete
agreement with Spellman that “it is essential that Christians of the whole world be
permitted freely to visit the Holy Places in Jerusalem, as soon as normal conditions are
restored in Palestine. The United States government, through the PCC and the UN, will
work for the establishment of a regime in Jerusalem which will assure this right.”
Truman‟s ambiguous response was more cold comfort for New York‟s Archbishop, who
sought more definitive guarantees of support for the corpus separatum.

146

Ibid.

147

NARA, RG 59, MTP, Box 26, Harry S. Truman to Francis Spellman, 22 June 1949.

148

Ibid.
265

Truman‟s circumspection, in fact, underscored the need to raise the awareness of
Catholic laity on the issue. Throughout the summer, a number of eminent American
bishops rallied to the cause, bolstering their public calls for an international Jerusalem,
with appeals to their faithful to make their voices heard. The Archbishop of Philadelphia,
Denis Cardinal Dougherty, implored every adult Catholic in the United States to write to
their political representatives on Capitol Hill and urge them to support “the points
proposed by our Holy Father.”149 Dougherty‟s call was echoed by Mooney, Cushing,
McNicholas, O‟Boyle and a number of other bishops in dioceses nationwide. The
episcopate‟s call for action resulted in legislators and congressmen being “flooded with
letters from Catholic citizens.”150
The deluge of correspondence appeared to pay some dividends. On 22 June, New
York congressman Franklin Roosevelt, Jr., who had recently completed a tour of
Palestine, arranged a meeting between the NCWC‟s Mgr. James Griffiths and a group of
New York congressmen “to discuss the real issues of the Palestine problem.”151 Clearly
sensing an ally in Roosevelt and the gathered legislators, Griffiths reported to the
apostolic delegation his “success in supplementing Mr. Roosevelt‟s impressions at [our]
off the record discussions this afternoon.” By early July, Myron Taylor had added his
name to those openly advocating for the full internationalization of Jerusalem. In a letter
to Truman, he advised strenuously that the city “not be divided but placed in international
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control under the United Nations.”152 Stressing the purely strategic and political
advantages of such a move, and echoing the views of the French and Italian ambassadors
to the Holy See, he counselled Truman that “any further segregation of populations not
friendly within the sacred sections of Palestine will lead to unending strife and constant
problems for the nations to wrestle with.”153 It was clear that by the late summer of 1949,
the question of Jerusalem, far from subsiding, was emerging as an increasing problematic
issue, dividing American and world opinion upon defined lines.
The International „Catholic Orbit‟ and the Palestine Question
American Catholic activism came at the head of a growing international Catholic
campaign for Palestine, sparked in part by the Pope‟s call to action outlined in
Redemptoris Nostri. On 24 March, the Hague based International Union of Catholic
Women (IUCW), through its New York secretariat, issued a detailed memorandum to the
PCC which demanded an international Jerusalem and the repatriation of Arab refugees.154
Speaking for “36 million women and girls in 65 countries and 5 continents,” the petition
raised specifically female concerns on the Palestine question, connecting demands for the
repatriation of the refugees to the abuse of women and children languishing in the refugee
camps of Egypt and southern Palestine. On Jerusalem, IUCW demands echoed a familiar
refrain: that the city was a uniquely historical crossroads of three faiths, a city in which
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Roman Catholics held “imprescriptible rights.” The demands of Christian in the Holy
Land, it concluded, “the states cannot ignore without impairing democratic principles in
all civilized countries.”155 In May, the Lebanese, French, Brazilian and Argentinian
episcopates followed the American lead in issuing formal requests, both to their own
governments and to the UN, for a Palestine settlement amenable to Roman Catholic
interests.156 In June, similar demands were expressed to the British government by the
Catholic hierarchies of England and Wales. British Catholic demands for Palestine were
echoed in the same month by the Anglican bishop in Jerusalem, Rev. Weston Henry
Stewart, whose open letter to Trygve Lie and the PCC was co-signed by the Catholic
auxiliary bishop of Jerusalem157
In August, in an address before the Irish parliament (the Dáil), Irish Foreign
Minister Sean MacBride made a “special appeal to the government of Israel” for the
internationalization of Jerusalem. He invoked the history of persecution endured by both
Irish and Jews, declaring that “our common suffering from persecution and certain
similarities in the history of the two races create a special bond of sympathy and
understanding between the Irish and the Jewish peoples.”158 To MacBride, this historical
parallel lent particular gravitas to Ireland‟s request. “Speaking from that point of view”,
he continued, “I venture to make a special appeal to the government of Israel to meet the
just claims of the Christian world for an international regime guaranteeing the safety of
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the Holy Places and freedom of access to them.” He later confirmed that Irish diplomats
in London and Washington were pursuing this end, and assured that his plea was shared
by the Irish government, which “strongly supported” demands for the
“internationalization of the whole area of Jerusalem.”159
In the same month, the official organ of Spanish Catholic Action, Ecclesia,
announced that the Spanish episcopate, on an appeal directly from the Vatican, would be
applying pressure on Madrid over the Holy Places. Spanish bishops also implored the
American and Canadian bishops to “interpose [their] good offices with [their] own
governments” so that “all of the nations of the Christian orbit could carry out the will of
Rome.”160 This international “Christian orbit”, conspicuously Roman Catholic in
composition, had already functioned to curtail Tel Aviv‟s ambitions, when Israel‟s May
bid for UN membership was accepted only with conditions attached by a clutch of Latin
and South American states.161 Key among their demands was the strict Israeli adherence
to the principles outlined in the 1947 partition plan, as well as the repatriation of refugees
displaced by the subsequent conflict, both conditions conforming to the Vatican‟s own
demands. The Chilean delegation insisted that the resolution to admit Israel explicitly
mention its obligations to the November 1947 resolution, and an Argentinian motion
suggested that Israel and the PCC formally “take into account the views of the Holy See”
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when deciding on the form and extent of an internationalized Jerusalem.162 Argentinian
delegates, in fact, pressed Israeli representative Aubrey Eban over his assurances that the
papal encyclicals would be used as a guide for Israeli policymakers, taking “careful note”
of all of Eban‟s pledges.163 On the importance, and imperative, of Israel‟s and the UN‟s
fulfillment of all of these vows, Catholic representatives were unequivocal. The Lebanese
ambassador to the UN, Dr. Charles Malik, expressed Catholic sentiment succinctly.
“What is at stake is not Jerusalem, not the Arabs, not the Jews,” he declared on 18 May,
“but the quality of Western statesmanship itself.”164
The mounting international Catholic pressure faced by Israel precipitated a
concentrated effort by Tel Aviv, in the spring and summer of 1949, to establish direct
diplomatic relations with the Holy See, in attempts to mitigate the effects of the Catholic
„orbit‟ ranged against it by negotiating directly with the Vatican secretariat. In early
August Moshe Sharett, clearly bending to the pressure applied to Israel, forwarded
Taylor‟s office a range of proposals for Jerusalem.165 If the Vatican was only interested in
the full internationalization negotiated in 1947, it was not possible, claimed Sharett, as
this would place 100,000 Jews under an ambiguous international regime, and at risk of
Arab attacks. He did, however, offer some conciliatory positions: international control
and supervision of the Holy Places both in Jerusalem and in the rest of the territory
(including sites in Jewish-dominated „new Jerusalem‟), and the internationalization of the
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„Old City‟, with Israel providing for its economic and political stability.166 The Vatican,
obviously sensing a growing upper hand in the dispute, rejected Sharett‟s proposals.
Tardini explained to James Dunn (American ambassador to Italy) that the Vatican “was
always cautious and slow in all matters involving recognition of any newly created state,”
calling the immediate exchange of ambassadors “quite premature”, but he suggested a
deeper rationale in rejecting both Sharett‟s proposals and the diplomatic recognition of
Israel.167 He stressed that the position of the Vatican remained unchanged from that
revealed in the encyclicals of 1948 and 1949, which proposed full corpus separatum, an
“international buffer” for the city “which neither Jew nor Arab could violate.” Tardini
asserted that “no other solution could be considered adequate by the Holy See,” since the
present status of Jerusalem teetered on the edge of a renewed Jewish-Arab war.168 He
suggested that as a pretext to serious negotiations, Israel would “do well to settle grave
unwarranted war damages suffered by Catholic institutions in the Holy Land.”
On 12 August, Tardini forwarded to Taylor a six-page memo, „The Present
Situation in Jerusalem‟, which was a “compendium of de facto and de jure considerations
which according to the Holy See were essential in the just resolution of the Palestine
question.”169 Its proposals, in short, dismissed any possibility of a compromise on the
Vatican‟s part, amounting to a loquacious restatement of long-held positions. The memo
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outlined factors beyond Catholic interests for the internationalization of Jerusalem. These
included the notion that Jerusalem was a crucial dividing line between Arabs and Jews,
and that international control for the city would greatly reduce the chances of a war
sparked by either for absolute control of the city. Tardini also surmised that an
internationalized Jerusalem would be more economically self-sufficient, not least because
its stability would draw Catholic pilgrims from around the world, generating significant
revenues.170 On the question of recognizing Israel and entertaining Israeli proposals for
Jerusalem, Tardini insisted on the establishment of a corpus separatum as a precondition
to any exchange of ministers. The Vatican clearly preferred allowing Tel Aviv to twist in
the wind of international Catholic pressure than to provide a direct line of communication
for resolving disputes.
Though the Vatican refused to extend formal recognition to Israel, it continued to
use Mgr. Thomas McMahon as an unofficial envoy in the territory. The American prelate
had returned to the territory in June, after being named president of the Pontifical Mission
for Palestine by Pope Pius XII, a position that placed him in charge of Catholic relief
efforts in the entire region. Though the Vatican refused to confirm or deny rumours that
McMahon‟s aid mission had a political agenda attached, his meetings with high-ranking
Israeli officials suggested that he indeed functioned as a papal envoy. At any rate, the
Israeli government considered him the pope‟s de facto representative. McMahon‟s
August meetings with Jacob Herzog and Chain Wardie, of the Ministry of Religious
Affairs, revealed a growing entrenchment of both Vatican and Israeli positions. In early
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August, Herzog asked McMahon how Israel could effectively open dialogue with the
Vatican on Jerusalem and the refugees, particularly in advance of the UN debate on the
PCC‟s resolutions, set to begin in September. Herzog also discussed with McMahon the
Israeli „reading‟ of the encyclicals of 1948 and 1949, claiming that he “did not read in
them the UN partition plan of 1947.”171 McMahon, again revealing the decisive
American Catholic leadership on the issue, replied that “the Vatican is not a member of
the UN, but the United States bishops and our own CNEWA have been demanding
implementation of the 1947 plan, and have never been told by our Holy Father to do
otherwise.”172 Clearly sensing the upper hand in the debate, he yielded to none of the
suggestions, already floated by earlier by Sharett, put forward by his Israeli hosts. “I
gather that the Jews are anxious to get to the Vatican before the September troubles, and
to present some compromise...all of which will naturally be in their favour,” he reported
back to the NCWC. “My own idea is that we should not be taken in, for it is certainly a
policy of „divide et impera.‟ However it is good to know what they are up to. I already
indicated that they have promised nothing, and that the most critical moment in the whole
period comes in the September Assembly.”
The Ostensible Triumph of the „Catholic International‟: The Revival of Corpus
Separatum
The PCC‟s proposals for the city, which were contained in the twenty-five article
„Jerusalem Statute‟, were completed by the committee on 29 August, and were forwarded
to the UN to be debated in the General Assembly‟s Fourth Session, set to open on 20
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September. Its recommendations amounted to a compromise between proponents and
opponents of a corpus separatum for the city, shaped by American desires to offend
neither camp too severely. Though French PCC delegates were claiming that Vatican and
French Catholic pressure was making it difficult to agree to anything less than full
internationalization, they were eventually persuaded to adopt a middle-of-the-road
approach that still appeared to fulfill the spirit and letter of the 1947 partition plan.173 The
PCC statute called for the establishment of a “permanent international zone” for Greater
Jerusalem (the territory that was to be a corpus separatum). Though it recognized the city
as one entity, it delegated civic jurisdiction to the “responsible authorities of the two
zones”, essentially recognizing Israeli and Jordanian sovereignty in the city. It forbade,
however, the establishment of national and governmental institutions there, a clear
challenge to Israel, which had already established branches of government services in the
city, including the Supreme Court. Immigration quotas were also imposed on the city, in
an effort to preserve the “demographic equilibrium of the area of Jerusalem.”174 On the
Holy Places, the statute proposed the appointment of a neutral (neither Israeli nor Arab)
commissioner, who would ensure free access to sites sacred to Christians, Jews and
Muslims, and who was authorized to station guards outside of these sites.175 It amounted
to a hybrid scheme intended both to establish a quasi-international character for the city,
reflective of the 1947 partition plan, and to recognize the reality on the ground, where the
Israeli and Jordanian presence had become well entrenched.
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Though the State Department, whose guidelines constituted the essence of the
PCC recommendations, believed that the statute represented “a last chance to achieve any
degree of internationalization”, the plan was not well received either by the Vatican or by
Israel. Advance copies of the PCC statute were forwarded to the Vatican and the
American hierarchy, under strict confidence, by Schaefer‟s NCWC UN Office on 10
September. Tardini immediately surmised that the PCC formula amounted to a significant
watering down of previous pledges. A day after receiving the report, he requested that
Schaefer‟s office re-distribute the IUCW pamphlet, „The Rights of Christians in the Holy
Land‟, to delegates at the General Assembly.176 In her reply to Tardini, Schaefer agreed
that the pamphlet made a powerful case for the Roman Catholic position, adding that the
“historical aspects of the pamphlet will be particularly valuable, since the long story of
the vicissitudes of the Holy Places is proof that their control by single nations has never
insured either their real freedom or protection.”177
Within the week, the Vatican again turned to the assistance of the NCWC UN
Office. On 16 September, Tardini forwarded Schaefer a memo outlining the Vatican‟s
questions and concerns on a large number of the twenty-five points in the PCC‟s
„Jerusalem Statute‟.178 Tardini again instructed Schaefer to distribute these Vatican
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observations to the UN “to make known the mind of the Holy See on this delicate and
complex problem.” He emphasized the need to target those whose views were amenable
to the Vatican‟s, “delegates likely to make their own contributions toward an equitable
solution of the question.”179 To this end, he suggested Roman Catholic delegates such as
Father Anand Souza of India, Charles Malik of Lebanon, and Dr. Emil Castro of El
Salvador.
Tardini‟s urgency was motivated by a growing apprehension, both in Vatican and
American Catholic circles, that various interests were conspiring against papal designs,
and that some Roman allies in the struggle for Palestine were wavering. In early
September, Tardini informed the NCWC of his concern about certain PCC members
whom he suspected of harbouring hardened anti-Catholic sentiments. He specifically
identified Dr. Pablo de Azcárate, principal secretary of the PCC, who he deemed “an
active Red in the Spanish Civil War,” with “an anti-Catholic record.”180 He requested that
the NCWC UN Office keep tabs on PCC members, and to forward relevant information
to Rome. Catholic apprehensions were heightened further on 16 September, when, during
an off-the-record UN luncheon for press correspondents, Secretary General Trygve Lie
expressed to Schaefer little hope that “the obstacles in the Jerusalem question would be
overcome or bypassed by the General Assembly”, hinting at the difficulty in imposing an
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international regime in a city already controlled by Israel and Jordan.181 Lie further
suggested that the Arab refugee problem would likely be “settled by dollars”, suggesting
monetary incentives for neighbouring Arab states taking in refugees, in lieu of
resettlement in Palestine.
In the same week, Schaefer also surmised that several Latin and South American
delegates were warming to the PCC‟s compromise statute for Jerusalem, in addition to
the American and British delegations, which were prepared to support PCC proposals “as
a basis of discussion.” She reported to Carroll that the Dutch delegation, which “included
several Catholic members”, and which had supported the corpus separatum concept since
its inception, was now considering “introducing a resolution which would in effect scrap
the whole idea of true and proper internationalization, leaving Jerusalem partitioned as it
is now, merely providing for some sort of mixed commission” to guarantee protection of
and access to the Holy Places.182 She considered the Dutch position particularly important
for its effect on the positions of Belgium and Luxembourg, both majority Catholic states.
As “the Benelux countries have a habit of consulting on these matters”, she stated to
Carroll, she would provide him with “urgent clarification” of the Dutch position.183
Roman Catholic efforts to shape UN developments on Palestine in the fall of 1949
were countered by a robust, vocal and international pro-Israeli lobby, which included the
largest and most powerful American Zionist groups, such as the AZEC, the AJC and the
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ZOA. It also included American Protestant groups such as the ACPC, which favoured
Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem, and which generally supported Israeli positions vis-a-vis
the Arab world and the UN. These groups largely mirrored the positions of the Israeli
government itself, which had formally announced to the UN General Assembly on 27
September that it rejected the PCC‟s „Jerusalem Statute‟. Like the Vatican and American
Catholics, pro-Israel groups also rejected the PCC‟s proposals for Palestine, but for the
reason that the proposals demanded unjustified concessions from Tel Aviv.
The diocesan press, on its part, continued to shine a bright light on the matter,
pointing up not only Israeli transgressions in the territory, but also the powerful Zionist
lobby at work in the United States. Throughout September and early October, the
Brooklyn Tablet reported on an American Zionist pressure campaign, co-ordinated “by
several thousand orthodox rabbis”, which resulted in a flood of telegrams, letters and
cards being dispatched to Truman and to American UN delegates from synagogues and
Jewish organizations.184 On 15 October, the paper further reported that a “crusade” was
about to be organized, calling on American Jewry to take a biblical oath, the 137th psalm
(„If I Forget Thee, O Jerusalem‟), whereby they would “bind themselves in relentless
opposition to the internationalization of Jerusalem.”185 “In 1947”, the paper observed
wryly, “we found no Zionists calling on American Jewry or on world Jewry for a
„Biblical Oath‟ to repudiate the internationalization of Jerusalem and its environs. At that
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time, when the viability of a Jewish state hung in the balance, there was no mystical
invocation of the phrase, „If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, Let my right hand forget her skill,
Let my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth...”186
At the same time, the AZEC issued an appeal to Truman demanding the right of
Israel to use Jerusalem as its rightful capital. Palestine, the AZEC‟s bulletin, voiced the
opinion of a majority of Jewish organizations in stating that “the Jews of Jerusalem and
their political life are not the concern of religious mankind; the Holy Places and their
security are”, a position which clearly refuted the Vatican‟s stand.187 On 3 November, the
AZEC and smaller Zionist groups staged a large „Save Jerusalem‟ rally at New York‟s
Manhattan Center, with leaders unanimously going on record to call for the rejection of
the PCC plan for Jerusalem, and to “accord the Jews of the Holy City the right to
participate in the government of Israel and share in its problems and responsibilities.”188
Speakers included Republican congressman Jacob K. Javits, Democrat congressman
Emanuel Celler, and prominent Zionist leaders such as Nahum Goldman and Louis
Lipsky. In turn, speakers emphasized the feasibility of protecting holy sites within a
Jewish Jerusalem, echoing Tel Aviv‟s rationale. Passionate evocations of Israel‟s historic
claims to the city, however, echoing the 137th psalm, were also invoked. As Lipsky,
chairman of the American Zionist Council asserted, “without Jerusalem, Israel would be
deprived of its spiritual significance.”189 Virtually the whole spectrum of American Jewry
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was mobilized in the „Save Jerusalem‟ campaign, as Zionist leaders, encouraged by a
powerful grassroots support among the faithful, organized a focused campaign aimed at
convincing the American UN delegation to “reject any plan which would sever the New
City of Jerusalem from Israel.”190
To this was added the support of mainline Protestant groups, such as the ACPC,
represented by influential theologians such as Reinhold Niebuhr and Carl Voss. In a letter
to Truman on 19 October, 101 members of the ACPC attacked the PCC proposals as
“neither desirable nor practicable.” The letter specifically recognized the New City of
Jerusalem (the section controlled by Israel) as “the natural capital of the State of Israel,”
adding that “the realization of the universal interest in Jerusalem and the fulfillment of
the national aspirations of the people of Israel are in no way incompatible.”191 On 3
November, the same day as the ACPC rally in New York, fifteen prominent Protestant
and labour leaders forwarded a letter to General Carlos P. Romulo, president of the UN
General Assembly, and Secretary General Trygve Lie, demanding an “international
curatorship” for the Holy Places, with an administering commission composed of
representatives from the Protestant, Greek Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Jewish and
Moslem faiths, and responsible to the UN Security Council. The letter advocated strongly
for a Jewish Jerusalem, echoing the demands of American Zionist groups, and was
clearly intended to downplay the Vatican‟s stake in the Holy City, by making a Catholic
representative only one of five representatives on the commission. Among the
signatories, which included no Roman Catholics, were Niebuhr, G. Bromley Oxnam,
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Methodist bishop of New York, Norman B. Nash, Episcopalian bishop of Massachusetts,
James Patton, president of the Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union, and Walter
P. Reuther, president of the United Automobile Workers of America.192
Various elements in the American Catholic Church were well aware of the threat
that the vociferous and focused „Save Jerusalem‟ lobby presented to the Vatican‟s
interests in the Holy Land. The Brooklyn Tablet mused openly on the potential of
American Zionism‟s campaign to “mislead officials of the United States and the United
Nations into thinking that there was only one point of view on the future of Jerusalem.”193
“It is possible that officials will get that impression,” it warned, “if the position of
Catholics is not expressed with comparable vigour and volume.” It reminded readers that
psalm 137, „If I Forget Thee, O Jerusalem‟, was “as much a challenge to the multiple
millions of Christians throughout the world as it is to Jewry and Islam” and it implored
Catholics not to “forget Jerusalem, even in this latest hour of struggle between Isaac and
Ishmael.”194
In early November, Catherine Schaefer expressed similar, if less grandiloquent,
sentiments to Howard Carroll, urging that the NCWC make the struggle for Jerusalem its
highest priority until the matter was settled at the UN. In alluding to the powerful Zionist
lobby active in the United States, she observed that “the present position of the United
States is in favour of the PCC report, but is subject to constructive influence. You will
remember that the United States position showed itself to be quite susceptible to strong
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representations of public opinion on previous occasions when the Palestine question was
discussed.”195 Observing that the American position “would be influential, if not decisive
to the outcome”, she advised Carroll that a high level representation from the American
hierarchy to the American government was imperative. “A personal visit to President
Truman by one of these officials,” she added, “would also help tremendously.” She also
urged representations from lay Catholic organizations, in line with the Pope Pius XII‟s
„call to action‟ in Redemptoris Nostri. She cited the recent examples of the French
Women‟s Catholic Action, which had submitted a petition to the Quai D‟Orsay
demanding internationalization, and the Catholic Women‟s League of Canada, which had
passed and published a resolution on the question. In closing, she emphasized to Carroll
the urgency of the matter. In early November, she added, the National Council of
Catholic Women of Cuba had wired the Cuban UN delegation making similar requests.196
“If anything is to be done by Catholics,” she stressed, “it is imperative it be done soon.
The Delegation of Israel is cultivating and consulting with members of various
delegations, including those from Catholic countries, and giving the impression that its
plan, which would not provide for the internationalization of Jerusalem, has the support
and tacit approval of the Vatican. A clear and unequivocal statement of Catholic aims and
desires in the matter is needed.”197
Indeed, the NCWC wasted little time in intensifying its own campaign for as
international Jerusalem. The day after receiving Schaefer‟s letter, Carroll wrote to Dean
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Acheson, reminding the Secretary of State of the American bishop‟s statement of 27
April, which contended that only the creation of a genuine corpus separatum “could
guarantee the security and preservation of the Holy City, which is venerated by the whole
civilized world, and which has been contested in blood by Jews and Arabs.”198 The letter,
which was also forwarded to Warren Austin and other key members of the American UN
delegation, was clearly intended to highlight American Catholicism‟s continued
insistence on full corpus separatum, and to counter impressions that the PCC‟s proposals
were acceptable to the Vatican, as some American Zionist groups had inferred. The next
week, Carroll cabled the letter directly to the White House.199 On 20 November,
Archbishop Timothy McNicholas of Cincinnati, Chairman of the Administrative Board
of the NCWC, made his own representation to Truman, asking the President for
American intervention at this crucial juncture.200 Stating that he spoke “for the vast
majority of American citizens”, he expressed hope that the United States “would remain
true to its glorious traditions of deep respect for religion and decency, and exercise its
powerful influence in this matter.” On the lay Catholic front, the NCCM and the NCCW
also sent telegrams to Truman, Acheson and Austin urging American support for true
internationalization.201
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The role that Schaefer‟s NCWC „UN Office‟ played in the crucial weeks leading
to the UN decision on the PCC‟s proposals deserve special mention. In early November,
Schafer and her assistant, Alba Zizzamia, were asked by Carroll, on instructions directly
from the Vatican, to “draft a memorandum or statement on the Catholic position on
Jerusalem”, which was to be used by the bishops at their upcoming annual meeting for
1949.202 Domenico Tardini, in fact, suggested that Schaefer‟s eventual memorandum,
which would be formulated from the principles gleaned from confidential Vatican
memoranda on Jerusalem and the papal encyclicals, be used as a guide for UN delegates
from Catholic states. Tardini was concerned that there was “a good deal of confusion
among UN delegates as to the precise position of the Church on the question”, a situation
exacerbated by Israeli delegates who claimed that Tel Aviv‟s proposals were amenable to
the Pope.203 To this end, Carroll forwarded Schaefer a confidential Vatican memorandum
on 5 November, which outlined Pope Pius XII‟s continued insistence on nothing short of
genuine internationalization.204 Schaefer and Zizzamia‟s familiarity with both papal
positions and the PCC proposals made them ideal, in Carroll‟s view, to draft “an accurate
statement of our position in the present stage of negotiations.” Just five days later,
Schaefer returned a pithy yet comprehensive statement, which she admitted both
Zizzamia and herself had “torn their hair out over, separately and collectively.”205 Schafer
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also included, for the “strictly confidential information of the bishops”, a copy of the
Israeli draft proposal for Jerusalem, allowing the NCWC to anticipate Tel Aviv‟s position
before formulating their own statement. The bishop‟s annual statement for 1949, issued
on 21 November, bore the indelible mark of both the Vatican‟s memoranda and of
Schafer and Zizzamia‟s draft.206 The statement, carried widely in the diocesan press, was
also forwarded to Truman, Austin and members of the American UN delegation.
Schaefer‟s office was similarly crucial in surmising where support for the
„Catholic position‟ did and did not exist among UN delegates, and for the dissemination
of a range of memoranda and position papers from the NCWC and Vatican sources to
these delegates. As discussed previously, this included a monitoring of South American
and European voting intentions on the PCC proposals. By mid-November, with a vote
just weeks away, Schaefer deigned support from the Brazilian, Peruvian, Cuban,
Lebanese and Russian delegations, along with the support of a clutch of Arab states (who
supported a corpus separatum in part to curb Jordanian ambitions).207 On 15 November,
however, she reported that a number of delegations, “even those sympathetic to the
Catholic point of view”, were warming to the compromise solution proposed by the PCC.
“Some have said they are starting on the basis of the PCC plan without much enthusiasm
for it”, she reported to Carroll, “in the hope that by insisting on as much as possible, some
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form of satisfactory compromise can be restored.”208 Schafer was referring to former
stalwarts Mexico, Venezuela and Chile, whose positions had modified gradually since the
late summer. Their positions were likely shaped by the growing scepticism on the
feasibility of a corpus separatum, and their desire to remain on-side with the United
States, Britain and Russia on such a key vote. Axel Serup, Legal Advisor for the PCC,
confirmed Schaefer‟s growing apprehension during an off-the-record luncheon on 15
November, when he announced that UN priorities were focused squarely on the
protection of the Holy Sites themselves, and peace between Arab and Jewish factions.
The UN “had no interest”, he intoned, “in the exercise of sovereignty of civil
administration.”209
In the midst of sagging support, and with just weeks left before a UN decision on
Jerusalem, the efforts of the Vatican and the American Church reached a new pitch. On
14 November, the Vatican issued an apostolic exhortation by Pope Pius XII calling upon
Catholics worldwide to pray for a just settlement for Jerusalem, “a status in accordance
with the norms of true justice that will remove the dangers of war and will preserve the
sacred character of those places which are venerated and loved by the followers of Jesus
Christ.”210 The following day, Cicognani urged the American bishops “to call upon your
pastors, priests, religious and laity to organize and to participate in public and solemn

208

Ibid.

209

Ibid.

210

‘Text of Apostolic Exhortation by Pius XII Ordering Worldwide Prayers for the Holy Places’, 14
November 1949, NCWC/OGS/ACUA, Box 44, File 24. An apostolic exhortation is a communication from the
Pope to his global faithful encouraging corporate action on a certain issue or theme. It does not define
Church doctrine, and carries less authority than an encyclical. It generally carries more urgency, however,
than an ecclesiastical letter, and is usually issued when the Church is facing a particular and/or timesensitive crisis, such as the battle for the internationalization of Jerusalem.
286

prayers for this intention.” “I am sure that your Excellency”, he continued, “will find for
your diocese the means best calculated to acquaint your priests and people with the
purpose and meaning of this crusade, and to carry out the ardent desire of the Holy
Father”, a clear attempt to rouse American Catholics on the eve of the UN vote.211 From
mid-November until the UN vote, various archdiocesan and diocesan associations,
including those in Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit and Buffalo, engaged in letter-writing
campaigns urging federal representatives adopt a solution amenable to the Vatican and to
global Catholicism.212
Further evidence of the leadership of American Catholics on the question of
Palestine was highlighted by a request made in October by Vittorio Veronese, president
of Italian Catholic Action to Carroll, when he requested that the NCWC present his
organization‟s petition, demanding the full internationalization of Jerusalem and its
environs, to the UN.213 “It is my personal conviction,” Veronese stated, “that at this time
American Catholics (being closest to the high international assembly and, as free citizens
of a great country, able to make themselves heard) can do so much so that the rights of
Christendom may be neither ignored nor go unrecognized. I take leave, therefore , in the
name of Italian Catholic Action, to ask you, as General Secretary of the NCWC, to be the
authoritative interpreter of our ardent desire to see the problem of the Land of Jesus
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solved according to justice.”214 In alluding to the fact that Italy was not a UN member
state, and again to the singular position of American Catholics in the „Catholic
international‟, he concluded that “Since Italy is not allowed to express, together with
other free nations, its opinion on the Palestinian problem, may the American Catholics be
our spokesmen in this cause, which is common to us all.” On 14 November, Schaefer
presented the petition to the UN General Assembly. On 5 December, just days before the
UN vote on Jerusalem, Carroll forwarded copies of the letter to Truman, Acheson and
Austin, and forwarded dozens more copies to Schaefer for distribution to UN
delegates.215 The statement was also given wide exposure in the diocesan press. In his
letter to Truman, Carroll informed the president that he spoke “for the Catholics of Italy,
as well as of the rest of the world.” To Veronese, Carroll expressed that the “joint efforts
of the Catholics throughout the world may result in a decision which will satisfy our
collective aspirations.”216
The initial six-day debate on the PCC report began on 24 November. Three views
quickly emerged on the future of Jerusalem: the first, evident in an Australian draft
resolution which favoured a full corpus separatum, as originally proposed by the
November 1947 General Assembly resolution; the second, supported by the United
States, which advocated for the PCC‟s „limited internationalization‟; and a third view,
proposed by Israel, which pledged the protection of the Holy Places themselves, in line
with similar proposals that Herzog had earlier presented to the Vatican directly. Yossi
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Feintuch has noted a growing American ambivalence at this stage of the negotiations, a
hesitation he traced to two factors. The first was the charting of a course designed to
offend neither supporters nor detractors of corpus separatum, namely Jews and most
Protestants groups on one side, and American Catholics (who had mounted an intensive
pressure campaign of their own since October) on the other. The second factor in
Washington‟s vacillation was American underestimation of the Vatican‟s ability to
coordinate Catholic states into nearly unanimous support for internationalization.217 The
first signs of wavering came on 29 November, when the American delegation chose not
to participate in a seventeen nation sub-committee formed to study the various proposals.
This committee, comprised of a large number of Arab states, and also including the
Soviet Union, adopted the Australian draft resolution on 2 December, thus inviting the
General Assembly to restate its intention to see a permanent international regime
established in Jerusalem as a corpus separatum.218 On 9 December, the committee‟s
resolution for a full corpus separatum was placed back on the agenda of the General
Assembly.
Schaefer, who had monitored voting intentions closely for both the American
Church and the Vatican, expressed concern over the expected votes of several Latin
American states on the final ballot. On 7 December, Tardini wired a number of these
delegations, urging them to support a resolution that was in line with the papal
encyclicals. Spellman, from New York, also called papal nuncios in Latin American
capitals to make vigorous representations to their governments to stand in line with the
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Vatican on the Jerusalem vote.219 The cardinal‟s intervention appeared to account for a
shift in the voting intentions of at least four members (Mexico, Venezuela, Haiti and
Chile), states that had either voted against the Australian resolution, or had abstained
during a 7 December preliminary ballot. Spellman similarly wired the head of the
Philippine delegation, Carlos Romulo, upon learning that he was about to cast a „no‟ vote
on 9 December. Spellman was, in the end, able to secure the support of Romulo in the
final vote.
On 9 December, after ten hours of debate marked by tensions and disagreements,
the committee voted 35 to 13 to internationalize the Jerusalem area as outlined in the
1947 partition plan, with support coming from what the NCWC described as “an unusual
alignment of Latin American, Arab and Soviet bloc states.”220 Notable supporters
included the Philippines (which Spellman had aggressively courted), the Soviet Union,
Brazil, Belgium and Luxembourg (which had wavered to the final hours), and a clutch of
Latin American and Arab states.221 Though the United States, Britain and Canada
opposed the resolution, the outcome was a clear victory for the Vatican and the American
Church, which had coordinated and cultivated the „Catholic vote‟ at the UN until the final
hours.222 An amendment introduced by El Salvador (which had assured Schaefer of
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support), defined the internationalized area as Jerusalem and its environs, including
Bethlehem and other towns, while another amendment, sponsored by the Soviets and
Lebanon, urged” immediate implementation.”223 Though the outcome was everything the
Vatican could have realistically hoped for, a Colombian delegate to the PCC, who had
cited the solidarity of Catholic states as crucial to the outcome, presciently observed that
“now [was] not the time to stop praying”, an allusion to the difficulties of implementing
the plan.224
Just days after the vote, Schaefer composed a short memo outlining the factors
that had contributed to the success of the Vatican and the international Church in securing
a corpus separatum for Jerusalem.225 The prime factor, she noted, was the solidarity of
the „Catholic vote‟ in the final tally. Though the chatter at Lake Success and reportage in
the American mainstream press focused on “Vatican pressure and Roman Catholic
opinion on Latin American governments”, she observed, less noted was the support of
„Catholic‟ European states in the final vote. France, Belgium and Luxembourg, “none of
which were openly committed to full internationalization at the outset”, voted in the
affirmative, with the Netherlands, another state with a large Catholic population,
abstaining. European „no‟ votes were registered by predominantly Protestant states,
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including Britain, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Schaefer also credited the solidarity of
Arab states, citing Charles Malik‟s efforts, whom she credited with “spearheading” the
Arab vote, and who was “insistent and articulate in stressing the religious interests and in
presenting the views of religious leaders, twice referring to the papal encyclicals and
reading into the record the statement of the Catholic hierarchy of the United States.” His
“exposition of the thesis of Israel‟s expansionist aims to encompass all of Jerusalem, and
of the United States‟ consistent support of Israel,” she observed, “had its effect.”226 Israeli
intransigence had indeed, she opined, contributed to the results of the final vote, in raising
fears that the General Assembly could be coerced into bending to the will of one member,
and into accepting “the dangerous precedent of recognizing de facto situations achieved
by force of arms, or be led by fait accompli tactics.”227 Schaefer‟s reflection on the vote
shed an interesting light on Spellman‟s role, when she noted that Manila‟s UN
representative voted in the affirmative, even though Elpidio Quirino, president of the
Philippines, was “known to be opposed to the full internationalization resolution.”
Finally, Schaefer credited Soviet bloc votes, which came from the Soviet Union, Poland,
Czecholsovakia and Byelorussia, as also having carried the day.
Schaefer also traced the reactions of various delegations to the vote. On 16
December, at a UN post-General Assembly meeting for observers and NGO‟s, she noted
that most attendees shared “a marked reluctance to comment on the internationalization
vote,” despite attempts by American officials to draw out reactions.228 She observed,
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however, that there was “less sympathy for the Israeli stand than the [secular] American
and Jewish press would imply.” Indeed, reactions from Tel Aviv and in Israeli-friendly
press organs were severely critical of the UN verdict. The New York Post, which had
been an opponent of internationalization, opined that “In moral terms, the UN decision is
shabby beyond belief...its religious mask shows through, its legal garments are skimpy,
its moral grounds non-existent, it unsettles rather than settles the peace, and it lacks any
method of enforcement.”229 Moshe Sharett called 9 December a “dark day” for the UN,
and stormed that “Israel [was] aligned against the whole world,” and charged that “three
powerful forces have joined hands against us- the Arab world, the Communist world and
the Catholic world.”230 “The „Catholic attitude‟ manifested,” in Sharett‟s view, “a
fanatical religious dogma, the desire to seek revenge for a nation‟s sin and to settle an
account of 1900 years standing.”231 Protestant groups such as the ACPC, which had also
warned against a corpus separatum, joined the chorus of denunciation, criticizing the
plan as “dangerous and unnecessary.”232 The Nation, a Protestant journal, expressed its
own hypothesis on Israel‟s defeat. On 17 December, Lillie Schultz, secretary of the
American Christian Committee for Palestine, and a UN observer, penned an article
tracing the voting patterns on 9 December to the Vatican‟s pervasive influence. “The
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immediate problem the UN faces,” she concluded, “is to destroy the Vatican‟s power of
coercion.”233
The full internationalization of Jerusalem and its environs, delivered in no small
part by the activism of the Vatican and particularly the American Catholic Church, was
evidence of the vitality of Roman Catholic trans-nationalism on the Palestine question.
The failure to enlist American support, however, spoke volumes on the inherent limits of
papal and wider Roman Catholic power. The American position, of course, was based on
a range of domestic and international considerations, but it also revealed a moderating
relationship between Truman and the Vatican of Pope Pius XII. And though the vote was
indeed a symbolic victory for the Roman Catholic „international‟, it would be chimerical,
as subsequent events would vividly illustrate.
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Chapter 5
Final Struggles: Defeat and Retreat of the „Catholic Orbit‟, 1950-1958
In the immediate aftermath of the December 1949 vote, congratulations abounded
in the Catholic „orbit‟. The NCWC‟s Howard Carroll praised the “masterful and effective
championing of Christian interests” of Dr Charles Malik, head of the Lebanese legation
to the UN, who had read sections of the American bishops statement for 1949 into his
speech to the Ad Hoc Political Committee on 26 November.1 Malik was assured that his
efforts had “elicited widespread admiration and was a source of deep gratification.” On 3
January 1950, the Vatican, through Cicognani, expressed its thanks for the activism of the
American Catholic Church. “I am directed to express the sentiments of profound
gratitude of the Secretariat of State”, he wrote, “for the cooperation which the entire
Episcopate of the United States gave in courageously making known and repeating the
words of the Supreme Pontiff for the defence of the rights of the Church in the land of
Our Blessed Saviour.”2 In closing, the Vatican reserved special praise for the NCWC and
the advocacy of Schaefer‟s „UN Office‟. “In a special manner I have been asked to
express appreciation for the cooperation of the staff of the National Catholic Welfare
Conference in supplying timely information to the Secretariat of State regarding this
question, and for the success they attained in their contacts with persons useful in the task
of making known the point of view of the Holy See.”3
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The success of international Roman Catholic efforts in gaining a favourable
resolution on Jerusalem, however, was quickly overshadowed by realities on the ground.
Israel and Trans-Jordan, in short order, unequivocally rejected a plan that would
eliminate their sovereignty in the Holy City. Israel quickly moved to establish a more
permanent national presence in the city, clearly intended to demonstrate its rejection of
the UN‟s Jerusalem statute. In December of 1949, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion had
already driven home the point that Israel would refuse to comply with the UN‟s
resolution for an internationalized Jerusalem when he declared that a “Jewish Jerusalem
[was] an organic and inseparable part of the State of Israel,” and if forced to, Jews would
“sacrifice themselves for [it] no less than Englishmen for London, Russians for Moscow
or Americans for Washington.”4 An Israeli government memorandum later explained its
position in more sober tones. “The suggestion that Israel is nothing to Jerusalem and
Jerusalem is nothing to Israel may appear fantastic, yet this bewildering thesis is
explicitly held up by the [corpus separatum]. One cannot have it both ways. It is an
axiom that Israel cannot be regarded as a factor in the implementation of a regime based
on the disappearance of its own authority.”5 As such, Tel Aviv wasted little time in
preparing to make Ben-Gurion‟s sentiments a concrete reality. On 16 December, just
days after the vote, he set 1 January 1950 as the deadline to transfer Israel‟s government
ministries to Jerusalem, effectively establishing the city as the national capital, despite its
uncertain legal status. Trans-Jordan‟s King „Abdullah similarly flouted calls to
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internationalize the city, and he ordered permanent Friday prayers to be held in the city,
which he attended personally.
Israeli and Jordanian intractability came at the head of a long list of factors that
soon militated against Vatican and American Catholic designs for Jerusalem. These
included the effective end of the Myron Taylor mission in January 1950, the ambiguity of
Washington‟s Jerusalem policy at the UN, American Protestant support for a Jewish
Jerusalem, and the withdrawal of Soviet bloc support for the corpus separatum (which
had been key to securing the December 1949 agreement). Added to this were signs of a
breakdown in international Catholic solidarity on the Jerusalem question, where some
states regarded the pursuit of territorial internationalization as just, but ultimately
unfeasible.
Throughout 1950, the Vatican could continue to count on the support of American
Catholics on the issue. The Jerusalem question was re-examined by the Trusteeship
Council in January, when a committee was convened at Geneva to hammer out a
functioning resolution, given Israeli and Jordanian reticence. On 5 January, the NCWC‟s
General Secretary, Howard Carroll, pressed the American delegation at Geneva on its
Jerusalem policy, anxious to secure assurances that the United States would seek to
uphold the majority decision of December 1949.6 The delegation‟s response confirmed
Carroll‟s concerns that American support for the status quo at Geneva (ie: corpus
separatum) would not be forthcoming. The delegation would confirm only that the
United States would seek a “workable resolution” which would guarantee the protection
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of the Holy Places, would be acceptable to Israel and Jordan, and satisfy the international
community‟s desire for peace and stability in the region.7
Miss Zizzamia Goes to Geneva
As it became evident that American support for the December 1949 resolution
could not be counted upon, the importance of making known the „Catholic‟ viewpoint at
Geneva, and of fomenting support among the various delegations there, became
increasingly essential. On this score, the NCWC‟s „UN Office‟ dispatched Alba
Zizzamia, Catherine Schaefer‟s assistant, to the Trusteeship Council‟s Geneva session in
January 1950. Her mandate was threefold: to keep the American bishops and the Vatican
apprised of developments on the Jerusalem question, to supply the diocesan press with
reports, and, where possible, to disseminate the Roman Catholic position among the
various delegations. Before arriving in Geneva, Zizzamia was received in a private
audience by Pope Pius XII, where she informed him of her mandate in Geneva. The
Pope, on his part, thanked the NCWC for its efforts on Jerusalem, an issue which
remained “a most serious question” both to him personally and to the international
Church, a sentiment the Pope repeated to his guest throughout the short audience.8
At Geneva, Zizzamia soon discovered that corpus separatum scheme for
Jerusalem, which had been passed by a UN majority resolution just a month previous,
was under attack from a number of quarters. Most notably, she sensed the willingness of
American delegates to support a revised and diminished statute, consistent with the

7

Porter McKeever to Howard Carroll, 6 January 1950, NCWC/OGA/ACUA, Box 25, File 44.

8

Alba Zizzamia to Catherine Schaefer, 15 January 1950, NCWC/OGS/ACUA, Box 159, File 12.
298

response that Carroll had received earlier in the month. Though the United States had not
supported the December 1949 agreement, the NCWC had hoped that American delegates,
in following their own precedent, would support the majority decision. Francis Sayre,
head of the United States delegation, however, expressed the “unrealizable” nature of the
corpus separatum, a solution that could not be imposed without force. “It will not mean
peace,” said Sayre, “and it is not Christian,” a clear challenge to the Roman Catholic
Church, which remained the most powerful advocate of full internationalization in the
Christian world.9 Sayre also informed Zizzamia that the United States could not support
any action on Jerusalem that might require the deployment of American troops to the city,
a concern that Truman had previously communicated to Spellman.10 By late January,
Zizzamia reported to Carroll that American support on maintaining the status quo, or
even on remaining benign on initiatives to water-down the corpus separatum, was
unlikely. From this point forward, it was evident that Washington sought a compromise
solution for Jerusalem, amenable to Israel, despite the milquetoast assurances that
Truman and officials in the American government had offered Catholic leaders the
previous year.
In another report, Zizzamia noted the “unwholesome” atmosphere at Geneva,
where “the preponderance of sentiment is not favourable to the Catholic viewpoint, which
is regarded as unrealistic if not unjust.”11 She noted several Latin and South American
delegates who appeared to favour a revised statute on Jerusalem. The Philippines, which
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Spellman had notably swayed in the final hours of the December vote, also appeared to
be shading toward support for a compromise solution. She further noted that Pierre
Ryckmans, head of the Belgian delegation, “made no attempt to hide his irritation” at
Catholic attempts to maintain the corpus separatum against all evidence that it could
succeed. “Why stick to the Assembly resolution of 9 December,” he intoned to Zizzamia,
“when there is no way at all to implement it?”12 In confidence, a French delegate echoed
Ryckmans, informing Zizzamia that “if it were not for religious fanaticisms in Jerusalem,
the question could be settled. The Catholic Church and Catholic organizations are very
stupid, because if a [compromise solution] is not accepted, there will be nothing.”13 Only
among Arab delegations did she find unanimous support in maintaining the corpus
separatum. Iraq‟s Dr. Faizal Jamali assured her that Arab states would not accept a
watered-down solution. “If the Arabs and the Catholics stick together,” he observed, “we
can block any other plan,” though he admitted that such a statute “would probably remain
a dead letter.”14
The revised statute that emerged from the Trusteeship Council‟s Geneva session
did reflect the prevailing spirit among delegates there, namely a compromise statute
reflective of the realities „on the ground‟. It was a plan inimical to that sought by the
Vatican and American Catholics, and a revision of a UN majority decision reached just
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weeks previous. The „Garreau Plan‟, tabled by French representative Roger Garreau,
proposed that as the area defined by the General Assembly resolution was too extensive
to be administered by the UN, extraterritoriality be applied only in the area regarded as
“absolutely essential” to the “protection of the Holy Places and freedom of movement for
pilgrims.”15 In essence, the Garreau Plan called for the division of the territory of
Jerusalem into three parts: an Israeli zone under the authority and administration of Israel,
a Jordanian zone under the authority and administration of Jordan, and an „International
City‟, under the sole authority and responsibility of a UN appointed „Governor of the
Holy Places‟.16
The Garreau Plan appeared to garner the support of a majority of the delegations
which opposed the December 1949 resolution, including the United States, and who
generally favoured a revised scheme acceptable to both Israel and Jordan. The plan also
received the endorsement of the powerful American Christian Palestine Committee
(ACPC), the prominent Christian Zionist organization, which had dispatched a „fact
finding‟ mission to Jerusalem in December and January. At a 19 January press
conference in New York, the ACPC discussed its “findings on the feasibility of the
internationalization plan for Jerusalem,” concluding that the corpus separatum idea was
“dangerous and unnecessary.”17 The statement closely mirrored Sayre‟s position at
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Geneva in recommending a UN commissioner for the Holy Places, but not territorial
internationalization, which might necessitate the deployment of American troops. That
the report was forwarded specifically to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Trusteeship
Council president Roger Garreau, and Sayre suggests that it was clearly intended to
influence American policy at Geneva.
The ACPC report posed a direct challenge to the Roman Catholic position, which
continued to advocate for full territorial internationalization. A concerned Zizzamia noted
to Carroll that not only were ACPC observers active in Geneva, but that they also
“seemed to be on very good terms with members of the U.S. delegation.”18 Its observers,
her report continued, were creating the impression among delegates that Roman Catholic
groups, both in Palestine and abroad, accepted the Garreau Plan as a realistic
compromise. In private conversation, Garreau himself noted that Cardinal Spellman “had
been shown the plan,” suggesting that the de facto head of the American Catholic Church
was not opposed to it. Garreau further suggested that he had received no protest from the
Vatican, despite Zizzamia‟s insistence that papal policy remained unchanged.19 The
inclusion of the ACPC report as an enclosure to the Garreau Plan, submitted on 13
January, and the reading of the report to a session of the Trusteeship Council by Samuel
Guy Inman, a member of the ACPC‟s „fact finding‟ mission, was evidence of the
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influence the organization wielded at Geneva.20 Inman‟s authority was buttressed by his
background as an academic and consultant to the State Department, where he was
credited with shaping Washington‟s “Good Neighbor” policy with Latin and South
American states. During his address before the Council on 11 February, Inman intimated
that his organization‟s view was representative of global Christian interests generally, and
he mentioned “two or three times that the ACPC includes in its membership Catholic
laymen.”21 “Mr. Inman seems to be creating the impression,” Zizzamia reported to
Carroll, “that he is speaking for Catholic opinion.” Though Iraq‟s delegate, Faizal Jamali,
questioned the political slant of the ACPC, charging that it “wore Zionist glasses”, the
organization was nonetheless successful in shaping the view that Christians, including
Roman Catholics, were accepting of revisions to the 1949 corpus separatum agreement.22
The task of correcting that impression at Geneva fell largely to Zizzamia, given
that the Vatican did not have its own representative at the Trusteeship Council‟s session.
On 11 February, a draft resolution by the delegate of the Dominican Republic, Max
Henriquez Urena, to invite a Vatican representative to present his views, was
withdrawn.23 The Council decided, without a vote, that communications with the Holy
See could be made through regular diplomatic channels, since “some members had
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accredited diplomats posted there.”24 Waning enthusiasm for full internationalization,
however, even among „Catholic‟ delegates, meant that Zizzamia would play a heightened
role in registering papal dissatisfaction with the Garreau Plan.
The Vatican did reject the plan, a position based on drafts of it forwarded to Rome
by Zizzamia. On 30 January, on the very eve of Garreau‟s tabling of the plan, the Vatican
issued a memorandum outlining its unequivocal position on Jerusalem “as clearly set
forth in the papal encyclicals.”25 It made clear that the Holy See “had expressed its
position, and did not accept or approve any compromises,” a statement clearly intended to
scuttle the idea that Rome was softening its stand. It demanded adherence to the status
quo, fearing that a plan such as Garreau‟s would create more turmoil than it would
resolve.26 This was followed by a pro memoria of 6 February, which more strenuously
outlined Vatican objections to the plan. It specifically criticized Garreau‟s notion of
creating „zones‟ in Jerusalem, charging that it “was not clear how a boundary can be
viable which crosses the narrow streets and alleys of the Old City, nor how these little
international islands can escape damage in case of an armed conflict.”27 It concluded that
the Holy See, in rejecting the plan, “could not share in the responsibility for its
acceptance on the part of the Trusteeship Council.” In early February, as the Council
prepared to debate the Garreau Plan, Zizzamia actively disseminated the Vatican‟s stand
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among various delegations, making clear that any suggestion of a moderated Roman
Catholic stance was categorically false.
Archival evidence suggests that, in the crucial days of debate on the Garreau Plan
before the Trusteeship Council, Roman Catholic reticence to accept a compromise
continued to shape the responses of a number of delegations, including that of the United
States. Yossi Feintuch has observed that the American delegation‟s position on the
Garreau Plan became increasingly ambiguous and incoherent in late January and early
February, reflective of a desire to alienate neither opponents nor proponents of a revised
Jerusalem statute.28 In confidence, delegates revealed to Zizzamia that domestic politics
continued to play a role in American policy. American Catholic and Jewish pressure,
specifically, appeared to play a role in Washington‟s indeterminate stance. This was
expressed by France‟s Pierre de Leusse, who intoned that despite “the formidable
propaganda campaign sponsored by Israel, the money used on the press (and some say
among the delegates), and the pressure put on the American government, attention will
have to be paid to Catholic strength in the U.S. Mr. Truman will have to take into account
the Catholic votes, which are far more numerous than the Jewish votes, although the Jews
have more money.”29 As such, he predicted that Sayre‟s eventual stance would be one of
“passing the buck” to avoid political entanglement in the United States.30 Australia‟s John
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Hood offered similar sentiments, citing “opposing parties” as being central to the UN‟s
lack of resolve on the Jerusalem question. “This was notably true for the United States,”
he offered, “which is, after all, „the kingpin‟ in this.”31
De Leusse‟s prediction that the American delegation would “pass the buck” on
the Garreau Plan became a reality on 10 February, when the Trusteeship Council shelved
the proposal in favour of a Chinese draft resolution calling for the immediate
consideration of the 1948 Jerusalem Statute, which had called for the complete territorial
internationalization of the city. A Belgian amendment, introduced by Pierre Ryckmans,
provided for the implementation of the statute at a date to be determined later, and made
its enactment subject to the approval of Israel and Trans-Jordan. Secretary of State
Acheson instructed Sayre to vote for the Statute, provided the Belgian amendments were
carried, but to follow up his vote with a statement affirming to the Council that it would
have to pass muster with Israel and Jordan before implementation. It was a stance
perfectly crafted to offend neither camp of the corpus separatum debate, and bore clear
signs of being influenced, at least in part, by American domestic politics. That Sayre was
instructed to abstain on the final vote, for fear of creating an impression that the United
States had reversed its position against internationalization, epitomized Washington‟s
sensitivity to the Jerusalem question.
Though the defeat of the Garreau Plan could most logically be traced to the
resolute stand of Arab delegations at Geneva, most notably those of Iraq and Syria, the
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influence wielded by the Vatican through Catholic delegates and observers was noted in a
number of quarters. The ACPC‟s Samuel Guy Inman, who had presented the Trusteeship
Council his organization‟s „report‟ on the feasibility of internationalization, held a late
February press conference at Lake Success where he bemoaned the revival of the corpus
separatum, charging that it would “make Jerusalem a centre of international intrigue and
disorder.”32 Though Inman claimed that American public opinion was solidly behind his
conclusions, he suggested larger forces were at play in Geneva. “It is no secret,” he
exclaimed, “that the Vatican wants to create a sub-capital at Jerusalem.”33 Similar
sentiments were expressed to Zizzamia earlier in the month, when an Israeli
correspondent, whose wife was attached to the Israeli embassy in Washington, provided
to her his own interpretation of Vatican policy. “It is no secret the Vatican wants a
Vatican city in Jerusalem. Since it did not get control as it wished when the commission
under the old mandate failed to be set up, it hopes to get Catholic control there now
through the Catholic countries at the UN.”34 He further stated, with some intensity, that
“the Jerusalem question is a bone in our throat.” The next week, a correspondent for the
London Observer and the Manchester Guardian, “a Jew,” as Zizzamia indentified him,
assured her that Belgium‟s Ryckmans “was [representing] the Vatican‟s point of view” at
Geneva.35
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The Trusteeship Council‟s adoption of the Jerusalem Statute on 4 April, therefore,
barely altered from the December 1949 resolution, appeared to be another example of
Roman Catholic interests snatching victory from the jaws of defeat. It was again,
however, a largely illusory triumph, as its practical implementation proved much more
difficult than its adoption. The Trans-Jordanian election of 11 April created further
barriers, as its results confirmed the unity of the Eastern and Western banks of the Jordan
and their merging into one unified state, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (hereafter
Jordan). The following day, Jordan notified the UN that it had formally annexed central
Palestine and eastern Jerusalem (which it had already occupied).36 Just five days after the
incorporation of eastern Jerusalem into Jordan, the Soviet envoy to the UN informed
Secretary General Trygve Lie that, in light of developments in Jerusalem, Moscow
considered the Jerusalem Statute unfeasible, and would not continue to support it. It was
a development that marked the end of the curious Catholic-Arab-Soviet consensus on the
corpus separatum, placing greater pressure on „Catholic‟ delegations to deliver a
Jerusalem solution amenable to the Vatican.
From April onward, however, given the rapid evolution of circumstances in the
Holy City, Zizzamia noted a definitive waning of support for carrying out the Jerusalem
Statute. Though the United States had remained theoretically neutral on the 4 April vote,
abstaining along with the United Kingdom, evidence suggests that the American
delegation‟s impatience with the old formula was growing. “It is increasingly evident that
the U.S. delegation,” noted Zizzamia, “has no interest whatsoever with the total
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internationalization plan.”37 Sayre, head of the mission, noted privately that he “would be
willing to cooperate if anyone will show us how internationalization can be put into
effect, but we feel it is turning back history.”
Flagging enthusiasm for internationalization extended beyond the American
delegation, as Zizzamia reported from Geneva the growing sense of its ultimate futility.
“Many delegates, in private conversation, admit that internationalization was the best,
long-run solution,” she noted to Carroll in May, “but they professed utter helplessness as
to the possibility of realizing it.”38 She also noted that Australia‟s John Hood, who had
introduced his country‟s favourable resolution regarding internationalization at the
December 1949 General Assembly session, and who “upheld it with a skilled
diplomacy”, was to become Australian ambassador to Indonesia. “His successor on the
Trusteeship Council could, without embarrassment,” she explained, “express a change in
the Australian position.”39 In addition, she revealed uncertainty on the part of a number of
South American delegations who could not be counted on if the question, as it appeared it
would, was returned to the General Assembly. In late April, in a moment of candour, she
bluntly assessed the situation for Carroll. “The fact that there is a diminishing interest in
the internationalization of Jerusalem, even among the nations that originally voted for it,
should be recognized. If the Statute elaborated by the Trusteeship Council is not
implemented, which does not at the moment seem at all likely, it should be decided
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whether it is advisable from the viewpoint of Catholic interests to keep the question open
and before the United Nations.”40
Jerusalem Calling: Zionist Parry and Roman Catholic Riposte
From the early spring of 1950 onward, the notion of corpus separatum was also
countered by a slick and well-orchestrated propaganda campaign by the Israeli Foreign
Ministry, an effort Uri Bialer considers unique in the history of the Ministry.41 A special
division, established in April 1950, was allocated considerable funds, recruited leading
experts, and was active on the international scene. Its objective was to present Jewish
Jerusalem to the world as a vital, modern city and an inseparable part of the State of
Israel. It was also intended to emphasize the historic stake of Judaism in the city, and to
emphasize the justice and practicality of Israel‟s proposals for solution.42 To this end, the
division commissioned numerous pamphlets and books for wide distribution to buttress
Tel Aviv‟s position. Special emissaries were also sent to the capitals of several Latin
American states to disseminate the Israeli position among nominally pro-Vatican UN
members, an initiative clearly intended to break up Catholic pro-internationalization
„bloc‟ which had functioned to keep the corpus separatum alive. Bialer notes, however,
that Israeli efforts were careful not to engage in open polemics against the Vatican “so as
not to provoke the other side to launch a vocal attack on us,” evidence that Tel Aviv
continued to regard the Vatican, and its international allies, as a viable threat.
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Israeli efforts to forge a compromise on Jerusalem were outlined in a
memorandum detailing new proposals for the city, submitted on 26 May to the
Trusteeship Council by Abba Eban, head of the Israeli mission to the UN.43 The 16-page
document outlined Tel Aviv‟s flexible new proposals for the city, which would have seen
the internationalization of the immediate zone surrounding the Old City‟s sacred sites,
and would allow for the establishment of a UN commissioner for the zone, who “would
be wholly separate” from Israeli and Jordanian control, and who would enjoy “a certain
degree of extraterritoriality so far as the Holy Places were concerned...[while] the
authority of the occupying governments would be more or less withdrawn.”44 It was an
arrangement giving the UN full territorial control of the Holy Sites. While not the corpus
separatum agreed upon in 1949, the proposals were evidence of Israeli attempts to
negotiate a conciliatory, yet favourable, resolution. In Garreau‟s view, the proposals
showed “an understanding and benevolent attitude towards the legitimate demands of all
parties concerned,” and represented “a considerable advance towards a settlement.”45
In the United States, public opinion appeared to be growing in favour of a
compromise solution along the lines of that proposed by Israel. The ACPC, on its part,
offered its endorsement of Eban‟s proposal on 28 May. Just days before, Truman and
Acheson received petitions, signed by almost 300 prominent Americans, which urged the
United States to back the recent Israeli proposals. Signatories included a cross-section of
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Protestant leaders, including bishops of the Episcopal Church (led by New York‟s
Episcopalian bishop, Charles K. Gilbert), as well as Methodist, Unitarian and United
Brethren leaders. Other signatories included college presidents, academics, Nobel Prize
laureates and other notable figures. On 2 June, Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt added her own
support to the petition, a symbolic endorsement given President Roosevelt‟s close
relationship with American Catholic leaders.46 Also in support were several leading
newspapers such as the New York Times and the Washington Post, which provided
supportive editorials on the Israeli proposals. The following week, Carroll assured
Cicognani that the NCWC was preparing to counter the statement, but his response
indicated a growing pessimism in American Catholic circles. “The NCWC is, of course,
preparing a critique of the statement for the press,” he informed the apostolic delegate,
“but it is too much to expect, even with our best efforts, that the attitude of the United
States government will change radically. From our point of view it seems that only the
steadfast and continuing support of Catholic nations which are members of the UN can
assure the acceptance of the position of the Holy See.”47
Carroll‟s dour appraisal, however, did little to modify the Vatican line on
Jerusalem. Nor did the growing consensus on a compromise to the corpus separatum,
bolstered by Eban‟s articulate proposal, alter the Vatican‟s insistence on the original
formula. To underscore this, Cicognani re-issued the pro memoria of 6 February to the
NCWC the day after Eban‟s proposal was circulated at Geneva. On 31 May, the
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Vatican‟s insistence on the original plan was outlined in the New York Times.48 Quoting
“well informed Vatican circles”, the article outlined papal opposition to the notion of
Israeli or Jordanian sovereignty in Jerusalem which, given the existing proposal “could be
broken in the event that hostilities were resumed,” an event the Vatican considered likely.
In essence, the Vatican considered the problem juridical, and not political, given that the
corpus separatum would create an international zone in a space that was not legitimately
Israeli or Jordanian to begin with. The December 1949 agreement, it concluded, “did not
affect the principle of the nationality of Jerusalem, since no one disputes that principle.
The question is one of administration and not of nationality.”49
On 12 June, the Trusteeship Council began its seventh session in an effort to
formulate a report to the General Assembly recommending a solution to the Jerusalem
question. Zizzamia noted that the session was held “in an atmosphere created by an
extremely skilful Israeli propaganda and pressure campaign.”50 In light of this, Zizzamia
suggested a two-pronged strategy in defence of the Vatican‟s interests. She advised
“concerted action in on the part of the Catholic press in UN member states before the
(December) General Assembly to counteract Israeli propaganda. One tactic might be a
critical attitude, based on reasoned judgement however, of the compromise plans.” She
also advised, despite flagging support for the corpus separatum, “political pressure in the
various countries, and especially in the United States.” Within days of the session
opening, it appeared that Zizzamia‟s suggested strategies would have some time to
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germinate. On 14 June, just two days after convening, the Trusteeship Council resolved
unanimously to inform the General Assembly of its inability to ensure the
implementation of the Jerusalem Statute “either by force” or by “moral authority.”51
Garreau, as the Council president, admitted that “the results of his mission had proved
disappointing and that the implementation of the statute would seem to be seriously
compromised under present conditions.”52 “In other words”, Zizzamia‟s report for the
diocesan press noted wryly, “the Trusteeship Council has accomplished virtually
nothing.”53
The failure of the Trusteeship Council to resolve the Jerusalem conundrum did,
however, allow time for the American Church to shape Catholic and wider opinion on the
question, as well as to mount a more coherent pressure campaign in advance of the
December meeting of the General Assembly. Optimism at the NCWC, however, was not
running particularly high in the summer of 1950. In June, at Cicognani‟s behest, Carroll
ordered a critique of the ACPC statement in support of a Jewish Jerusalem, though he
cautioned the apostolic delegate that “it is too much to expect, even with our best efforts,
that the attitude of the United States government will change radically.”54 Carroll place
greater hope in Roman Catholic delegates at the UN, advising Cicognani that “from our
point of view, it seems that only the steadfast and continuing support of Catholic nations
which are members of the UN can assure the acceptance of the position of the Holy
51

Feintuch, U.S. Policy on Jerusalem, 98-99.

52

‘Jerusalem Issue Returned to Assembly after Tepid Move to Internationalize’, NCWC/OGS/ACUA, Box
44, File 26.
53

Ibid.

54

Howard Carroll to Amleto Cicognani, 8 June 1950, NCWC/OGS/ACUA, Box 44, File 26.
314

See.”55 On this score, the Holy See requested regular appraisals of developments both at
the UN and in the United States, which the NCWC forwarded throughout the summer.56
On the issue of shaping public discourse, the NCWC continued to defend the
integrity of the corpus separatum, despite the deferral of debate on the question at the
UN. Throughout the summer, the diocesan press, fed by reports from Schaefer and
Zizzamia, highlighted the merits of full internationalization as well as the potential
pitfalls of the various compromise schemes that surfaced in the first half of 1950.57 In
June, Carroll assured that the views of the Armenian Patriarch of Jerusalem (bishop Tiran
Nersoyan), who had penned an eloquent and persuasive defence of the Vatican‟s position
on Jerusalem, were given ample coverage in the diocesan papers. In order to balance
what Catholics perceived as one-sided coverage in the mainstream secular press (and
which generally favoured a compromise solution), Carroll also advocated for Catholic
views to be aired in mainstream papers. On 4 June, the New York Herald Tribune carried
the statement of Jerusalem‟s bishop Nersoyan, which had been forwarded to the paper by
Carroll.58

55

Ibid.

56

See, for example, Catherine Schaefer to Howard Carroll, 14 July 1950, NCWC/OGS/ACUA, Box 159, File
13; Howard Carroll to Amleto Cicognani, 28 July 1950, NCWC/OGS/ACUA, Box 159, File 13; Catherine
Schaefer to Howard Carroll, 11 August 1950, NCWC/OGS/ACUA, Box 159, File 13.
57

See, for example, ‘Jerusalem in International Law’, America, 15 April 1950, 33; ‘Internationalization
Doomed’, America, 27 May 1950, 231; ‘Therefore, Internationalize Jerusalem’, America, 17 June 1950,
313.
58

Howard Carroll to John Butler, 12 June 1950, NCWC/OGS/ACUA, Box 44, File 26. Carroll’s efforts with
New York papers were intended to combat a perceived bias in the coverage in the mainstream press. An
NCWC press report observed that “metropolitan newspaper comment in New York in general tends to
regard internationalization as a dead issue and to favour the latest Israeli proposals. Lack of consent of the
parties concerned is the main argument used against internationalization. Yet in favouring the Israeli
315

In a bid to shape elite opinion, Catholic academic journals also highlighted the
imperative for an internationalized Jerusalem. The March 1950 issue of Thought, a
quarterly published by Fordham University, featured an article by Constantine
Rauckaskas, a professor of international law at the school, which carefully outlined the
historical evolution of the Jerusalem question.59 Rauckaskas argued that the purpose of
internationalization was not merely to protect the Holy Places from destruction and to
guarantee access to them, as compromise solutions had suggested, but to “preserve the
future peace in granting such places an administration which would be above the interest
of any church or religion and above the particular interest of any nation or state.”60
Rauckaskas opined that the preservation of the corpus separatum was essential to the
maintenance of regional peace which, he concluded, should be the UN‟s primary motive.
In July The Jurist, published the Catholic University of America‟s Faculty of Law,
carried an article by law professor Peter Berger which argued for the maintenance of the
corpus separatum.61 In a stark and juridical analysis, Berger delineated the case for an
internationalized Jerusalem, arguing its justice in legal, historical, moral and practical
terms. The piece was clearly intended to re-assert the case for corpus separatum amid the
muddying waters of the various compromise solutions floated in the spring of 1950. It
was also intended to confirm that the Vatican and American Catholics accepted nothing
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less than what was pledged in December 1949, despite chatter that a practical
compromise was acceptable in Roman Catholic circles. At Carroll‟s behest, Schaefer
distributed Berger‟s article to all the UN delegations as a reiteration of the Vatican‟s
stand.62
As the December General Assembly session drew nearer, however, American
Catholic optimism on securing a favourable Jerusalem resolution was clearly waning,
battered by a number of headwinds. The first of these was Israeli intransigence in
claiming the city for the new state, despite its indeterminate legal status. In September,
Schaefer noted the “fait accompli” attitude of Israeli delegates and officials at the UN,
who “assumed that Jerusalem will be, and for all practical purposes was, a part of
Israel.”63 Abba Eban, Israel‟s ambassador to the UN, confirmed Schaefer‟s sentiment in
the September issue of United Nations World, the body‟s semi-official journal.64 In it,
Eban outlined the inherent historic and moral righteousness of a Jewish Jerusalem, the
negation of which would be anti-democratic and against the wishes of the city‟s own
residents. The corpus separatum, which he charged was “conceived in disregard of the
wishes and interests of Jerusalem‟s population,” was “courageously discarded by the
Trusteeship Council and returned to the General Assembly unimplemented.” Eban
concluded that “democratic principles, which had a compulsion of their own, could least
of all be set aside in the city of Jerusalem, in which the ideal of government by consent is
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expressed in the daily practice of a proud and constructive national life.”65 That Eban‟s
notions were steadily garnering acceptance among UN delegates was, by September,
clear to leading figures in the NCWC.
A second headwind faced by the American Catholic lobby were the pointed
critiques of that lobby itself by figures in the American liberal and academic
establishment. The appearance of Paul Blanshard‟s American Freedom and Catholic
Power late in 1949 sparked a growing critique of the American Catholic political lobby,
and of the Vatican‟s attempts to shape Washington‟s policies through its American
faithful.66 In the book Blanshard, a lawyer and assistant editor of the left-leaning weekly
The Nation, asserted that the United States had a “Catholic problem” in that the American
Catholic Church represented “an undemocratic system of alien control.” The critiques
levelled by Blanshard appeared to pose a direct challenge to the growing political
stridency of the American bishops and various organs of the Church. Though the work
often barely concealed its nativist and anti-Catholic leanings, it received acclaim from a
number of leading liberal intellectuals, including John Dewey, Albert Einstein and
Bertrand Russell. Far from an obscure polemic, the work sold nearly 300,000 copies in its
first year, remaining on the New York Times bestseller list for seven months, making it, as
John T. McGreevy has noted, “one of the most unusual bestsellers of 1949-1950.”67
Though several leading Catholic figures, including John Courtney Murray, Robert C.
Hartnett and James M. O‟Neill, offered rebuttals to Blanshard‟s charges, none of these
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responses could undo the disrepute and sense of suspicion which had been draped over
American Catholic political activism.68
Blanshard‟s notions were buttressed later in 1950 by Pierre Van Paassen, a
journalist and Unitarian minister whose book Jerusalem Calling levelled specific charges
against the Vatican and the American Catholic lobby on the Holy City. 69 Apart from
surveying the history of Catholic anti-Semitism, Van Paassen “illuminate[d]” American
Catholicism‟s attempts to “subvert the triumph of Zionism through international political
activism.”70 He charged that “the struggle of Rome against Israel goes on, and will be
intensified as papal nuncios negotiate with Arab princes, and General Franco, to devise
ways and means to prevent the new community of Israel from assuming a position and
playing a role of importance in the international concert.”71 Van Paassen also claimed to
unveil the “machinations” of the American Catholic political lobby. “That the Vatican is
out to gain control of the Holy Places,” he charged,
...became evident during the debates on the internationalization of Jerusalem at
the UN, when Cardinal Spellman of New York, throwing all restraint to the wind,
telegraphed papal nuncios in various South American republics to insist to the
governments to which they are accredited that they must take an
uncompromising stand at Lake Success for the internationalization of the Holy
68
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City. Internationalization in these circumstances would have been implemented
by an international commission made up chiefly of Catholic South Americans,
probably with a Monsignor at the head.”72
Though a number of Van Paassen‟s claims bordered on the fantastical, Catherine
Schaefer warned the NCWC that the book would likely “stir up considerable antiCatholic sentiment, particularly among the Jews.73 The charge of official anti-Semitism
by the Church will be thrown around alot, I imagine. We should be prepared to meet the
attacks that will come.”74 American Catholic attempts to negate criticisms, however,
couldn‟t erase suspicions aroused by works such as Blanshard‟s and Van Paassen‟s.
The third headwind faced by American Catholic efforts to secure a Jerusalem
Statute amenable to the Vatican was the growing convergence between American Jews,
Protestants and liberals for a Jewish Jerusalem. It was a development which essentially
ranged Catholics against a majority of their fellow citizens on the corpus separatum,
underscoring the Roman inspiration of the American Catholic position. Added to this
convergence was Washington‟s growing desire for an “implementable” or “workable”
solution for Jerusalem, consistent with Truman‟s position as outlined to Spellman the
previous summer. The president‟s growing personal commitment to Israel and its
interests, moreover, also boded ill for Catholic interests. In October, in a confidential
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memorandum to the NCWC, Schaefer noted this confluence of forces ranged against
Vatican and American Catholic policy for Jerusalem. Chief among these oppositional
forces, she noted, was Washington‟s insistence on a compromise solution amenable to
Israel and Jordan, a policy which produced “the weak and vacillating positions of other
countries” on the Jerusalem question.75 She highlighted the domestic factor in
Washington‟s position, stating that “American policy on this question is undoubtedly
made at the White House- that is, it is strictly political in a domestic sense,” and noting
Truman‟s “responsiveness to the cohesive vote and pressure of five million Jews.”76
“This policy,” she continued, “is helped along by the constant lobbying of Israeli and
American Jews, and by the attitude of the (Protestant) World Council of Churches, and
by the press in the United States which constantly infers that the Vatican has changed its
point of view and is willing to „settle‟ for less than full internationalization.” To correct
this impression, she concluded to Carroll, “the first responsibility lies on Catholics in the
United States.”77
Schaefer‟s UN Office Orchestrates a Final Push
Schaefer‟s memo amounted to a call to action prior to the upcoming General
Assembly session, preparing the American Catholic lobby for yet another push to secure
the Vatican‟s positions at the UN. On 22 October, she suggested an immediate and
national program of action, given that the Jerusalem question was weeks away from
appearing on the General Assembly‟s agenda. To this end, she suggested a concentrated
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program of political and popular pressure by the American Catholic Church. Schaefer
continued to believe that pressure on Washington, which was a lynch-pin on the
Jerusalem question, could yield results if American Catholics mounted a concentrated
campaign. Even down to this late stage, she intimated that pressure on Washington and
the American delegation to the UN might yet bear fruit. “If, through United States
pressure Israel could still be made willing to yield that portion of the Jerusalem area it
now occupies, the task of persuading Jordan...to yield the Old City to international
control would be simplified.”78 To Schaefer, the key to exerting pressure on Israel was to
exert pressure on Washington, which exercised more financial and diplomatic clout in Tel
Aviv than any other power.
In terms of concrete plans, Schaefer urged a multi-pronged pressure campaign.
She recommended that organizations such as the National Council for Catholic Women
(NCCW) and the National Council for Catholic Men (NCCM) pass resolutions
demanding that the Truman administration defend the corpus separatum “as was
promised in the Democratic Party platform of 1948.”79 She suggested that such
resolutions “should be utilized on the local and state scale, as well as nationally, by
means of group and individual letter writing to political figures, newspapers, etc.” On
mobilizing parishioners, she lamented that “the Catholic public remains somewhat
ignorant of the Palestine problem and the problem of Jerusalem. Could there not be some
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sermons very soon in every diocese followed by prayers particularly for Jerusalem? The
question will come up in the General Assembly in two weeks. Time is of the essence.”80
Within days of Schaefer‟s call to action, and just weeks before the General
Assembly session to determine the fate of Jerusalem, the various organs of the American
Church again began to mobilize. The NCCW, at its annual convention in October,
produced a resolution again calling for the full internationalization of Jerusalem. The
statement demanded that the UN honour its pledge on the Holy City which had, until
then, been “flouted and ignored.”81 It urged the world body to implement its 1949
resolution “so that history may not accuse it of using its pledge to further special political
and territorial aims.” It specifically called on Washington to “respect not only the deep
convictions and desires which so many of its citizens hold in common with peoples
throughout the world, but also to respect the decisions and honour the UN and cooperate
actively in the UN to this end.”82 The NCCW, founded specifically to “give Catholic
women of the country a common voice and an instrument for collective action,” also
heeded Schaefer‟s call to write to local and state representatives to press for a favourable
resolution. On 6 November, copies of the NCCW resolution were forwarded to President
Truman, Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Warren Austin, head of the American
delegation at the UN.83 On the same day, the diocesan press reported on the urgent appeal
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of the Paris-based Comité de Sauvegarde des Lieux Saints (Committee for the
Safeguarding of the Holy Places) for the immediate implementation of the corpus
separatum, reportage intended to highlight the international scope of Catholic appeals for
Jerusalem.84 The next week, Schaefer ordered translations of the French statement made
for distribution to every delegation at the UN.85 In thanking Schaefer for her efforts, the
Committee‟s president, Comte de la Baume, assured her that the NCWC‟s efforts “were
in perfect harmony with the appeal of the Catholics of France.”86
The American bishops, through the coordination of the NCWC, also stepped up
their campaign in the fall of 1950. In October, the NCWC augmented its tack on
internationalization by demanding that any loan from Washington to Tel Aviv be
contingent upon Israel‟s acquiescence on the Jerusalem question. Based on information
from Alexander Mombelli, the NCWC‟s correspondent in Jerusalem, that the Israeli state
was “near bankruptcy”, and that the American government was about to release a “multimillion dollar loan” to Tel Aviv, the bishops demanded that “the UN‟s plan for
internationalization be a condition of American financial aid to the Israeli government.”87
The statement continued that “American Catholics do not want to be a party to an
agreement which would thwart their deep interests in safeguarding the holiest Christian
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sites.” On 11 October, the statement was forwarded to Truman and to the American
delegation at the UN.88
The American bishops also sought to raise the issue as widely as possible
throughout the dioceses as the General Assembly session drew near. In early November,
the NCWC ordered the immediate distribution of a memo, composed by Schaefer, to the
entire episcopate.89 The document outlined the history of the Jerusalem question at the
UN, emphasizing the Holy See‟s unchanged position on internationalization, and was
intended to serve as a template for sermons on the issue for the remaining Sundays of the
month. On 17 November, Domenico Tardini thanked Schaefer for her efforts, confident
that “the memo will serve to enlighten North American Catholics regarding the present
state of the question, and the grave motives for which the Holy See has pronounced itself
in favour of the true and proper internationalization of the City as the only means to save
Jerusalem and the Holy Places in the present violent conflict between Arabs and Jews.”90
This was augmented the same week by the translation and distribution, at the
behest of Chicago‟s Cardinal Samuel Stritch, of an Osservatore Romano editorial which
re-stated the Holy See‟s resolute position on the issue. Stritch wanted “the mind of the
Holy See to be known in as many quarters as possible”, and urged the bishops to forward
copies to all diocesan priests.91 He also requested that the NCWC “forward the piece to
the secular press at the earliest moment” in an effort to make known “the authentic
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position of the Vatican with regard to the internationalization of the Jerusalem area.”92 In
forwarding the editorial (which appeared in the Osservatore Romano on 29 November),
Carroll further urged “their Excellencies to use whatever resources available to them to
have the position of the Holy See widely and accurately understood.”93
At the UN, Schaefer was tasked with keeping the NCWC, and by extension the
Holy See, apprised of developments on the Jerusalem question. An off-the-record
conversation with John Ross, the American representative on the Ad Hoc political
committee that would consider the Jerusalem question, however, confirmed some of
Schaefer‟s longstanding apprehensions.94 Ross reiterated to Schaefer the notion that the
United States could only back a solution acceptable to Israel and Jordan. Though he
favoured a scheme that would protect Christian, Jewish and Muslim shrines, he asserted
that “it would be idle to think of any scheme of internationalization involving a corpus
separatum.” “That is absolutely out of the question,” he emphasized, adding that he “had
never trusted that scheme anyway” as it contained “that fancy Latin phrase.”95
Given the diminishing hope that the American delegation would back a Jerusalem
solution amenable to the Vatican and American Catholics, Schaefer attempted to
determine where pockets of support for the corpus separatum did lie. On 13 November,
she was informed by Iraq‟s Dr. Faizal Jamali that the Arab nations which had firmly
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backed the scheme in 1949 would remain in support. On the same day, Cuba‟s Francisco
Ichaso confirmed that the Latin American delegations which had supported the plan
remained firm in their support. He added, confidentially, that “even Uruguay, which had
campaigned violently against the resolution last year, would stand for territorial
internationalization this year.”96 Specifically, Ichaso assured Schaefer that the Holy See
could expect the support of Cuba, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, and El Salvador. Though
the Soviet-Arab-Catholic bloc that had delivered the corpus separatum in 1949 was no
longer, it appeared that core support among Arab and Catholic states remained firm. On
15 November, Schaefer apprised Carroll of these developments, which were forwarded to
the apostolic delegate the following day.97
On 7 December 1950, the General Assembly‟s Ad Hoc political committee began
its review of the Jerusalem question. Central to the committee‟s objective was to devise a
functioning agreement which reflected the realities in the city, and was acceptable to the
world community. In short order, Sweden‟s Erik Boheman introduced a Swedish-Dutch
proposal which amounted to a repudiation of the corpus separatum, proposing provisions
to “ensure the international protection of the spiritual and religious interests of the world
community.”98 In addition, it proposed a UN appointed commissioner to administer the
Holy Places, though one who would be under the authority of the Israeli and Jordanian
governments. In effect, the resolution amounted to a severe watering-down, if not recall,
of the December 1949 General Assembly resolution, and represented a rejection of the
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Vatican‟s designs for the city, which American Catholics had so faithfully advocated for
nearly three years.
In the desperate days leading to a vote, American Catholic efforts to secure a
corpus separatum reached a nadir. Catholic efforts in this crucial stretch were spurred
further by the submission, on 29 November, of a petition from over one thousand
American educators and Protestant seminary professors “instructing” the Truman
administration, and the American delegation at the UN, to “take the initiative in settling
the problem by international supervision of the Holy Places, leaving political sovereignty
in the hands of the Israeli and Jordanian governments.”99 In the same week, Schaefer
ordered the translation and distribution of a pro-internationalization statement of Italian
Catholic Action to UN delegations, both as a means of countering the „Protestant
statement‟ and of reiterating the Roman Catholic position on the question. She further
assured the association‟s president, Vittorio Veronese, that the statement would receive
“maximum exposure” in the American diocesan press, which carried the statement
widely during the week of 11 December.100 The statement, along with that of the French
Committee for the Safeguarding of the Holy Places, was also carried on NCWC radio
broadcasts in the first weeks of December, in a bid to emphasize the international
character of Roman Catholic demands for Jerusalem. In the same week Martin Work,
national secretary of the NCCM, forwarded his organization‟s petition to preserve the
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territorial internationalization of Jerusalem to Dean Acheson and Warren Austin.101 In
speaking for the “deepest interests and sentiment for the Holy Places shared by millions
of co-religionists in the United States,” the brief statement clearly, if implicitly, linked the
potential voting power of twenty million American Catholics with demands to preserve
the corpus separatum for Jerusalem.102
By 11 December, as the General Assembly entered the crucial week in deciding
the fate of Jerusalem, open disproval of the Swedish-Dutch resolution quickly emerged.
Arab and „Catholic‟ delegations, in particular, rightly regarded the plan as the death knell
of the December 1949 agreement. Lebanon‟s Dr. Charles Malik, who had carried the
torch for Catholic interests on the floor of the General Assembly in 1949, again
advocated for the preservation past resolutions on Jerusalem. On that Monday, Malik, at
the request of his delegation, made two interventions against the Swedish-Dutch
proposal, arguing that it essentially discarded the majority resolutions passed by the same
assembly in 1947, 1948 and 1949. He was refuted by Israel‟s Abba Eban, who urged
delegates to accept the Swedish-Dutch proposal lest “the opportunity for any form of
internationalization might pass.”103 The following day Malik, who had assured Schaefer
that he had a strategy “up his sleeve” for the General Assembly session, read into the
record a number of statements which Schaefer had previously distributed to delegates
through her office. These included the statements of the French Committee of the
Safeguarding of the Holy Places as well as the Osservatore Romano editorial of 29
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November.104 He further requested that the French statement be distributed as an official
document of the General Assembly. In addition, Malik read into the record the America
editorial of 17 June 1950 which had forcefully argued for a corpus separatum as the only
means to preserve peace and stability in the region. In stressing that “religious interests
had been overlooked in the political and national rivalries” in the city, he lamented the
resulting “uneasy peace prevailing in Jerusalem and the whole of Palestine.”105 Israel‟s
Eban, who had emerged as Malik‟s adversary in these final days, offered a stern rebuttal,
highlighting a multitude of Christian leaders who backed a “realistic approach” on
Jerusalem. Eban specifically read into the record a statement of the Greek Orthodox
Patriarch of Jerusalem, who favoured the Swedish-Dutch proposal, as well as the
American „Protestant statement‟ of 30 November, which represented Episcopal,
Methodist and Evangelical leaders.106 He stated that “those who were interested in
religious peace might well consider that [full internationalization] might well lead to
religious schism and division.” He further deemed Malik‟s position “wishful thinking,”
and unreflective of “a general shift of opinion since 1948 and 1949.” “Let it be forever
recorded that a practical solution (Sweden‟s) came before the General Assembly in 1950
and Israel gave it support,” he concluded. “Historians will regard it as a turning point in
history.”107
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Though the Swedish-Dutch resolution would, in short order, be relegated to the
dustbin of history, the debate surrounding it did produce a Belgian resolution that sought
to appease both supporters and detractors of the corpus separatum. Submitted on 12
December, the resolution called for the appointment of a four-person panel to consult
with Israel, Jordan and other interested parties to ascertain “the conditions of settlement
capable of ensuring the effective protection...of the Holy Places.”108 The committee was
to report its findings at the General Assembly‟s Sixth Session the following year.
Belgium also accepted, at the insistence of Malik and other members of the Lebanese
delegation, an amendment which urged the committee to keep in mind the UN‟s three
successive resolutions on Jerusalem (all of which preserved territorial
internationalization).Though the Belgian proposal didn‟t assure the survival of the corpus
separatum, it kept alive the possibility of its implementation at a later date, enough to
give it support from Catholic quarters. On 13 December, the Ad Hoc Political Committee
voted to adopt the Belgian proposal. As State Department files have revealed, Cardinal
Spellman again played a role in last minute negotiations, urging a number of delegations
to back the Belgian scheme, and “exerting a decisive influence against the Swedish draft
resolution.”109
The General Assembly voted on the Belgian resolution on 15 December. The
results of the vote, which failed to produce the two-thirds majority required for adoption,
revealed the entrenched clefts between those supporting and those opposing the corpus
separatum. In the end, a large clutch of South American states (Chile, Colombia,
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Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela) supported the proposal, evidence of the
persistence of the „Catholic bloc‟ on the Jerusalem question. France, which appeared noncommittal in the final days, also supported the Belgian proposal. Though the American
delegation voted against the resolution, Yossi Feintuch contends that the delegation‟s
position was strongly tempered by passions aroused by the question in the United States.
As a result, the American delegation was reluctant to overtly back any plan “on a matter
of such religious and emotional value,” fearing the domestic repercussions of any such
stand. Acheson himself instructed John Ross to make no efforts to persuade other
members to follow the American course “or to discourage a possible shift in the voting
for the Belgian resolution.”110 If American Catholic pressure had not succeeded in
securing American support for the Belgian proposal, it did appear to have dissuaded an
activist stand by the delegation in support of the Swedish-Dutch proposal. Given the clout
that the Americans wielded at the UN, such a clear stand might well have assured the
victory of the Swedish-Dutch plan, ending any hope of a future implementation of the
corpus separatum.
The defeat of the Belgian resolution produced a longstanding stalemate on the
Jerusalem question at the UN. It also, in effect, marked the end of the active Roman
Catholic lobby to secure territorial internationalization for the city. As Elihu Lauterpacht
has observed, after the December 1950 vote, “the question of Jerusalem was conspicuous
only by its absence from discussion at the UN.”111 The status quo appeared acceptable to
a majority of states if only because the corpus separatum had proved to be not practically
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implementable. As the deadlock dragged on, Israel moved to consolidate its official
presence in the city. Following the 1950 decision to make the Holy City its capital, Israel
announced plans to transfer its Foreign Ministry from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in May
1952. In July, an Israeli spokesman confirmed Tel Aviv‟s designs for the city, stating that
Jerusalem “was, is and always will be the capital of Israel,” calling the corpus separatum
“impractical and unrealistic” and, for all intents and purposes, a “dead issue.”112 In
November, upon the death of President Chaim Weizmann, the official residence of the
President was also moved to Jerusalem, prompting Prime Minister Ben-Gurion to declare
that “the status of Jerusalem now remains as settled as that of Rome or London.”113 Rapid
Israeli moves to consolidate an official presence in Jerusalem, noted a disconsolate
Schaefer, “appeared to put internationalization further off than ever.”114 In the winter of
1952, she also noted to Carroll that she was witnessing “the very death throes” of
internationalization at the UN.115
Though the Vatican remained resolved to establishing an international Jerusalem,
and the American bishops never relinquished their role as the primary advocates of such a
policy, it was clear that by the winter of 1952-1953 that the issue had reached a
deadening stalemate. Washington‟s acceptance of the status quo in Jerusalem, where
Israel and Jordan had established a firm presence, dealt a fatal blow to any reversion to
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the November 1947 resolution. American support for the status quo, moreover, weakened
the support of other states previously committed to corpus separatum. The Philippines,
Mexico and Colombia, to name a few, appeared more anxious to stay onside with
Washington as the Cold War congealed than to gain the good graces of the Vatican.
Although a clutch of Arab states remained committed to the idea, they were increasingly
“more interested in the repatriation of refugees than in the internationalization question,”
as Schaefer reported in October 1952.116
For the remainder of the decade, the NCWC resigned itself to defending the rights
of Roman Catholic access to Holy Sites in the territory. One of its more notable victories
concerned the Carmelite Monastery in Haifa, which had been seized and occupied by the
Israeli navy since 1951. Following “repeated rude rebuffs by the Israelis to the local
superior,” the NCWC‟s Legal Department took up the case in 1958 on behalf of the
Vatican. Several months of intense negotiations, both with the State Department and with
the Israeli government, yielded the withdrawal of the naval offices and an
indemnification paid to the Carmelite Order.117 It was a small victory in a decade of
rebuffs for the Vatican and the American Church.
McMahon continued until 1955 to work tirelessly in directing the significant
financial and material aid collected by the CNEWA, which a November 1956 estimate
placed at twenty-six million dollars in cash, goods and services since 1948. “More than
half of the money,” the report noted, “was donated by American Catholics.” After 1951,
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however, the deadlock at the UN rendered his efforts on internationalization largely
irrelevant. In late 1953, he compared the Vatican‟s feelings towards Israel‟s intransigence
on Jerusalem to those of “a man looking into the window of his home to be told by
intruders that he could have any compensation except the right of possession.”118 It was a
prophetic observation that revealed both the failure of the Vatican and the American
Church to extract even their minimum demands on Palestine, as well as the enduring
frictions between the new state and its oldest adversary, tensions which would decades
yet to abate.
Conclusion
The publication of Robert F. Drinan S.J.‟s Honor the Promise: America’s
Commitment to Israel in 1977 was emblematic of the sea-change in American Catholic
attitudes towards Zionism and the state of Israel in the decades after the intense struggle
for Jerusalem wound down in the mid 1950s.119 The weight of Christian responsibility
and guilt for the Holocaust, contended Drinan, necessitated a new understanding between
Christians and Jews, and a reparation that was “moral and material.” This reparation,
however, should not be motivated by feelings of guilt since this alone “would be an
unhelpful basis for Christian-Jewish understanding.” What was first required of all
Christians, Drinan urged, “was a recognition of the righteousness of Zionism as the basis
for the Jewish democratic state.”120 The Jesuit priest, Georgetown law professor and
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congressman had, in fact, been expressing such notions publically for over a decade. On
the need for Roman Catholic acceptance of Zionism, he was unequivocal.
There is no doubt that Zionism as the basis for the establishment of a nation is
unique in the annals of mankind. But so is the whole history of the Jewish people.
Consequently, it is improper to adopt a procrustean attitude to insist that Israel
conform to the usual model of a contemporary state...From the beginning,
Judaism was conceived as the interlinking of a people, a Torah, a land. The
Hebrew Scriptures, medieval and modern Jewish literature, the Talmud, and the
Jewish liturgy is replete with the idea of a return to Zion...Zionism and Judaism
have always been integral parts of each other. Since the Holocaust and the
founding of Israel the inseparability of Judaism and Zionism has never been
clearer.121
Though Drinan did not speak for the Vatican or for the American Episcopate on
the issue, the lack of public rebuke from either body did signal the demise of the activist
and near-monolithic Roman Catholic trans-nationalism that had characterized earlier
periods. By the 1970s, it was evident that the ideological solidarity that had made the
American Catholic Church such a valuable ally to Rome in the struggle for Palestine had
run its course. Though many American bishops continued to adhere to the Vatican line on
Israel and the Jerusalem question, the consensus of previous decades had been replaced
by a plurality of nuanced views, which included outright support for Zionism and for the
state of Israel.
The American Episcopal consensus that remained intact from the 1920s to the
1950s was weakened in subsequent decades by a number of factors, not least the Second
Vatican Council (1962-1965), the great renewal movement in the Roman Catholic
Church that was called by Pope John XIII in 1959. A number of American bishops took
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active roles at the Council, embracing its reformist zeal as evidenced by the promulgation
of Dignitatis Humanae, a declaration on religious freedom conceived by John Courtney
Murray and tabled by Archbishops Albert Meyer of Chicago and Joseph Ritter of St.
Louis. Though Cardinal Spellman loomed large at the Council, and was undoubtedly the
leader of the „conservative‟ faction of American bishops, there emerged in Rome a
growing faction of liberal-minded bishops, which included Meyer and Ritter as well as
Detroit‟s John Dearden and Kansas City‟s John Patrick Cody, who more openly took up
the Council‟s mandate of revival and renewal. The post-Conciliar period, in fact, revealed
a growing divide among „conservative‟ and „liberal‟ bishops in the United States on
issues such as the Vietnam War, disarmament, contraception and the role of women in
the Church. The near-monolithic American Church of the pre-Conciliar period had, by
the late 1960s, given way to a plurality of views on a number of questions relevant to the
Vatican and the international Roman Catholic Church, including, as Drinan‟s work
reveals, on Israel and Zionism.
The Second Vatican Council was also significant, moreover, for the promulgation
of Nostra Aetate, a declaration on the relationship of the Roman Catholic Church with
non-Christian religions. Notable was the fourth section, which dealt specifically with
Judaism. It repudiated the centuries-old charge of deicide against the Jews, and stressed
the religious and spiritual bonds shared by the faiths, reaffirming the eternal covenant
between God and the people of Israel. It further dismissed the Catholic objective of trying
to convert the Jews, a symbolic turning point if juxtaposed with Pope Pius X‟s 1904
warning to Theodor Herzl that should the Jews return to Palestine, there would be
“Catholic priests waiting there to baptize them all.” For the first time in history, Nostra
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Aetate called for Catholics and Jews to engage in friendly dialogue and theological
discussion to better understand each other‟s faiths. After intense debate, the declaration
was adopted by the world‟s cardinals and bishops on 28 November 1965, a definitive
turning point in the history of Catholic-Jewish relations. The conceptual underpinnings of
Drinan‟s work in the 1970s, and the Vatican‟s diplomatic recognition of the state of Israel
in 1993, could definitively be traced back to the seminal shift in Catholic-Jewish relations
initiated by Nostra Aetate.
For nearly three decades between the 1920s and the 1950s, however, the Vatican
could faithfully rely on the American Catholic Church, and particularly its bishops, to
transmit uniquely Roman Catholic ideologies and policies to the most powerful nation in
the world. As Peter D‟Agostino has skilfully demonstrated, this Roman Catholic transnationalism manifested itself in the 1920s in the attitudes and opinions of American
Catholics on the Roman Question (where American Catholics supported the creation of a
sovereign territory for the papacy in Italy), and on Mussolini‟s Fascist regime, when
many Catholics, particularly Italian-Americans, expressed open sympathy. Mussolini‟s
success is resolving the „Roman Question‟ by granting the papacy sovereignty in the
Vatican City in 1929 only increased his allure in American Catholic circles. In the 1930s,
this trans-national relationship between the papacy and American Catholics congealed
into a defined political lobby, when the American bishops, organized through the
National Catholic Welfare Conference (NCWC), represented papal interests vis-à-vis
Washington on Mexican anticlericalism, the Italo-Ethiopian War and the Spanish Civil
War. As in the case of American Catholic sympathy for Mussolini and Italian Fascism,
these positions created frictions with non-Catholics, and clearly delineated the Roman
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sources of American Catholic policy. Also emerging in the 1930s was a rising chorus of
American Catholic opposition to political Zionism, another position that appeared to take
its inspiration directly from Rome, and which placed Catholics at odds with their Jewish
fellow citizens.
The growing political stridency of the American bishops, as outlined in chapter
one, was girded by a number of factors in the interwar decades. The organization of a
bishops conference in 1920, the NCWC, undoubtedly provided an organizational nervecentre through which the episcopate could more concertedly, and forcefully, express a
collective political will. The exponential growth of the Church, owing to migration and
high birthrates, particularly in the northeast, facilitated a rapid institutional expansion in
the interwar years, when Catholic schools, hospitals and colleges, not to mention new
parishes, were built to accommodate this burgeoning population. The genuinely warm
relationship between President Roosevelt and leading American bishops was further
evidence of the growing clout of American Catholics. The Vatican, on its part, was
clearly cognizant of the growing power of the American Church, and from the early
1920s on sought to strengthen its ties with the American episcopate. In addition to its
growing political influence, the Vatican was aware of the significant financial clout of the
American Church, as evidence by the vast sums raised in the United States for the Papal
Relief Mission to Moscow between 1922 and 1924. The ceding of perpetual control over
the CNEWA to the Archbishop of New York in 1931 can directly be traced to the
fundraising capacity of American Catholics. Roosevelt‟s appointment of Myron Taylor as
his „personal representative‟ to the Holy See on the eve of the Second World War
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appeared to cement the informal, yet ideologically cohesive, tripartite alliance of the
Vatican, American Catholics and Washington.
Upon the American entry into the war in 1941, American Catholics heeded the
call to duty issued by the bishops, who had abandoned isolationist leanings to wholly
endorse the war effort. The course of the war, however, revealed the extent to which the
bishops continued to “toe the Roman line,” actively in their protests of the allied bombing
of Rome, and passively in their adherence to the established Vatican position on Zionism.
Both from the Vatican and from the various organs of the American Catholic Church
there emerged a distinctly dual response to the tragedy of Europe‟s Jews. On the one
hand, expressions of sympathy for the Jewish plight were expressed both by Rome and
the American bishops. American Catholics, in fact, expressed their revulsion at the Nazi
persecution of Jews in particularly poignant and clear language, surpassing the Vatican‟s
restrained expressions of sympathy and solidarity. On the substantive question of Jewish
emigration to Palestine, and the creation of a Hebrew national home there, however, the
American bishops remained resolutely in line with Rome. It was a policy that withstood
the full airing of the tragedy of the Holocaust, and which stood firm against the rising tide
of sympathy for Zionism in the United States, not just among Jews but among a growing
segment of American Protestant Churches, Congress and even the Truman White House.
Open expressions of sympathy for Zionism from the American bishops, in contrast, were
virtually non-existent. When nonconformity did surface, as the case of New Orleans‟
Archbishop Joseph Rummel illustrated, it was quickly suppressed, further evidence of the
unanimity the Vatican expected from the American episcopate.
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In the postwar years, as the Palestine question reached its most crucial phase, the
American bishops adhered staunchly to papal opposition to the creation of a Jewish home
in the Holy Land. At the root of this stance continued to lay an ancestral Roman Catholic
refusal to yield the territory of Christ‟s birth, life and death to a faith and a people that it
continued to hold responsible for deicide, an idea expressed clearly and consistently by
American Catholic leaders after 1945. Catholic leaders in the United States, in fact,
emerged as committed opponents of Zionism in an atmosphere of rising sympathy for
that very cause. On this question the bishops, the diocesan press, independent Catholic
journals, religious orders and a range of lay Catholic organizations exhibited a
remarkable consensus, evidence of a resilient position on the Palestine question that
clearly took its inspiration from the Vatican. The dearth of dissenting voices in the
American Catholic Church only underscored the monolithic unanimity of American
Catholic attitudes.
In this study, I have argued that not only did the various organs of the American
Catholic Church support the papal position on Palestine, but also that Catholic leaders in
the United States emerged as the primary advocates of this Vatican policy in the first
decade of the Cold War. A number of factors placed American Catholics at the forefront
of this Roman Catholic transnational lobby attempting to shape developments on the
Holy Land. The withering of the British mandate for the territory after 1945, and the
passing of the question to the UN made the United States the hub of the debate on the
future of Palestine. The close ties of leading American bishops to the American
government, the Vatican surmised, endowed them with a unique ability to transmit papal
policy to the most powerful capital in the world. As both patriotic Americans and loyal
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Roman Catholics, these figures brought a distinctive pressure to bear on Washington.
Ideological affinities between Washington and the Vatican in the early postwar years,
moreover, also raised hopes that the efforts of the American bishops on Palestine would
bear fruit. Transnational Catholic unanimity on the Palestine question, of course, girded
this international Catholic lobby led by the American Church.
That this transnational lobby was unable, ultimately, to secure its demands spoke
volumes on the limits of Vatican diplomacy in the early Cold War. Despite musings on
the nefarious politicking of the Vatican and its international bishops by polemicists such
as Paul Blanshard, Pierre Van Paassen and Avro Manhattan, the Roman Catholic lobby
was not able to claim any definitive victories on Palestine. From a policy of opposing the
very creation of a Jewish state in the Holy Land, to strenuously advocating for an
internationalized zone encompassing Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Nazareth, to finally
demanding the working establishment of a circumscribed corpus separatum for
Jerusalem‟s „Old City‟, Roman Catholic labours came to naught. Several factors militated
against these efforts. The Vatican and American Catholic were met by a well-orchestrated
and funded American Zionist lobby, which gradually gained the support of a number of
mainstream Protestant Churches. The Holocaust itself, though not altering the Vatican‟s
position, had also created a compelling logic for a Jewish state, and a significant
groundswell of public support for Zionism among non-Catholics. Even Vatican demands
for a functioning internationalization of Jerusalem, promised by three successive UN
resolutions, met the reticence of the Truman administration. American troops needed to
secure the city, along with the funds required to maintain such a force, was enough to
give Truman and the American delegation to the UN pause. Finally, the fickle support of
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a number of majority-Catholic states at the UN, eager to remain onside with the United
States on Israel, ultimately stalled the creation of a corpus separatum for Jerusalem.
The American Catholic lobby on Palestine could, in retrospect, be credited with
some modest victories. As this study has outlined, and as recent research by Uri Bialer
has corroborated, the nascent Israeli state did consider the Vatican‟s efforts, and
particularly the American Catholic lobby, as threatening to its interests. As a result,
Israeli policymakers tried earnestly to forge a Jerusalem solution acceptable to the
Vatican. Tel Aviv also encouraged, and funded, an American Zionist counter-lobby to
blunt criticisms of Israel in the American diocesan press, which were considered
detrimental to its reputation at the UN. Intense American Catholic lobbying also shaped
the guarded and prudent Jerusalem policy of Warren Austin and the American delegation
to the UN. Though Austin‟s delegation never cast a vote in favour of territorial
internationalization, it was instructed not to counsel other delegations on the question, or
to trumpet its policy too loudly. The divisiveness of the question in the United States,
documents reveal, was at the root of this circumspection. Vocal disproval of the scheme
from Austin might have sunk the corpus separatum much sooner, but intense Catholic
lobbying managed to make the question politically volatile for Truman. As a result of
American discretion, then, the Jerusalem question remained theoretically „in play‟ at the
UN into the 1950‟s.
In the final analysis, however, it was, as Peter C. Kent has suggested, a “lonely
Cold War” for the Vatican and the international Roman Catholic Church, as the case of
Palestine illustrated. Though the transnational consensus on the Holy Land between
Rome and its American Church remained firm, the American bishops and the various
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organs of the American Catholic Church could not even secure the most modest of the
Vatican‟s demands. The ideological transnationalism observed by Peter D‟Agostino on
the Roman Question and Italian Fascism remained vigorous through the first decade of
the Cold War, as the robust American Catholic lobby on Palestine attested. It was,
however, to be the last stand of such a monolithic Catholic lobby. The Second Vatican
Council, and its promulgation of Nostra Aetate, would herald the beginning of a new era
both in relations between Catholicism and Judaism and, by extension, between the
Vatican and Israel. The Council, moreover, would unleash a plurality of views in the
Church that would preclude the survival of such a monolithic transnationalism.
Consensus on issues such as disarmament, peace, and ecumenism only served to draw the
Vatican and international Roman Catholics closer to faith groups, including Jews and
Protestants, who sought similar ends.
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